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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses organized crime in post-Soviet Eurasia (Georgia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan) exploring the nexus between politics, business and crime. Based on extensive
field research in the three countries the dissertation examines organized crime groups in the
region and describes their inter-relationships with political and business elites, then discusses
the impact of the three countries’ Coloured Revolutions on crime and corruption. The
impacts of the revolutions on organized crime are situated in several variables, among them
political opposition to incumbent regimes; the strength of civil society and the role of
organized crime groups during the revolutionary processes; personal morals of the leaders
and their views on cooperation with organized crime; and the presence and nature of the
“pact” between outgoing and incoming elites.
The dissertation also takes into account larger explanatory variables, such as
geography, natural resources, industry, and regional wars and documents their role in shaping
organized crime. In accounting for the diverging patterns of the three countries in terms of
post-revolutionary effects on crime and corruption, the role of the West, defined as a “push”
factor for democratization, and the experience of earlier statehood are also considered.
The interaction between elites and criminals is regarded as a crucial part of state
formation, and is characterized by shifting dominance between the actors of the underworld
and upperworld. The thesis identifies points of cooperation and conflict between licit and
illicit actors, and provides insight into the collusive nature of criminal networks in the post-
Soviet context, arguing that the distinction between licit and illicit is frequently blurred and
the representatives of the upperworld are sometimes key participants in organized criminal
activity.
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1Chapter 1. Introduction
The so-called “coloured revolutions” in post-Soviet Eurasia (the Rose Revolution in
Georgia, 2003; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004; the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan,
2005) have engendered much international debate regarding their nature as “democratic
processes.”1 However, the term “revolution” has yet to be defined with precision, and
conclusions have yet to be drawn about whether these events were “democratic” and resulted
in a radical break with the past.
All three “revolutions” followed allegations on rigged elections that had caused great
popular discontent with the ruling regimes. Furthermore, all three involved active youth
groups (“Pora” in Ukraine, “Kmara” in Georgia and “Kelkel” in Kyrgyzstan), and resulted in
some elite changeover. However, implications of the “revolutions” for organized crime and
corruption in the three countries have been different, even though all three were considered
anti-corruption and anti-crime statements of mass frustration with rampant elite corruption,
clan structures and deeply-rooted connections to organized crime.
The new political leaders in the three countries (Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia,
Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Kurmanbek Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan) had reputations as
honest, democratic and clean politicians and the very idea of the revolution presumed that
their governments should combat corruption and crime. However, outcomes varied. In
Georgia, the new authorities took decisive steps to fight organized criminality, with regime
transition resulting in successful investigation of native criminal networks at home and
abroad.
In Kyrgyzstan, corruption and political violence skyrocketed after the “Tulip
Revolution” in 2005, and the state remained weak. Several MPs and influential criminal
leaders were assassinated after the revolution in rivalry for the leadership of crime groups and
newly available state resources. Organized crime bosses began to dictate their will to
politicians; criminal figures have even organized mass protests demanding the resignation of
Prime Minister Feliks Kulov, oblidging him to step down in December 2006.
After the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, Ukraine’s political scene was marred by
infighting between political factions, resulting in frequent changes of government which
limited the depth and duration of reform efforts. Corruption and politically-connected
criminal networks remain a national scourge.
1 Hale (2006), Chaulia (2006), Pejic (2008), Melnykovska (2008), Kutbettin (2010).
2In this thesis, I endeavour to explain the variations among the three country cases, by
concentrating on the political-business-criminal nexus of organized crime, and discussing the
impact of the three revolutions on this nexus. One crucial question I investigate concerns
whether factors in a post-revolutionary environment which either sustain or undermine
organized criminal activity. Why, for instance, has organized crime increased in post-
revolutionary Kyrgyzstan, while the reverse occurred in Georgia? Regarding Ukraine, I
attempt to explain the relative stability of its underworld. Finally, I examine how criminal
networks have adapted to post-revolutionary settings.
In the course of addressing these questions, I make the case that post-revolution,
Georgia moved from being a state dominated by professional organized crime, to a type of
police state. The elite in Georgia’s post-revolutionary period did cut organized crime links,
but greater funding for law enforcement structures had both the positive effect of more
efficient policing, and the negative one of excessive power for the police and secret services
and the consequent “authoritarianization” of the ruling regime. Since anti-government
demonstrations in November 2007 weakened the regime, political-criminal links have re-
emerged, albeit with less clout.
Following its initial post-revolutionary violent and criminal upheaval, Kyrgyzstan is
now following the Georgian trajectory. Incoming elites have now mobilized licit and illicit
resources, revitalized the latent pyramid schemes of corruption, and reasserted themselves
over criminal leaders. Following the assassination of two of the most influential underworld
leaders, the new regime and ruling family are consolidating their power, but the Kyrgyz state
is still weak. With the state-crime nexus still in place, and judging from the effectiveness of
anti-corruption, anti-crime campaigns in 2005-2008, the “Tulip Revolution” failed.
By the same terms, the Orange Revolution also failed. One of Ukraine’s greatest
impediments to reform is the presence of “spoilers,” or powerful holdovers from the previous
regime who derail anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts. While the slogan of “sending the
bandits to prison” was heard often during the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians now smile
ironically at how “committed” to reform the incoming elites turned out. Ukrainian corruption
and crime rates, which dipped just after the “Orange Revolution,” have since returned to pre-
revolutionary levels.
The dissertation determines a collection of variables indicating a relationship between
political transitions or revolutions, and a growth or decrease in organized crime. Several
factors can sustain or hinder organized crime in a “post-revolutionary” setting. They include
the strength of political opposition to the ruling regime during the revolution; the role in the
3revolution of organized crime groups; the influence of pre-revolutionary incumbents after the
revolution; the intermingling of politics with business; the post-revolution stability of the
political scene; the extent of state intervention in the re-privatization process and re-
distribution of the spoils; the extent of corruption and the presence of “political will” to fight
it; and the efficiency of policing and the criminal justice system.
The thesis also stresses revolution-based social and political conditions which may
affect organized crime, such as the establishment or collapse of the rule of law (the country’s
independent legal system and professional law enforcement agencies) or the presence of
independent, credible media.2 I also trace the historical and political roots and context of the
transitions, since criminal dynamics in the three countries pre-date the most recent political
transition or “revolution.”3 Soviet legacies are similar for the three countries that adds to the
puzzle of diverging patterns in post-revolutionary period. From a historical viewpoint, I
examine how the past influenced current forms of organized crime, and what constraints or
other changes for organized crime the revolutions might have prompted.
1. Defining state, regime, revolution and transition
Other countries provide analogies for the post-“Coloured revolution” developments in
organized crime, in particular in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South Africa. Coloured
Revolutions, though, had far greater impact on crime and political corruption than, for
instance, the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, where mass dissatisfaction with
corruption and crime was not as pertinent. By contrast, the Coloured Revolutions are known
as “anti-corruption movements” or “anti-crime revolutions,”4 sparked by a popular rejection
of rampant corruption, clan structures and deeply-rooted organized crime, in line with the
Giraldo and Trinkunas model.5
The theme of “sending bandits to prison” set the tone for Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution, which was presumed to have dealt crime and corruption a major blow. The
implicit contract between the masses and elites crafted during the public uprising was the
source of legitimacy for the new regime, which was supposed to eliminate elite rent-seeking.
The fight against corruption was expected by the citizens as a political good deliverable by
2 Moran (2001, p. 380).
3 Lotspeich (1995, p. 6).
4 On the Rose Revolution see for instance Shelley and Scot (2003); Nodia (2005, p. 99); Kandelaki (2006, p. 3).
Regarding the Orange Revolution: Yuryi Lutsenko repeated several times that it was primarily an anti-criminal
revolution, see for instance Lutsenko quoted in Kuzio (2006); Kuzio(2008). On the Tulip Revolution, see
Aslund (2005a); Radnitz (2006, p. 141).
5 Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007, pp. 347, 346-367).
4the new state, a guarantee of the new “social contract between ruler and ruled.” 6 These
expectations did not all materialize. In Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan there has been only modest
institutional change, and some of it has arguably been negative.7
Public attitudes toward the three revolutions also differ. Most of the respondents
interviewed in Kyrgyzstan judged the events of March 2005 to be a coup d’état rather than a
revolution,8 since no major and lasting changes were observed afterward, only a replacement
of Akaev’s elites with new ones.9 The “Tulip Revolution” can be best understood as a battle
between the pro-Akaev regional clan and family groups, which constituted the political and
economic elite, and other groups that felt deprived of their share of political and economic
power.10
Experts also differ on the nature of the Georgian “Rose Revolution”: some from the
legal field argue it was a coup d’état;11 however, unlike in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, in
Georgia some quite successful reforms and significant transformations in public life have
taken place. Police reform was among the most successful ones,12 but the authorities’
treatment of the public upring in November 2007 and police’s role had some negative impact
on public perception of Georgian police.
Opinions also differ in Ukraine: people from the more pro-Russian eastern Ukraine
argue that the Orange Revolution was a coup d’état, in contrast to the western Ukrainians’
view. It is widely agreed that the Orange Revolution was a unique event changing the course
of Ukrainian politics, and details are supplied in the chapter on revolutions below.
While there is no agreement across the three countries about the nature of the
“Coloured Revolutions,” we can conclude based on the argument that follow, that the events
were in fact “real revolutions.” As I mentioned, all three countries did undergo revolutions,
but the implications of these events for crime and corruption differ.
Definitions of “revolution” can be divided into two categories: first, classical or
maximalist as in the work of Theda Skocpol and Anthony Giddens, and second, minimalist as
defined by Charles Tilly. Skocpol’s definition includes rapid transformation in the state’s
fabric and class-based revolt,13 and Giddens emphasizes violent means and stresses that
6 Rotberg (2004, pp. 2-3).
7 On Ukraine see D’Anieri (2005,p. 25); On Kyrgyzstan see Koichumanov, Otorbayev, Starr, (2005).
8 Author’s field research in Kyrgyzstan, March-May 2007.
9 Blank (2006); Author’s field research in Kyrgyzstan, March-May 2007.
10 Nichol (2005).
11 See for instance Esadze (2007).
12 Kupatadze (2007b).
13 Skocpol (1979, p. 4).
5major reforms will follow the revolution.14 Later, Paige formulated another definition
according to which “a revolution is a rapid and fundamental transformation in the categories
of social life and consciousness, [these categories’] metaphysical assumptions, and the power
relations in which they are expressed as a result of widespread popular acceptance of a
utopian alternative to the current social order.”15 None of these definitions is fully applicable
to the events under study. First, few “lasting” and “fundamental” changes can be observed in
all three countries; second, in general, all three events were violence-free; third, the
revolutions had no distinct social class identity. In general, these were popular revolts,
encompassing many layers of society. Some of these characteristics fit Jeff Goodwin’s
anticipation of future revolutions as not necessarily violent, and consisting of “mass
movement for social justice.”16
Of all the literature, Charles Tilly’s approach best reflects the type of revolution under
study. Tilly writes that revolution is a “forcible transfer of power over a state” where “two or
more blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state,” and each bloc
receives some popular support.17 Tilly’s definition applies to all three Coloured Revolutions.
The political opposition in all three countries, enjoying the support of part of the population,
challenged incumbent regimes. The transfer of power, although largely non-violent, was still
forcible as none of the incumbent Presidents surrendered immediately or voluntarily and even
threatened to use force.
Tilly continues that revolution combines a “revolutionary situation” with a
“revolutionary outcome,” where in addition to the above, there is “incapacity or
unwillingness of [incumbent] rulers to suppress the alternative coalition” and/or its popular
support.18 Concerning the inability of incumbents to counteract the revolution, the three
presidents might have threatened the use of force against the demonstrations, but were not
able to enact the threat because of their weakened grasp on power and the presence of many
stakeholders who would not endorse violence. Alternatively, the incumbents might have
feared civil war or been too weak already to direct the security apparatus to use force.19
Tilly elaborates on revolutionary outcomes, stating they might include defections of
regime members; acquisition of armed force by revolutionary coalitions; neutralization or
defection of the regime’s armed forces; and acquisition of control over the state apparatus by
14 Giddens (1989, p. 605).
15 Paige (2003, p. 24).
16 Goodwin (2003, pp. 59-72).
17 Tilly (2006, p. 159).
18 Ibid.
19 Mitchell (2004, p. 348).
6the revolutionaries.20 In all three of our case studies, intelligence and law enforcement bodies
cooperated with the political opposition. In Georgia, a number of military and police
detachments declared loyalty to the opposition.21 In Ukraine, high-ranking officers of the
special services addressed the crowd at the central revolutionary gathering place, Maidan
Square, indicating security appartus support for the peaceful protests of the “Orange camp.”22
In Kyrgyzstan, the Minister of the Interior went to talk to opposition leaders.23 President
Akaev subsequently alleged collusion between his security forces and the opposition.24
Thus, Coloured Revolutions were “true revolutions” according to Tilly’s definition,
but they did not lead to fundamental transformations of state and social fabric, as did, for
instance, the French and Bolshevik revolutions. Rather, they resulted in continued transitions
which produced an “interval between one political regime and another,” according to the
transitologist definition.25 This thesis treats the events in the three countries as regime
transitions, and not as transitions from authoritarian rule to another form, like democracy. I
also leave open the definition of the ultimate outcome of these regime changes. Lincoln
Mitchell writes that the Georgian revolution was directed “away from the Soviet system,” a
description that applies broadly to all three states.26
The term “regime,” for our purposes, refers to the formal and informal organization of
political power, and to its relations with society. A regime determines who has political
power, and how those in power deal with those who are not.27 The relevant rules may be
formally codified in constitutions, or they may be informal, embodying customs and habits.28
We distinguish between state, regime and government. Ayubi elaborates that “regimes are
more permanent forms of political organization than governments, but typically less
permanent than the state, which by contrast is a more permanent structure of domination and
coordination with a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract
resources from it.”29 In Calvert’s work, “a regime is a government or sequence of
governments in which power remains in the same hands.”30 Several scholars argue that the
20 Ibid.
21 Kandelaki (2006, p. 3); Katz (2006, p. 165).
22 Chivers (2005).
23 Author’s interview with Kelkel activist, March 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
24 RFE/RL Newsline (July 12, 2005).
25 Mainwaring (1992, p. 295).
26 Mitchell (2007).
27 Fishman (1990, p. 428).
28 Bratton and De Walle (1997, p. 9).
29 Ayubi (2001, p. 31).
30 Calvert (1987, p. 18).
7distinction between state, regime and government is clearest in developed Western
democracies.31
This thesis draws upon the definition of a state as a “process of interaction of
groupings.”32 Migdal sees states as “fields of power marked by the use and threat of violence
and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization representing people
bounded by a territory, and (2) the organization’s actual practices.”33 For Migdal, power
denotes a struggle for domination, and states are “the practices of a heap of loosely connected
parts with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the
official state borders.”34 One can include organized crime groups among those vying for
power and domination.
According to Tilly, domination is defined by coercion that is the “application,
threatened or actual, of action that causes loss or damage to individuals or groups who are
aware of the action and the potential damage.”35 Elites might monopolize the means of
coercion, or it could be contested among several rival groups, especially during regime
transitions.
To elaborate the distinction between a state and a ruling regime, the latter is the clique
in power, perhaps including relatives and friends of high-ranking officials, which formally or
informally controls the key state institutions, including tax collection and law enforcement.
This clique has access to political power and the state’s coercive apparatus, which it often
uses for private rather than public interests. In Tilly’s terms, a ruling regime is government
powerholders who use state “information, resources and coercive means to their own
profit.”36 This distinction between regime and state is essential to my argument in this thesis
that the strengthening of the ruling regime does not guarantee a stronger state. In fact, a
ruling regime can be regarded as only one of the groups competing for power over the state,
according to Migdal, rivaling others like organized crime groups and ruling cliques. State
formation includes some resolution of who monopolizes violence and provides protection,
often bringing organized crime and government into contact, according to Tilly in “War
Making and State Making as Organized Crime.”37
31 Ayubi (2001, p. 31) and Lawson (1993, p. 187).
32 Migdal (2001, p. 23), emphasis is original.
33 Ibid., p. 16.
34 Ibid., p. 22.
35 Tilly (1990, p. 19).
36 Tilly (2006, p. 8).
37 Tilly (1985, pp. 169-191).
8Returning to regimes, the developments after revolutions are sometimes termed
regime transitions. These transitions involve changes in the regime’s “rules and decision-
making procedures”38 rather than regime change that “involves alteration of norms and
principles.”39 Importantly, regime transition, which is part of the state making process, can be
depicted as “a struggle between competing political forces” to set the “rules of the political
game” and for the game’s “resources.”40
I maintain a clear distinction between the “first transition” that happened after the
break-up of the Soviet Union, and the “second transition,” a result of the Coloured
Revolutions. The first transitions were dual, or both political (from totalitarian to
authoritarian or quasi-democratic) and economic (from a planned to a market economy).
Second transitions were single, or only political. Both transition types have affected
organized crime, whose development corresponded with the economic upheaval of the early
1990s.
Transitologists differentiate between a first and second transition; the first implies a
transition from authoritarian rule, and the second, a transition to the consolidation of
democracy.41 It is slippery to apply strict definitions to the regime types that existed in our
target countries before the “revolutions.” All three regimes were meeting basic requirements
of democracy; however, the country’s elections were constantly rigged, freedom of speech
and human rights violated, and political opposition harassed. According to Roeder, of fifteen
post-Soviet successor states, fewer than half could be categorized unambiguously as
democracies in late 1990s.42 Instead, they feature other traits, such as those of “competitive
authoritarianism,”43 or those of O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy” in their erratic patterns
of policy making, weak institutionalization and strong, though unaccountable, executives or
presidents. Such states are vulnerable to “second transitions,”44 similar to what happened in
the countries under study, where it is unclear if democracy will be the end result.
Carothers’ definition is most applicable to the conditions in our three target countries:
he states that they have entered a “political gray zone,” and display some attributes of
democratic political life, without being considered full democracies. Carothers further
38 Krasner (1983, p. 3).
39 Ibid., p. 5.
40 Bratton and De Walle (1997, p. 10).
41 O’Donnell (1992, p. 18).
42 Roeder (1998, p. 201).
43 Way (2005).
44 O’Donnell (1993).
9differentiates between “feckless pluralism” and “dominant-power politics.”45 Pre-revolution,
our three countries arguably fall in the latter category. Further, some post-transition countries
may become trapped in a “gray zone” when, as Przeworski states, “transitions get stuck.”46
Carothers describes dominant-power politics as those operating in a limited political space
dominated by a single leader or party, with some political contestation and basic institutional
forms of democracy. The distinction between the state and the ruling party is blurred, and the
state’s main assets are in direct service of the ruling party. Election fraud, large-scale
corruption and crony capitalism are characteristics of dominant-power politics systems.47
Most importantly, all three states share the traits of the predatory state, as elaborated
by Larry Diamond in his article “Democratic Rollback: the Resurgence of the Predatory
State.”48 The thesis provides further distinctions between criminalized states, fragmented
states and predatory states.
2. Defining organized crime and corruption
Organized crime has lacked extensive attention in the domain of international relations
and political science, even though it fits into many sub-fields of the discipline, such as
democratic transitions, comparative politics, international relations and political theory.49 The
partial aim of this dissertation is to contribute to filling this void.
The definitions of the organized crime can be grouped in two broad categories: first,
behavioral that makes a distinction between ‘protectors’ (krysha) and ‘protected’ in criminal
networks and makes distinction between those who protect/govern/extort and those who
‘produce’ goods and second relational, where organized crime is “a web of affiliations” of
individuals in the underworld and upperworld. It needs to be recognized that relational
definition tends to obscure differences regarding what these actors actually do, such as the
distinction between providing protection and smuggling goods. However relational definition
captures well the nature of actors involved in organized criminal activity. As discussed in
eighth chapter purely criminal groups are really involved in criminal activities and sometimes
the representatives of upperworld (representatives of law enforcement structures for instance)
45 Carothers (2002, pp. 5-21, 9).
46 Przeworski (1991, p. 51).
47 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
48 Diamond (2008).
49 Harasymiw (2003).
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are directly engaged in criminal activities (such as smuggling drugs) together with providing
protection for other smugglers.
Organized crime can be described as an “unholy alliance” of state, market and crime,
or in other words, a political-business-criminal nexus.50 In this thesis, organized crime is
understood as a web of affiliations of “underworld” and “upperworld” societal participants,
who have complicated relations of reciprocity.51 These societal participants include people
and groups in law enforcement agencies, political parties, the business sector and the crime
world.52 The underworld is defined as a milieu of “groups of criminals who manage through
the social bonding power of ethnicity, race or some other sociocultural trait, to combine the
capacities to do violence, to corrupt and to generate and manipulate capital.”53 The
underworld is by definition illegal and informal, while the “upperworld” comprises the
legitimate, formal structures, including the government.
Most organized crime literature agrees on the features of organized crime. Michael
Maltz, for instance, identifies eight attributes: use of corruption and violence, sophistication,
continuity, structure, discipline, multiple enterprises, involvement in legitimate enterprises,
and bonding rituals.54 Reuter and Rubinstein concentrate on five elements: multiple
enterprises, durability, hierarchy, nonviolent dispute settlement procedures, and the use of
violence and corruption to protect criminal enterprises.55 I argue that clear structure and
continuity are no longer a crucial feature of organized crime groups. Criminal partnerships or
networks can develop over single deals of short duration, frequently without a strict
hierarchy. This is close to Haller’s “partnership model” where criminals are seen as merely
pooling resources, sometimes for a single “job,” without structured, long-lasting
organization.56 For this thesis, it is best to shift the focus to organized criminal activities and
away from organized criminal groups.57 When an activity involves highly complex linkages
between the underworld and the upperworld, it falls into the purview of this research and is
considered organized crime.
Violence, the threat of violence, and corruption also remain important features of
organized crime. Williams argues that cooptation can be achieved through “corruption and
50 In the literature, the nexus is referred to in different ways. Williams calls it a triangle of business, crime and
politics, see Williams (2001a, p. 113); Los refers to it as a state-market-crime nexus, as in Los (2003, p. 145).
51 Liddick (1999, p. 1).
52 Chambliss (1988).
53 Kelly (1999, p. 18).
54 Maltz quoted in Reuter (1994).
55 Reuter and Rubinstein (1978, pp. 45-67).
56Haller in Liddick (1999, p. 16).
57 Hagan (2006, p. 133).
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bribery on the one hand, coercion or intimidation on the other, or both.”58 The literature
widely recognizes the role of violence and corruption in organized crime to achieve goals.
Naylor mentions that violence permits organized crime to drive away competitors, and
corruption allows it to undermine the regulatory apparatus. Furthermore, violence and
corruption are used to penetrate the legal economy, to acquire criminal profit and perpetuate
the corruption cycle.59
However, as shown in the case studies, organized crime groups are largely switching
away from violence to more peaceful tactics such as negotiation, co-option, bribery and
private contacts. The shift from “forceful means” to more “peaceful means” is the result of
the legalization process of organized crime. The groups trying to penetrate the licit economy
now have less interest in using violent means because they jeopardize their efforts to become
legitimate. Vadim Volkov posits that for the sake of income and securing permanent gains,
the groups change their strategy from violence and coercion to participating in local politics
and investments in the economy what would make them less vulnerable in case of a change
in state policy toward crime.60 In short, relying only on violence is economically inefficient.61
One of the prominent scholars on Russian organized crime, Alexander Gurov, described this
process as the movement from “barbaric methods to civilised ones.”62 In 2008, influential
“thieves-in–law” in Russia, Aslan Usoyan (aka Ded Hasan), stated: “we are peaceful people
and don’t bother anybody. We are for peace.”63 A former professional criminal told me in an
interview: “the ‘new thieves’ avoid violence and use diplomatic methods. When mediating
between conflicting sides, they now try to achieve everything verbally. The thieves of the
‘old tradition’ would never do so. ‘Wrongdoers’ would have had to be killed on the spot.”64
Much of the violence following the Soviet breakup can be explained by the so-called war
of “roofs” (krysha) or the illicit protectors of enterprises, who fought against challenger
criminals until ownership structures emerged. Once criminal monopolies were established
over market segments, violence was no longer necessary.65 In the former SU (especially post-
revolutionary Kyrgyzstan) this type of equilibrium has persisted unless disturbed by abrupt
changes, such as revolutions.
58 Williams (2001b, p. 76).
59 Naylor (1995, pp. 15-16).
60 Volkov (2002).
61 Volkov (1999, p. 753).
62 Gurov quoted in Galeotti (1998, p. 428).
63 International Herald Tribune (2008).
64 Author’s interview with former professional criminal, Tbilisi, Georgia, January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
65 Beare (1996).
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Corruption and bribery are important tools for organized crime groups. In general,
organized crime thrives in environments where bribery is rampant, and vice versa, and
several authors call corruption the “connecting tissue” between crime and politics66 or the
“oxygen” sustaining organized crime.67 For our discussion, corruption is defined as behaviour
in a public role which deviates from that role’s formally sanctioned duties for the sake of
private (personal, close family, clique) financial or status gains.68 Bribery is the money,
goods, services, or quid pro quo exchanged for an illicit advantage. Sometimes a distinction
is made between political and administrative corruption, the former being the abuse of
elected office, and the latter the abuse of appointed and professional positions. Both,
according to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, involve using public office for personal interests.69
Geis and Meier employ the term “political white collar crime” for this practice. 70
3. Thesis Outline
The thesis begins by outlining the methodology used, and discussing the problems
associated with field research on organized crime-related issues. This first part includes a
note on research ethics and indicates the limitations of applicability of the “concept” in
organized crime research.
The section on methodology is followed by a chapter on the theoretical framework of the
thesis, which first summarizes the literature on the political-criminal nexus and then proposes
several categories of interaction between politicians and criminals. The chapter then advances
into discussion of the legal-illegal interface and proposes an underworld-upperworld
continuum that summarizes the discussion about the linkages between the licit and illicit
milieux. I then bring in the notion of state capture within the framework of the nexus between
elites and organized crime. The chapter concludes with two sub-sections on the applicability
of the network approach to the crime groups under study, and some initial thoughts on how to
measure changes in organized crime.
The fourth chapter focuses on organized crime in Soviet times and the ways it has
survived and developed in the post-Soviet context. The chapter summarizes the literature on
Soviet organized crime and corruption and then categorizes the different organized crime
66 Harasymiw (2003, p. 14).
67 Lupsha (1996, p. 24); Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 10).
68 Nye (1967, p. 419).
69 Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002, p. 15).
70 Geis and Meier (1977) quoted in Ross (1995, p. 57).
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groups emerging from the Soviet context. A separate discussion of professional criminality,
new criminal entrepreneurs and nomenklatura networks follows. The chapter then moves to
discussing criminal networks in the three countries and pointing their differences and
commonalities. The closing section presents some quantitative data on organized crime in the
target countries.
The fifth chapter discusses the “Coloured Revolutions.” It starts by outlining general
trends in these events, and then proposes three crucial variables that have contributed to the
diverging crime and corruption patterns in the cases under study.
The sixth chapter focuses on post-revolutionary processes, discussing trends in state-
building and democratization in the three countries, as well as the consequences of the
presence of the pre-revolutionary “old guard,” signs of surviving patrimonialism, trends in
the post-revolutionary redistribution of spoils, and the implications of corruption and bribery.
The seventh chapter discusses the loosely controlled territories in the three countries,
entailing post-conflict (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) areas as well as so-called “black holes,” and
shows how these areas have contributed to the development of organized crime in these
countries.
The eighth chapter focuses on the involvement of representatives of legal and government
institutions in organized criminal activity, and is divided into three parts. The first part
addresses the development of a corrupt oligarchy in Ukraine, and the impact of the Orange
Revolution; the second part discusses professional criminality in Georgia and the fight
against crime in the post-revolutionary period; the third part focuses on the role of both illicit
(criminal) actors and licit (state) actors in drug smuggling in Kyrgyzstan. The final chapter
concludes the overall discussion.
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Chapter 2. Methodology
This works falls clearly within the comparative historical tradition in comparative
politics71 and draws on both contrast based comparison, as it seeks to reveal different
outcomes of the similar situations72 and “Method of Agreement” approach of macro-analysis
since it looks at several cases having in common the hypothesized causal factors, but varying
in the ways that initially seems causally relevant.73
1. Sources of Research
Cut-off date for the data gathered is mid-2008.
1.1. Primary sources
The material I present in this dissertation is based on roughly 100 interviews I conducted
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. There I interviewed representatives of government, in
particular the law enforcement structures (Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of the Interior,
Ministry of State Security); policy institutes or “think tanks”; research institutions; relevant
academic departments of higher education institutions; the business sector; the media; and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many respondents agreed to an interview on
condition of anonymity; therefore the names of the sources are not disclosed.74 Whenever
possible, information furnished by one source was cross-checked with other respondents or
with published material.
I undertook field research in the capitals and extra-capital regions of the three
countries, including in Batumi of the Adjarian autonomous republic and Zugdidi in Georgia;
in the cities of Lvov and Odessa in Ukraine; and in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. During the field
research local experts, government employees, policemen, journalists and academics were
interviewed and relevant data were retrieved from local government offices.
1.2. Secondary sources
Research on organized crime in the three countries is scant, especially in the cases of
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In Georgia, the most comprehensive research on organized crime
and corruption has been produced by the Georgia office of American University’s
71 See Moore (1966) and Mahoney (2004).
72 Skocpol and Somers (1980), pp. 179-180
73 Ibid., p.183
74 Several police officers refused to disclose their names.
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Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre (TraCCC). I worked for this institution for 3
years (2003-2005). The Centre’s research has been published in the book Organized Crime
and Corruption in Georgia (2007) the only English language book of its kind. In Kyrgyzstan,
no institute has researched crime and corruption with a similar level of organization.75
Additionally, I scrutinized the reports of local and international organizations about
crime and corruption, government accounts, and police files in the three countries. Arguably,
the police and court statistics on highly sophisticated organized crime and grand corruption
are misleading since the majority of these crimes are not investigated. Jan Van Dijk notes,
“low rates of court cases on corruption or organized crime may point to higher rather than
low prevalence of such types of crimes.”76 Furthermore, a comparison of crime rates before
and after the revolutions is not very productive. In Georgia, this sort of before-and-after
comparison would lead to the argument that crime increased in the country, but in fact the
upsurge in crime rates may be the result of increased efficiency in policing or changes in
legislation.
2. Research Challenges
Empirical research into organized crime and corruption is saddled with certain
difficulties, some general and some particular to the former USSR. In general, organized
crime and corruption are subjects that are very difficult to research empirically since evidence
is extremely sparse and sometimes unobtainable. The political-criminal links are difficult and
in most of the cases, impossible to quantify. The official evidence is very frequently non-
existent due to corruption in the criminal justice system and political pressure that derails any
investigative or prosecution efforts. The criminal cases, if raised, are stopped in their infancy
and almost never reach the court. Evidence may still be gathered by some branches of the law
enforcement system on behalf of particular representatives of political and business elites for
75 The only comprehensive book available on organized crime in Central Asia in general and Kyrgyzstan in
particular is the work by Swadomir Redo (2004). Kairat Osmanaliev produced a more focused monograph about
criminality in Kyrgyzstan, Organizovanaia Prestupnost v Kirgizskoy Respublike (2003). The research record is
better in the case of Ukraine, where the branches of TraCCC in Kharkiv, Odessa and Zaporozhia have produced
high quality research over several years. American and Ukrainian academics produced another comprehensive
study, The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime (2004). In addition, a few Ukrainian academic journals
publish research on crime and corruption-related issues. Borotba s Organizovannoi Prestupnostiu (Fight With
Organized Crime), a Ukrainian language journal published quarterly by the Academy of the Ministry of the
Interior of Ukraine, is worthy of mention.
76 Van Dijk (2007, p. 40).
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the purposes of using it as compromat.77 The access to these files is certainly restricted for
researchers. In the former Soviet Union there was no tradition of academic research deemed
to be directly relevant for operational usefulness in organized crime investigation.Hence, law
enforcement officers think that there is little or nothing to gain from providing researchers
with the information.78 Although very informative interviews were conducted with several
police officers, their comments on political-criminals links or access to the operational files
could not be obtained. Nevertheless, their reaction to particular questions can sometimes be
interpreted as implicit evidence as demonstrated later in the text when it refers to the link
between police officials and criminals.
Field research has to be undertaken with a number of precautions. Fluency in the local
language is an asset, as is knowledge of Russian, still widely spoken in Kyrgyzstan and
Ukraine. Translation during the interviews may result in the loss of some valuable insights
since the translators are not always familiar with the subject, and frequently offer their own
interpretation of what the respondent said. Safety precautions include the establishment of
local contacts and maintaining a low profile while in the country.
In one case, I was approached by a local journalist in Kyrgyzstan for an interview. In
such an instance it is important to ensure what is printed in the media cannot be interpreted as
a threat by local elites and police. In the conversation with the journalist, I emphasized my
research interest in the Coloured Revolutions and their impacts on political and economic
conditions, minimizing my interest in organized crime and corruption. In general, journalists
writing on corruption and crime-related issues are a dependable source of information, and
can through their connections provide access to high-ranking officials and influential
businessmen. Journalists’ sources of information are also more diverse than those of any
government structure, including the secret services.
Additional obstacles in field research require mention. Firstly, potential respondents
are often reluctant to talk, citing the lack of permit, but really due to fear. I kept several
respondents anonymous. Second, the respondents frequently give very general answers,
without details. Third, they are easily scared away if they assume that the researcher has
particular interest in some highly confidential issue. In my experience, every respondent
develops assumptions about the interviewer’s possible “disguised” interests during the
conversation, sometimes in the belief that the interviewer is working for a particular
country’s secret services. Furthermore, transcribing the interviews was not possible because
77 On the use of compromising materials as a tool of control see Darden (2003).
78 See, for example, Beare (1996, pp. 20–35).
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respondents were reluctant to speak on confidential issues while being recorded.79 Therefore,
the researcher relied on handwritten notes to record interviews. In cases where respondents
refused to permit even handwritten records, the interview was written up by the researcher
immediately after. Sometimes the researcher avoided noting down specific information
during the interview, because showing interest could deter the respondent from elaborating
on that particular issue.
Being an ethnic Georgian also affected the research. As explained elsewhere in this
thesis, Georgia contributed significantly to the world of professional criminals in the Soviet
Union. So, my interest in the subject was accepted with understanding. Additionally, because
the first “Coloured Revolution” happened in Georgia, my interest in the research topic was
accepted and not treated as remarkable.80
Trying to open up the respondents the researcher was trying to show his competence
in the issue and to create expectations that he can also give some useful insights to the
respondents in case if his questions are answered. At different stages of the interview, the
researcher was sharing some data from other primary sources that he thought would be
interesting to the respondent given the issues discussed. This is closely related to how my
nationality had an impact on the data. In international media sources Georgia was often
described as success case in terms of fighting crime and corruption in the aftermath of Rose
Revolution. The respondents in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan where keen to know about anti-
crime policies in Georgia. My insights were much appreciated and had a positive impact on
the overall attitude of the respondents to me and my research. Certainly personal network of
friends and acquaintances in Georgia was a great asset, that was not available in Kyrgyzstan
and Ukraine. In the two countries the researcher needed much more effort to get to the ‘right
sources of information’. The readily-available network of social contacts is the substantial
asset in any research, organized crime and corruption included.
In order to cultivate trust, the researcher has been citing his previous research
experience in dangerous environments and on “difficult to research” issues emphasizing the
79 See Serio (2008, p. 52).
80 The fact of being Georgian led to interesting conversations that might not have taken place otherwise. For
instance, a taxi driver, being aware of the “criminal reputation” of Georgians, proposed services in case of
problems with the police. He had the business card of a police general signed and sealed with the stamp of the
Ministry of the Interior of Kyrgyzstan. Apparently, he was the chauffeur of this police general, but was earning
extra income moonlighting as a taxi driver. He brandished the signed business card in case he was stopped by
traffic policemen to avoid paying fines or bribes. Also, with the apparent endorsement of his boss, he was
proposing services for “solving problems” with the police, for a fee, to any “shady” seeming clients he
encountered.
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need for anonymity of the sources of information. This was giving the sense of security to the
respondents and they were speaking more freely.
3. Validity of the data
I used the method of triangulation that was based on two major pillars: first, careful
selection of the respondents and second, cross-checking information through various sources.
Once in the field, the first meetings were held with academics and journalists. The
researchers at the host institutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and their contacts in
the media were first useful contacts. The researcher has been asking who would they
recommend to meet and who would they consider as more reliable sources of information.
The journalists proved most useful in providing contacts and researchers were valuable for
evaluating appropriateness and extent of reliability. Hence the selected respondents have
been recommended by several individuals that is an important pillar of the methodology.
Second, the data on the links, involvement in crime and corruption is given only if the
particular pieces of information were corroborated by two or more sources. The important
information mentioned by one respondent were re-formulated into the question form and
asked to other respondents.
The aforementioned research conditions have particular importance for the validity of
the data. The respondents were categorized into two clusters: first, less reliable, such as
journalists and citizens in the streets, and second, more reliable, such as police officers,
researchers, government officials and representatives of NGOs. Statements by the first group
of respondents were scrutinized more carefully and cross-checked with two other sources and
again with available published material, while the statements by the second group were
considered more trustworthy, and regarded as verified after corroboration with one media
publication or another primary source. Sometimes, indirect statements helped to verify highly
contested allegations, such as when I asked a police officer in Kyrgyzstan whether the former
Minister of the Interior was providing protection for a notorious criminal in the country. The
officer’s answer, “if you repeat this anywhere, [the former Minister] will kill you” was taken
as implicit verification of the link between this official and the criminal leader.
Frequently, my interviews were convened in the less formal environment of a pub/bar,
where, once the official interview was over, the respondent opened up in casual chat, which
yielded even more results. Hence, the distinction is made between personal communications,
referring to informal chats, and formal interviews.
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4. Research ethics
Several crucial postulates of research ethics were not relevant for the research. For
instance, informed consent could not always be applied. Frequently, disclosing the real
research aims would have resulted in a potential respondent’s refusal of an interview.
Therefore, in Ukraine, for instance, I approached several respondents with a request for an
interview related to the Orange Revolution in general, without disclosing my interest in
organized crime and corruption. The conversation focused on the revolution, and “by-the-
way" questions were asked about the involvement of criminals. In Kyrgyzstan, I approached
several officials, for instance in the Financial Police, expressing a general interest in
contraband activities. I also followed the advice of several contacts and did not mention the
academic research, simply offering that “the material is being gathered for potential
publication.”
In Georgia, friends of mine introduced me to several sources in informal
environments and no reference was made to research. We followed this procedure: after a
general chat, one of the friends (not me) mentioned the subject, although no particular
interest was indicated. In this environment, the respondents spoke freely. Certainly they
would not have spoken as forthrightly during a formal interview.
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Chapter 3. Theoretical framework
1. Understanding organized crime through the lens of the political-business-criminal nexus
1.1.Political-criminal nexus
In order to more fully understand organized crime, one needs to look at the political
and social realities in which organized crime grows in a “traditional network of collusive
relationships with members of external, licit groups – social, political or entrepreneurial.”81 A
state’s political, social, economic and cultural conditions contribute to the formation and
functioning of political-criminal alliances.
Politicians and criminals can sometimes detect a mutual interest in cooperation and
the reciprocal exchange of services, because the web of interrelations makes possible various
illicit activities. The relationships are initiated by both sides. Sometimes criminals co-opt and
recruit individuals in “powerful positions” in order to “facilitate, enhance or protect their
activities.” 82 Equally, it may run in the opposite direction, when a politician or businessman
co-opts and recruits criminal operatives for illicit operations, as Serio writes. 83
The political-criminal nexus is not new. American historian David R. Johnson
reported the existence of “the symbiotic relationship between politics and vice” in the United
States in the 1840s.84 Later, Chambliss studied the powerful political-criminal alliances in the
city of Seattle, Washington.85 In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement concluded that “nearly all of the large cities in the United States suffer from an
alliance between politicians and criminals.”86 More recently, the prevalence of the nexus has
been reported in democracies as well as autocracies worldwide, including China,87
Colombia,88 Italy,89 Mexico,90 and Nigeria.91
81 Armao (2003, p. 27).
82 Williams (2001, p. 76).
83 Serio (2008, p. 8).
84 Johnson quoted in Block (1991, p. 47).
85 Chambliss (1988, pp. 9, 61).
86 Quoted in Block (1981, p. 111).
87 See for instance Lintner (2005, pp. 84-97).
88 Lee and Thoumi (1997).
89 Paoli (2003).
90 Pimentel (2003).
91 Ebbe (1997).
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Armao calls the area of true interaction between criminals and politicians a “grey
zone.” 92 The same term is used by Strange when she refers to financial crime, writing that
the distinction is unclear between “widely practiced but ethically questionable” and
“downright criminal” transactions.93 The interest in cooperation is mutual: “criminals need
protection, impunity, security and assistance in facilitating their activities. Collaboration with
the upperworld can bring protection against law enforcement, and from rival criminals…they
can obtain information from the police, intelligence and military to help neutralize their
opponents…and take advantage of privatization and public tenders.”94 Political elites seek
collaboration primarily to obtain finance for personal and political ends. Criminals also can
provide services for “corrupt businesses and money laundering for politicians,” as well as
other favours like providing intelligence on, disrupting or even eliminating political rivals, or
securing votes in particular regions. Fear of threats to their families or to their position is an
additional factor pushing politicians to cooperate.95
However, politicians and criminals do not always cooperate or collude. Nikos Passas
argues that a legal-illegal interface can have either an antithetical or a symbiotic relationship.
In antithetical relationships, he points out four interfaces: first, antagonistic relationships,
that mean “competition between legal and illegal actors;” second, injurious relationships that
“occur when actors undermine, attack or harm each other;” third, predatory relationships that
develop “when the aim or effect is to destroy or bleed to death an organization;” and fourth,
parasitical relationships when “the aim is to preserve the viability of the target, such that
illegal benefits can be extorted on a more or less regular basis.”96
Passas determines eight types of symbiotic relationships, including outsourcing,
which refers to “a division of labour between legal and illegal actors, where one party offers
specialized services to the other;” second, collaboration, when “legal and illegal enterprises
work together;” third co-optation of illegal groups by legal or vice versa; fourth reciprocity,
when “there are mutual benefits [exchanged] between the legal and illegal actors;” fifth
synergy, when “legal and illegal actors benefit each other while they go about their business
independently;” sixth legal interactions, when criminal actors use legal transactions for
profit; seventh, funding relationships, when “legitimate organizations provide, knowingly or
not, essential financial support for the operation of criminal groups;” and eighth, legal actors
92 Armao (2003, p. 29).
93 Strange (1996, p. 117).
94 Godson (2003, pp. 8-9).
95 Ibid., p. 9.
96 Passas (2002, pp. 20-21).
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committing organized crime.97 Several categories from this typology will be used in this
thesis.
Godson writes that “in some areas the problem of the political-criminal nexus is
chronic… only the forms and balance of power among the players change. Sometimes the
politicians dominate, sometimes the criminals. Regardless of who is dominant, the coalition
of forces influences many aspects of government.”98 Domination in the political-criminal
nexus is divided into three main categories here: underworld dominance, elite dominance and
symbiotic balance. All three categories imply the presence of collaborative, collusive and
corrupting links as well as competing and antagonistic relations between the underworld and
upperworld.
1.1.1.Underworld Dominance
This category coincides with the symbiotic stage from Lupsha’s stage-evolutionary
model, where the legitimate political and economic sector becomes dependent upon “the
monopolies and networks of organized crime to sustain itself.” When this level of
dependency is reached, organized crime goes beyond being a law enforcement problem and
becomes “a state within a state.”99 Rawlinson emphasizes “decreasing dependency” on
official entities once organized crime moves from the parasitic to the symbiotic stage.100 The
formal authorities are left with no choice but to pragmatically accept the power domains of
organized crime.101 In this case, the elites risk bringing organized criminals into the political
arena.
Thus, over time, unsophisticated groups in gangs mainly engaged in petty crime
become highly sophisticated, even transnational, criminal networks. The organized crime
continuum proposed by Frank Hagan differentiates among three levels in crime group
development, beginning at the street gang level, moving up to semi-organized crime groups,
and finally arriving at full-fledged criminal network status. Hagan ventured to measure the
level of development according to primary and secondary characteristics. Primary
characteristics would include: the absence of ideology, the use of violence/threat of violence,
the provision of illicit services, and the degree of immunity through the use of corruption and
97 Ibid., pp. 22-25.
98 Godson (2003, pp. 1, 5).
99 Lupsha (1996, p. 32).
100 Rawlinson (2002, p. 296).
101 Blok (1974, p. 172).
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intimidation.102 Otherwise stated, the more organized crime groups use violence and
corruption, the more developed they are considered. As already mentioned, this may not be
true in the case of the violence component, and I argue here that the more sophisticated
groups become, and the more they penetrate the legal economy, the violence decreases.
Among secondary characteristics, Hagan concentrates on structured hierarchy, rules/codes of
secrecy and exclusive membership.103 Concerning hierarchy, some academics argue that
well-structured hierarchies are today the exception rather than the rule,104 though criminal
networks still do possess types of structure.105
An organized crime group in its last stage of development would normally have
transnational crime linkages;106 provide social stability, informal policing, 107 and
protection;108 and directly influence and participate in state politics. At this stage, the political
elites are weak and need partnership with crime groups109 which might also mean dependence
upon the criminals for provision of goods or services. In other words, advanced-level
organized crime assumes a quasi-governmental role, filling power needs where the
government cannot,110 such as by making and enforcing rules of conduct and by settling
disputes111 as an alternative government or policing agency would.112 This is tantamount to
state capture by organized crime groups. However, organized crime does not seek to destroy
the state. It rather uses the continued existence of the formal state to its own advantage.113
Using Passas’s typology of antithetical relationships, the relationship between
organized crime and the elites is mainly antagonistic since organized crime groups are
competing with the elites for influence or market share. However, as emphasized by Jurgen
Roth, on the one hand organized crime prospers in the conditions of weak state institutions,
but on the other hand, running illicit business requires the cooperation, or rather the
corruption, of state agents.”114 Thus, it is in the parasitical interest of organized crime groups
to keep government representatives or elites in place, but in a weak and dependent status.
102 Hagan (1983, p. 54); and Hagan (2006, pp. 135-136).
103 Hagan (2006, p. 135).
104 See for instance Finckenauer (2005, p. 65).
105 Williams and Godson (2002, p. 335).
106 Hagan, (2006, p. 136).
107 Kelly (2003, p. 110).
108 See for instance Varese (2001); Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995); Gambetta (1993).
109 Schulte-Bockholt (2006, pp. 25-6).
110 Finckenauer (2005, p. 74).
111 Lampe (2003, p. 16).
112 Kelly (2003, p. 110).
113 Naylor (2002, p. 55).
114 Roth quoted in Schulte-Bockholt (2006, pp. 25-6).
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1.1.2.Elite Dominance
This category coincides with the predatory stage from Lupsha’s “stage-evolutionary”
model, where organized crime is principally the “servant” of the state and the criminal group
is basically a type of street gang rooted in a particular area, neighbourhood or territory.”115
Schulte-Bockholt argues that if the services of organized crime “are no longer required, or if
they are perceived as a threat, elites can and do turn against organized crime using the power
of the state.”116 At this point, organized crime groups lose the capability to participate in state
politics, and they challenge political elites while keeping a low profile, but are regardless
constrained, as Blok observes.117
Much like the crime groups continuum, the involvement of legitimate actors in
organized crime can be deemed a continuum having the sporadic involvement of individual
members of legitimate institutions in organized criminal activities at one extreme, and the
takeover and monopolization of organized criminal activities by licit actors at the other.
Beare argues that the legitimate actors are not simply honest people corrupted by “evil”
organized crime; they can be viewed as those “who are corruptible [and] chose to act as
criminals” instead.118 Legitimate actors can be criminal entrepreneurs and not only “nominal”
or “passive” supporters.119 The elites in this category profit from state resources, diverting
substantial public assets for private gains and thus “living off politics” and making the state a
permanent source of income.120 In Weberian terms, state officials become the most effective
criminals.121
Block and Chambliss pioneered the studies of organized crime that focus on
representatives of the legitimate sector. In his study of organized crime in the US, Block
found that the “crime network is an inevitable outgrowth of the political economy of
American cities. The ruling elites from every sphere benefit economically and socially from
the presence of a smoothly running crime network.”122 Chambliss found that some law
enforcement officers not only accept illegal payoffs from criminals but some “police and
prosecutors were instrumental in organizing and managing” organized criminal activities.123
115 Lupsha (1996, p. 31).
116 Schulte-Bockholt (2006, pp. 35-36).
117 Blok (1974, p. 101).
118 Beare (2007, p. 3).
119 Morselli and Giguere (2006, pp. 185–200, 189).
120 Weber (1994, pp. 309-369).
121 Chambliss (1999, p. 156).
122 Block (1981, p. 100).
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Kelly likewise wrote of the political use of gangs in the 20th century United States as agent-
provocateurs, labour mediators, and business-intimidators.”124
More recently, other authors have written about the re-conceptualization of the role of
legitimate actors.125 In this model, the criminal protectors or “roofs” (kryshas) are replaced by
actors from the legitimate world, especially law enforcement structures. The protection racket
is run by officials or the individuals/entities linked to them through informal networks. As
Volkov asserts, in this way the protection racket has been rearranged into private protection,
a form of legalization.126 Padovani says, “in order to fight against the Mafia, the state
transformed itself into another Mafia.”127
The elite dominance model is compatible with John Bailey and Roy Godson’s
centralized-systemic model that detects a “coherent, centrally guided system” linking the
political system with organized crime, where political leaders control the network from the
top down.128 In general, this model assumes that criminal organizations take their orders from
political authorities and the system resembles a pyramid, with centralized control of the
criminal system concentrated in the hands of top officials, including the President and cabinet
ministers. A parallel underworld shadow system, symbiotically connecting under and upper-
worlds, is controlled by the same people in state institutions.129
In the elite dominance model, criminals may be chosen or even created by authorities
for the advancement of certain goals. These goals could take two forms. First, officials might
use criminals for informal policing over highly unstable areas, like the use by Italian police of
the Camorra organised crime group for maintaining “law and order” in “dangerous places,”
130 or as the authorities of Marseilles used criminals to keep social order in the city in the
1920s and 30s.131 Second, authorities might use criminals to establish control over other
criminal factions. Reportedly, the Soviet state created professional criminals for controlling
the prison population.132 Alan Block writes that the law enforcement system maximizes its
effectiveness by “creating and supporting a shadow government that manages vices.”133
Third, authorities can manipulate criminals to maintain balance in the criminal world.
124 Kelly (1986, p. 16).
125 For instance see Kleemans and van de Bunt (2003, pp. 97–104); Ruggeiro (1998); Morselli and Giguere
(2006).
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128 Bailey and Godson (2000, p. 3).
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Certainly, the state does not want a single criminal group to become powerful enough to
challenge the elites. Therefore, elites may try to play several criminal leaders against each
other to ensure the state’s influence as arbiter.
This is also consistent with Lupsha’s second model of organized crime as elite-
exploitation where criminal enterprises are treated as “cash cows to be taxed, exploited, and
manipulated by the political system’s agents and institutions of social control.”134 In this
model, agents of state institutions plan and initiate criminals’ activities. When elites change,
organized crime group leaders tend to be replaced and the former leaders, now out of favour,
are arrested, extradited, or killed.135
1.1.3.Symbiotic Balance
It can be argued that in certain conditions, organized crime groups are “sub hegemonic”
because political elites share the power instead of giving it up.136 Flinders mentions that
politicians are frequently reluctant to cede control; they rather seek to develop informal
control mechanisms.137 In this case, the relationship between the state and organized crime
can be viewed through the lens of public-private partnership, where to deliver public goods or
services, the state collaborates with “para-statal actors”138 (i.e. organized crime groups) that
can be thought of as “quasi-autonomous bodies or 3Ps.”139 Deriving from the typology of
Passas, the relations between organized crime and elites are symbiotic and to a lesser extent
antithetical, and may be interpreted via the outsourcing and collaboration models. First, some
illegal or semi-legal work is usually delegated to crime groups, as mentioned above, and
second, collusion is extensive and boundaries between the underworld and upperworld are
blurred. Protection is provided by “combined roofs” to mean, as in Volkov’s terms,
protection by private security companies and criminal groups.140
This category is close to Bailey and Godson’s “fragmented-contested” system, where
criminal-political alliances are a set of dynamic, constantly changing and fluid relationships
134 Lupsha and Pimentel (1997).
135 Bailey and Godson (2000, p. 57).
136 Schulte-Bockholt (2006, p. 36).
137 Flinders (2006, p. 226).
138 Ibid., p. 223.
139 According to Matthew Flinders (2006, p. 224), public private partnerships are known as “3Ps” in North
America. Flinder himself defines “3Ps” as “long-term purchases of service contracts between the state and for-
profit private sector bodies.”
140 Volkov (1999, p. 745).
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between the political system and organized crime.141 In the “fragmented-contested” system,
“functional coalitions of actors from the political and criminal worlds are assembled at
different levels and on a more or less ad hoc basis.”142
The political-criminal nexus may vary across these three categories and may change
from one to another. For instance, the collusive relationships between criminals and state or
party officials in the Soviet Union changed after the break-up of the USSR, so that criminals
assumed control due to the lack of centralized order and weak state institutions.143 In the late
1990s, the elites tried to monopolize power again, leading to a new distribution of power
among legal and illegal actors. The Coloured Revolutions may be seen as windows of
opportunity bringing a shift from one category to the other. In Georgia, symbiotic balance
was directly substituted with the elite dominance model, while Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip
Revolution resulted in the dominance of underworld figures that is now changing again in
favour of the elites. Thus, in particular conditions, as in Kyrgyzstan, revolution served the
criminals, whereby the latter emerged as “power brokers and/or nationalist spokesmen”144
and “states within a state.” In different conditions the opposite process may develop, as when
the government takes organized crime as the “main threat,” putting the latter on the defensive
and prompting devolution to a predatory stage where organized crime is purely a “law
enforcement problem.” In the latter case, the state policy changes from peaceful coexistence
with organized crime to its suppression, when this rival (non-state) authority’s power is
perceived to threaten the state.”145 In Ukraine, the elite dominance model remained intact,
although it increasingly resembled the symbiotic balance model. These shifts are explained
by the set of variables considered later in the thesis, but first the underworld-upperworld
interface merits more discussion.
1.2.Underworld – Upperworld Continuum
The processes of legalization of organized crime, as well as the reverse process of
criminalization of legal enterprises, are key here. Criminal organizations need to find ways to
ensure that illegally-earned money is protected. For this purpose, they might consider
investing the money in legal business, thus legitimizing assets and laying groundwork for a
141 Bailey and Godson (2000, p. 3).
142 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
143 Williams and Godson (2002, pp. 316-7).
144 Lupsha (1996, pp. 31-2).
145 Strange (1996, p. 117).
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“peaceful transition” to entirely legal activities. Vinzenzo Ruggiero elaborates on Merton’s
conceptualization of “innovative” behaviour in crime, arguing that criminal entrepreneurs
have to introduce “new combinations of productive factors, therefore pursuing legitimate
goals through illegitimate means.”146 Volkov argues that the process involves two important
adjustments: introducing a more efficient property regime for the enterprises under their
control, and changing their status vis-à-vis the law and public opinion.147 In this way, they
may either retire from criminal business and legalize all activities, or use the legal cover for
continued illegal operations. This makes the lines between legal and illegal extremely
difficult to draw.
First, the strategy of criminal organizations is largely based on co-optation. Criminals
“seek to expand and co-opt a whole set of support players who provide entry points to the
licit world.”148 To this end, they exploit “vulnerable points of entry”149 and legitimate
companies may be considered as this kind of “natural bridge between gangsters and
politicians.”150 Hence, criminal groups can grow into “power brokers and political
middlemen,” in Kelly’s terms.151
Second, criminal organizations seek to maximize their profits, and are attracted by
economic opportunities that become available as a result of state weakness. “Rational”
criminals seek to limit the risks they face in illicit activities, by putting some of their wealth
and resources into legitimate enterprises with a vulnerable weak point.152 “Organized crime
groups appear where there are economic opportunities available to pursue their ultimate
objective of money and power.”153 Third, organized crime groups need legal businesses in
order to launder and invest the proceeds of crime, pursue respectability and social status,
minimize the risk of law enforcement action or decrease the efficiency of such action.154
Fourth, together with wealth comes the need for legitimacy and respect,155 that is met
by seeking formal status.
146 Ruggiero (2003, p. 182).
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149 Ibid., p. 327.
150 Kelly (2003, p. 114).
151 Ibid., p. 104.
152 Kelly (1999, p. 5).
153 Allum and Siebert (2003, p. 227).
154 Williams and Savona quoted in Beken and Defruytier (2004, p. 72).
155 Ledeneva (1998).
29
In pursuit of these purposes and much like legal enterprises,156 criminal organizations
constantly scan the environment for opportunities to maximize profits with little risk.157 In
order to be more efficient, crime groups use upperworld agents such as lawyers and
accountants for money laundering, of government officials for network protection and
support and of law enforcement officers for counterintelligence.158 Armed with the
appropriate expertise, crime groups penetrate legitimate sectors through the three main
strategies described by Kelly: first, criminal investments in strictly legal businesses; second,
investments in “midpoint” businesses, like bars, that are complementary to illegal activities;
third, opportunistic or short-term investments used to defraud other businesses (short-term
credit arrangements that can bankrupt businesses).159
Here, the market paradigm model, as advocated by Peter Reuter and R. Thomas
Naylor beginning in the 1980s, provides a useful framework. Naylor sees organized criminals
as “highly individualistic entrepreneurs who simply carried the notion of free enterprise to its
logical conclusion.”160 Criminal organizations in this model represent informal trade
associations, or “old-boys networks,”161 or non-coordinated groups of firms mainly dealing
with illegal markets.162 In these cases, criminal organizations seek market share rather than
monopoly control.163 Williams and Godson propose that individuals or small groups of
members of a criminal organization, rather than the organization per se, meet the demand for
illicit products.164 Thus, the market paradigm model sees organized crime more as
“disorganized” and suggests two main points: criminal groups seek shares in rather than
monopoly over the market, and illegal markets are populated by multiple small groups.165
Naylor suggests an “underground government model” and a “parallel economic
system,” where the role of criminal organizations is to “adjudicate disputes, enforce property
rights, control the use of violence, function as a social security fund and sometimes play the
role of small business development bank for upstarts.” The parallel economic system has “its
own distribution channels, its own information sources, its own labour exchanges and
156 The analogy between the behaviour of legal and illegal organizations is contested by Naylor who argued that
either it’s oversimplified or wrong. He thinks that “in illegal markets that are highly segmented, decisions are
personalized, information flows constricted, capital supplies short term and unreliable, objective price data
lacking, and the time horizons of enterprises coterminous with those of the entrepreneurs.” (Naylor 2002, p. 21).
157 Williams and Godson (2002, p. 324).
158 Ibid., p. 334.
159 Kelly (1999, p. 24).
160 Naylor (1995, p. 39).
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certainly its own banking and financial methods… in this system one finds myriad individual
entrepreneurs, along with firms large and small with commercial inter-relationships.”166 He
adds that the parallel economic system is “usually symbiotic with the legal system and for the
most part institutionally embedded within it.”167 The last observation is important, as it
already questions the validity of the claim that two parallel systems exist in isolation. Rather,
he argues that the “criminal associations are not contained within an underworld or dirty
marketplace that parallels upperworld or clean business.”168 These grey markets are what
Ruggeiro would call dirty economies, where informal and formal intermingle.169
A good example is illegal arms trafficking: the involvement of conventional
organized crime groups in illicit arms trade is confined to mainly light and second-hand
weapons, while the main illicit trafficking is “the preserve of corporate criminals who are
often in a position to set up their own semi-clandestine commercial conduits and services.”
This is what Ruggeiro calls the shift from the “black” to the “grey” market.170 Thus the terms
“grey market” and “dirty economy” will be used interchangeably.
It is sometimes challenging to fit a particular company with “grey” characteristics into
either the legal or the illegal world. One example is private security companies, which
mushroomed in the former Soviet Union. These are either police-run private security firms,
which hire out off-duty officers who retain their state police privileges and powers,171 or are
run by former officials of police or security services that maintain friendly relations with
former colleagues in law enforcement structures. These companies also shelter criminals and
are frequently involved in organized crime.172 Volkov’s category of a “violence-managing
agency,” defined as “any human activity that commands organized force and manages this
key resource in such a way as to make it the source of a permanent income, eventually by
establishing control over a local economy” is relevant. He differentiates between “private
illegal” (organized crime groups); “nonstate” (private); “legal” (private protection
companies) and “state illegal” (units of state law enforcement structures acting as private
entrepreneurs).173
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In general, the extent of the penetration of the legal economy depends on the strength
and effectiveness of the state. Frequently, the success of crime groups can be seen “as a
solution to problems associated with governmental bureaucracies that endanger inefficiencies
and that stymie commercial activity.”174 However, what is most important is the potential
blurring of boundaries between the legal and illegal sectors. Illegal organizations may
become increasingly similar to legal ones if criminal organizations use illegal versions of
legal practices, such as money laundering or tax fraud. 175 At the same time, there is a
tendency of legitimate businesses to use “shadier and shadier methods.”176 As found by
Ruggeiro, in business, “organized criminal groups both teach and learn from their legitimate
counterparts.”177
This leads to another very important point: not only do criminal organizations
legalize, but legal organizations criminalize as well. Rawlinson argues that “violations of the
law amongst corporations are so common as to be the norm… like the underworld, business
sees no problem with law-breaking” if it does not impede its own codes of behavior.178
Similar to the legalization of criminal activity, the reverse process is strongly related to
political economy and gaps in state capacity. Additionally, the rent-seeking state also pushes
legal companies into the shadows, when engaging with the formal economy means that a
company becomes visible to the state and hence a target for state extortion.179
Certain types of organized criminal activities, such as human trafficking, need the
involvement of different legal agencies and individuals. Ruggiero states that the functions
normally associated with criminal groups can be assumed by business groups. For example,
tourist agents, employment mediators, transport entrepreneurs and drivers, commonly found
to be complicit in human trafficking, are business rather than criminal groups.180
The extent of law-breaking by legitimate companies can be thought of as a continuum
with the most honest companies at one extreme and the dirtiest at the other. In this regard, the
concept of “illegal enterprise,” popular in the 1990s,181 offers further explanation. The term is
largely associated with Dwight C. Smith in the 1970s, when he challenged the conventional
view of organized crime as more prone to “felonious activities,” such as burglary, and not to
174 Kelly (2003, p. 130).
175 Ponsaers (2002, pp. 191-202, 194).
176 Naylor (1995, p. 44).
177 Ruggiero (2000, pp. 187-199, 192).
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legal business activities. Smith defines illicit enterprise as “the extension of legitimate market
activities into areas normally proscribed, for the pursuit of profit and in response to latent
illicit demand” and contends that there is a continuum in the marketplace, ranging from “very
saint” to “most sinful” enterprises.182 Judging by the basis of size, financial standing,
management reputation and product-process legitimacy, Smith differentiates between three
types on the spectrum, based on the products or services offered: the paragon, the pirate and
the pariah. Pariah firms operate at “the margin of legitimacy, some recognizably illegal and
trying to evade regulations, and others trying hard to maintain a newly won or problematic
measure of legality.”183
Later, W. Alen Martin elaborated on Smith’s framework that “a continuum of
business propriety may be described by examining the legality of the product or service
offered. For example, a legitimate business which purchases legal products in a legal manner
and sells those products legally represents one extreme of the legitimacy spectrum. At the
other end are firms which buy illegal goods in order to sell these illegal goods illegally.184
Illegal markets are defined as markets for: a) goods that are illegal in themselves, such as
narcotic substances and forged-brand cigarettes; b) illegal trade in legal goods: this concerns
black markets for goods that involve evasion of taxes, duties or import duties and are traded
unlawfully on black markets, such as legally produced cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and
fuels; c) illegal provision of services; for example human trafficking (illegal employment in
prostitution) as well as “facilitating financial services” for the purpose of laundering the
profits of activities on illegal markets and other facilitating activities, such as violent
settlements of business disputes.185 Chart 1 summarizes this discussion. The continuum
depicts the legalization of criminals (from the extreme right to the middle) and
criminalization of legal enterprises (from extreme left to the middle). The focus is the grey
market or dirty economy, where criminal organizations simultaneously engage in legal and
illegal activities.
182 Smith (1978, pp. 163-164).
183 Smith (1980, pp. 382-3).
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partial interests, so that legitimate lobbying is outside of my focus. Frequently the distinction
is made between “deep and shallow” and between “occasional and standardised” state
capture.189 Distinctions are drawn between the types of institutions that are captured—the
legislature, the executive, the judiciary, or regulatory;190 however, the main focus concerns
the types of actors that capture the state.
Keeping in mind Migdal’s definition of states (see page 10) and the distinction made
between state and ruling regime, it can be argued that state capture or criminalization of the
state happens in three ways. State capture by criminal interest is present in all three forms;
however, a distinction is made between state capture by organized crime groups, state capture
by criminalized elites and a mixture of both. In the first case, organized crime groups co-opt
and establish control over state institutions or “obtain preferential treatment from public
servants through extortion,” what Lambsdorff calls an “extreme example;”191 in the second
case, elites monopolize control over organized criminal activity and in the third case, there
are signs of both processes.
The Elite Dominance model shows how the state is criminalized via the incorporation
of protectors and perpetrators of organized crime into the ruling elite, who then monopolize
control over organized criminal activity. This kind of state is called a Predatory State. In a
predatory state, the ruling regime is strong and organized crime groups are weak. The
strength of the ruling regime sometimes results in increased state capacity, and sometimes
not.
Larry Diamond is insightful on predatory states: “the natural tendency of elites
everywhere has been to monopolize power rather than to restrain it through the development
of transparent laws, strong institutions and market competition. And once they have
succeeded in restricting political access, these elites use their consolidated power to limit
economic competition so as to generate profits that benefit themselves, rather than society at
large. The result is a predatory state.192 In predatory states, the power of the rulers over the
populace may come from a greater capacity for violence193 and normally the rulers maintain a
large police force.194
This kind of state meets the definition of Marxist state theorists who would view the
state as a “neutral instrument to be manipulated and steered in the interests of the ruling
189 Dobovsek (2008, pp. 679-690, 686).
190 World Bank, (2000, p. 2).
191 Lambsdorff (2002, p. 116).
192 Diamond (2008).
193 Olson (1993, p. 567).
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elite”195 as well as the arguments of elitist state theorists who would posit that the “power
elite comprised of politicians, military and corporate bosses mould public policy to suit their
own ends.”196 The Underworld dominance model shows how the state can be captured by
organized crime groups via co-option and hijacking state institutions. This kind of state,
where crime groups are more powerful than the government, is called the criminalized state.
Armao would describe a Mafia State as one in which organized criminals “assume
both the political leadership and the monopoly of the economic and financial resources of the
State.”197 Here, organized crime groups can be regarded as an “illicit authority” that “enjoys
legitimate social recognition to the extent that they step into a power vacuum left by a weak
state and provide public goods that the state fails to provide.”198 In a criminalized state,
organized crime leaders set the rules of the game and directly participate in state policy-
making. The political and business elites are dependent on them.
The Symbiotic Balance model leads to a state being fragmented by competing
political and business groups that are fighting each other, frequently through the help of
criminals. It displays characteristics of both the predatory and criminal state, and is called a
fragmented state.
Wedel describes as a partially appropriated state, the type of government where
“informal groups privatize certain state functions. Individual clans, each of which controls
property and resources, are so closely identified with particular ministries or institutional
segments of government that the respective agendas of the state and the clan sometimes seem
identical...”199
As a result of continuous competition for resources, the state is manipulated by
various interests, criminal, business and political. Reforms are constantly pushed forward and
then reversed. Powerful firms distort the reform agenda for their narrow private gains.200 The
net winners of the malfunctioning state (such as former Communist nomenklatura or “new
entrepreneurs-cum-Mafiosi”) are trying “to stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium
that generates concentrated rents” and “to preserve the status quo as long as possible.”201
The following chart sums up the discussion on state capture by criminal interests.
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Chart 2. Political-Criminal Continuum and State Capture
Vadim Volkov presents a framework that is useful for this discussion. He outlines a
typology of “roofs,” (kryshas) which is “a colloquial term for a private protection
arrangement.”202 He suggests that depending on who has access to state coercive capacity, a
“roof” may be provided by a criminal group, private security agency or by state employees,
normally high-ranking officials. Ideally, the roof or protection is provided as a public good
by a developed state.”203
Table 1. Vadim Volkov’s typology of roofs
Informal State Roof
Illegal
Public
State Protection (public)
Criminal Groups
Private
Legal
Private Security Agencies
Building on this typology, it is argued that the prevalence of certain types of roofs
correlates with the elite-organized crime dominance model outlined above, as well as with
202 Volkov (2002).
203 Ibid.
State Capture
Crime groups/gangs
under state control
Organized crime
groups co-opting
state institutions
es creating and
promoting
anized crime
Elites seeking
services from
organized crime
Elites monopolizing
control over organized
crime activities
Organized crime
groups developing
corrupting and
collusive relations
with elites
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the specific type of state elaborated in this section. The following tables sum up this
argument.
Table 2. Volkov’s Typology of Roofs and the Elite-Organized Crime Model
Illegal
Informal State Roofs
Elite dominance model
Predatory State
Georgia (November 2003-present)
Kyrgyzstan (May 2006-present)
Ukraine (1998-December 2004)
Other examples:
Russia (under Putin)
Serbia (under Milosevic)
Nigeria (under Abacha)
Public
State Protection (public goods)
Organized crime at predatory stage
Democratic, developed state
Examples: United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria
Private
Criminal Groups Roof
Underworld dominance model
Criminalized, Mafia State
Kyrgyzstan (1991-2000/1; March 2005-May
2006)
Georgia (1991-1998)
Ukraine (1991-1997-8)
Other examples:
Tajikistan (during the civil war and in its direct
aftermath)
Russia (under Yeltsin)
Some African states (Namibia, Ghana)
Bolivia under General Louis Garcia Meza (1980-
1981)
Legal
Private Security Agencies’ Roof
Symbiotic Balance Model
Fragmented, Privatised State
Ukraine (January 2005-present)
Kyrgyzstan (2003-March 2005)
Georgia (2001-2003)
Russia (during transition from Yeltsin to Putin)
Other examples:
Columbia
Mexico
3.Network approach and organized crime groups in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
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The absence of a clear structure and organization in organized crime was first noted
by Albini and Ianni and Reuss-Ianni in their research on crime groups in the United States.
They found that the groups were loosely-structured and based on cultural and economic
ties.204 Presently, the network approach is most popular in organized crime literature,205 as
opposed to the formerly influential Mafia model,206 also referred to as the “Godfather
model”207 where organized crime was “far-reaching, centrally-ruled, hierarchically-structured
criminal conspiracies” that sought monopoly over the markets for illegal goods and
services.208 The network approach, by contrast, is built on the collusive relationships between
the underworld and upperworld, since crime “networks cross easily from the illicit sector to
the licit one.”209
The Chambliss definition helps to understand the network paradigm. He writes that
organized crime is “a web of affiliations” including people in state institutions, law
enforcement structures, political parties, the business sector and criminal groups.210 He
argued that there is not a “godfather” in every crime network, and people “come and go,
dominant offices shift and change, roles vary and fluctuate … the entire system is simply a
collection of independent operators who cooperate and compete according to their ability,
their power, and their interests.”211 However, some hierarchy is present: “some people are
more important than others. In times of crisis some people have the power to make critical
decisions.” 212
Williams and Godson summarize well the major characteristics of criminal networks.
First, they posit that networks are “flexible and adaptable, able to respond quickly to market
opportunities and to the efforts of law enforcement to disrupt their activities;” second, “they
are highly resistant to disruption and have a significant capacity for reconstitution;” third,
“they are capable of considerable expansion through recruitment of new members, whether
individuals or organizations;” fourth, “they can extend in ways that allow them to cross
boundaries of demarcation such as that between the licit and illicit sectors of the economy
and society;” fifth, “networks seek to defend themselves through expansion into the
204 Albini (1971); Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972).
205 See for instance Lampe (2004); Baere (2003).
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upperworld and recruitment of politicians, bureaucrats, judges and law enforcement agents
who are susceptible to coercion or bribery.”213
The basis of the illicit networks is of vital importance. A number of factors that are
referred to here as connecting nodes have played a role in the formation of crime groups and
the forging of links with the upperworld in the three countries. These nodes are essential to
identify, since as Williams and Godson wrote, criminal networks will not be easily defeated
unless the nodes and connections that are identified and eliminated are those that are critical
to the functioning of the network.214
It has been argued that organized crime networks in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are
based on kinship ties, such as friendship and family. In Georgia, criminal networks are
mainly based on family allegiance and friendship, while in Kyrgyzstan, tribal allegiances and
zemliachestvo (networks of people from the same village/town/region) are most important.
Traditional norms of solidarity play a less important role in the criminal networks of Ukraine
that are more “pragmatic coalitions of convenience” 215 based on material interest. However,
we should not underestimate the importance of material interest in the Georgian and Kyrgyz
cases. Blood kinship ties play a crucial role in the recruitment of agents, but money keeps the
partnerships together.
Here the difference between strong ties vis-à-vis weak ones is useful. Weak ties “span
relatively heterogeneous segments of society rather than being clan or kinship based”216 and
they link members of different small groups.217 On the contrary, strong ties link the members
of the same group or family218 and are mainly blood kinship-based. Thus, kinship and
marriage would qualify as strong ties and blat and clientelism as weak ties.219
Other divisions affecting the structure of crime groups include ethnicity and
regionalism. In Georgia, mainly ethnic and sub-ethnic differences prevail, taking, for instance
Abkhazian, Ossetian and Svanetian crime groups. Likewise, in Kyrgyzstan, there are
Chechen criminal groups in the north and Uzbek ones in the south. However, the importance
of the north-south divide in Kyrgyz organized crime and the east-west divide in Ukraine’s
organized crime groups is not clear, mainly because many criminal relationships are initiated
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in prison where certainly, the inmates are not divided according to regional affiliation,
allowing criminal networks that originated in prisons to transcend regions.
The networks vary depending on the type of illegal operation. More sophisticated
networks, involving politicians and businessmen, can form for smuggling illicit or licit
materials, not illicit only, and sometimes for single deals. Cigarette smuggling, for instance,
may involve more upperworld actors than the smuggling of radioactive materials. The very
same networks may engage in smuggling of both licit and illicit items. Thus, a criminal
network engaged in the wholesale smuggling of fuel may also get involved in the trafficking
of radioactive materials. For instance Oleg Khintsagov, a Russian citizen, who was caught in
a sting operation for smuggling 100 grams of HEU from the Russian Federation for the
purpose of sale in Turkey, was an ordinary smuggler engaged in bringing food products from
North Ossetia to Georgia.220 Importantly, more stable and no less sophisticated collusive
networks can develop over the illicit wholesale trade in legal goods, for instance tobacco
products. One of the largest cigarette importer companies in Georgia was protected by the
Minister of the Interior for several years. Certainly, the regular illicit share of profit from
illegal shipments, usually involving paying less custom duties through under-declaring the
importing goods, was paid to this official.221 This kind of network is less likely to develop for
smuggling radioactive substances due to the nature of the materials involved.
Another crucial emphasis made throughout this dissertation is the focus on the links
between law enforcement officials and criminals. As Williams argues, links with law
enforcement agencies that involve exchange of information or protection for money may lead
to the hijacking of the criminal justice system by organized crime groups, and its ultimate
paralysis.222 Naylor argues that with the penetration of organized crime into the legal
economy, the nature of corruption becomes much more insidious. Corruption targets higher
levels of bureaucracy, especially in law enforcement structures.223
4.Toward measuring the change in organized crime
In the late 1970s, Marxist-influenced criminologist William Chambliss asked what could
be done about the entrenched crime networks in the United States. He thought the
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suppression of organized criminality would require “a change in political economy possible
only through revolution.”224 There is no comprehensive work done on the changes in
organized crime or the impact of revolutions, democratisation or transition on criminal
activity. Scholars almost unanimously admit that the research on measurement of and
changes in organized crime is underdeveloped. Although it is accepted that organized crime
has the capacity to reconfigure and reconstitute its organizational structure225 in response to
changes, how it is accomplished and what these changes might be requires further scholarly
research. In this section, an attempt is made to link the discussions in transitology and
criminology literature in order to provide foundation for further inquiry into the
transformation of organized crime in response to changes in its political and economic
environment.
Leggett applies three major schools of classical criminology to the study of crime in
transition countries. These are anomie/strain, learning/differential association and control
theory. Each of these theories predicts an increase in crime in transition countries. The
anomie/strain theory, advanced by Merton, is based on Durkheim’s coinage of the term
“anomie” describing the state of “normlessness.” He postulated, “during periods of rapid
social change, traditional norms may be viewed as no longer applicable, leaving people free
to pursue any ends by any means.” This theory has normally been focused on pressures that
build up when society promotes a goal that is not attainable by a segment of the population.
Barak summarized Merton’s position: “crime emerges in the societies where material wealth
is idealized and where the available or legitimate means for obtaining the valued ends are
systematically denied to groups of people. In response to the social problem of anomie/strain,
people adapt in one or more of several ways, including acceptance of innovation, or the
pursuing of the cultural goals of success through illegitimate or criminal means.”226
The learning/differential association theory was founded on the work of Sutherland and is
also associated with the Chicago School. This theory principally argues that people living in
areas of anonymity and heterogeneity, particularly poor urban youth, generate their own
subcultures of crime. Leggett argues that the fragmented and heterogeneous nature of many
developing countries makes them prime candidates for the growth of alternative criminal
cultures. The theory stresses excluded groups as prone to involvement in criminal activity.
Control theory, as articulated by Hirch, posits that human beings naturally break the law
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when sufficient social bonds do not constrain action.227 All these theories of criminology are
more applicable to the long-term vice short-term consequences of transitions, but some of
their assumptions will be used when applicable.
What is clear from the organized crime literature is that organized crime is “very
adaptable to changed circumstances.”228 Certainly, the resilience of criminal networks is
cemented into the societies in which the networks developed, “within its institutions and with
the full participation and consent of its citizens.”229 However, changes in these societies, such
as transitions or revolutions, certainly do make an impact on organized crime.
Durkheim argues that most societies have regulatory mechanisms to restrain criminal
behaviour through both formal sanctions and social norms, but when society is disturbed by
some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable to
exercise this influence.230 Organized crime in Bulgaria was created by the “transitional
state.”231 Sicilian mafia grew significantly during the years immediately following the
unification of Italy in an area that was previously under authoritarian rule and in which
Republican institutions were unfamiliar, compared to other parts of Italy.232 Behan argues
that the Camorra in Italy emerged “during the chaotic vacuum of power in the years between
1799 and 1815.”233 The importance of the power vacuum has also been stressed by other
scholars. Skaperdas argued that a “power vacuum can be created by revolutions, wars and
major political change. With the previous political authority and institutions gone, and, [with]
new effective ones taking time to develop, there can be long periods of time during which
people face physical insecurity in addition to more complex problems of uncertainty and
insecurity of contract enforcement.”234 The transition is accompanied by a chaotic period
where control is secured neither by the previous authoritarian or premodern institutions, nor
by their more modern, democratic successors.235 This creates significant gaps in state
capacity that are eagerly filled by organized crime groups.236 Huntington and others argue
that transitions can lead to the breakdown of centralized pyramids of bribe collection, which
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multiplies the bribe-takers.237 The increase of corrupt officials in the post-transition period
improves the chances of organized crime groups for success.
The Transitology school’s discussion of uncertainty is helpful here, and is
summarized as the “high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected
events, insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and
interests, plasticity and even indefinition of political identities, as well as talents of specific
individuals” play a role.238 Hope, opportunity, choice, incorporation of new actors, shaping
and renewal of political identities, and inventiveness239 are characteristic of the politics of
transition. O’Donnell observes that, during transitions, all actors have to function in great
uncertainty and the choices of the actors frequently lead to numerous unexpected and
unintended consequences.240 In general, this kind of chaos is an ideal breeding ground for
organized crime, due to confusion over acceptable behavior norms and temptations of former
and current state officials to work with criminals.241
The notion of “criminogenic asymmetries” is useful here, defined by Nikos Passas as
“structural disjunctions, mismatches and inequalities in the sphere of politics, culture, the
economy and the law.” These asymmetries “first, generate or strengthen the demand for
illegal goods and services; second, generate incentives for particular actors to participate in
illegal transactions; and third, reduce the ability of authorities to control illegal activities.”242
Revolutions eliminate some criminogenic asymmetries and generate others. “Political
opportunity structures,” a term coined in corruption literature by Kitschelt and later borrowed
by Heywood, can also be related to criminogenic asymmetries. Revolutions may contribute to
the emergence of some “political opportunity structures” and the removal of others.
Regarding the Georgian example, public trust in a reformed law enforcement structure can
translate into high rates of crime reporting to the police by the population, as well as
increased cooperation between law enforcement structures and the general public. High trust
in police also removes the constraints on police behaviour, resulting in the abuse of power by
high-ranking police officials.
Transitologists differentiate between pacted and non-pacted transitions. Pacts are
accords between incumbents of the regime and the opposition that, while not obstructing
regime change, assure the continued and significant influence of past rulers and elites after
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238 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 5).
239 Ibid., p. 19.
240 O’Donnel (1986, p. 15).
241 Godson (2003, p. 11).
242 Passas (2001, p. 23).
44
regime change. Gramscian’s concept of transformismo may also be useful here. As Femia
explains, “the dominant groups keep their power through transformismo, the practice of
incorporating the leaders of potentially hostile groups into the elite network.”243 This concept
draws attention to the active role and dynamic survival of various elements of the old system,
as well as their reconstitution within the new institutional framework.244 Alternatively, the
factions of the ancien regime may be removed from power as a result of revolutions, which
means that those involved in organized criminal activity or protecting organized crime groups
either lost their influence to some extent or were removed from power altogether. However,
this does not necessarily stop organized criminal activity, because “clients will shift to other
patrons and continue their operations.”245 The alien-conspiracy/bureaucracy paradigm,
formerly the dominant approach of law enforcement in North America, incorrectly assumes
that disabling the leadership of organized crime groups will end criminal activity.246 Strange,
referring to the Italian case, states that after jailing many criminal figures, the government
remained “burdened with the legacy of a symbiotic relationship with the mafia. It has not
proved easy to reverse decades of political malpractice.”247 As posited by the enterprise
approach, the crackdown on crime groups and capture of their leaders often has little impact
because “the business simply goes somewhere else under new management.”248
The effect of removal of the “old guard” may be dual: first, new organized crime
groups might emerge with links to new political elites, and second, old organized crime
groups might consolidate their power through new government connections. After the
departure of Romanian President Iliescu in 1996, organized crime offered its services to the
new government. Despite their being put on the defensive through the anti-corruption
activities of the new government for one year, most of the corrupt retained their enormous
wealth, money, and influence, though the sources of their revenue had dried up. At the same
time, some of the new incumbents also started to sell influence.249
Organized crime groups may lose their influential patrons as a result of clean-up in
the government. The elimination of protectors may inflict a considerable blow on their
activity and the ultimate effect can be the decrease of organized crime. Regarding pacted
transition, in its presence the negotiation between elites in power and elites outside as in the
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case of Ukraine, may sustain organized crime. The absence of pacted agreement, as in the
Georgian case, contributes to the decrease of organized crime.
The influence of “pre-revolutionary” elites in the “post-revolutionary” setting is a
crucial variable here. Pacted agreements guarantee the significant retention of “reform
spoilers” who might oppose change in post-revolutionary governments. For instance, there is
some strong evidence that post-revolutionary reform in Serbia was undermined by the pact
made between incoming “revolutionary” elites and the secret police.250 Transitologists speak
about the persistence of decidedly authoritarian actors who control important resources of
power.251 O’ Donnell and Schmitter point out that the structures and even the personnel
inherited from previous democracies have shown a surprising capacity for revival.252 At the
same time these people, with their attitudes and competencies and the networks of solidarity
existing among them, would constitute a threat to the new regime if they were allowed access
to important political, administrative or professional positions.253 Hence, the previously
influential elites and criminal actors may fight back in the case of eminent threat, this
resistance perhaps finding its expression in attempts at “counter-revolution” or derailing
reform efforts, as happened in Georgia and Ukraine.
Staniszkis calls the strategy of past incumbents the “politics of institutionalization,”
the informal networks that could not officially institutionalize their power position use
various techniques to promote anarchy within the state as a method of quasi-institutionalizing
their control over crucial economic and political processes.254 Otherwise, the “old guard”
may use financial capital, compromising information (kompromat) and access to various
informal networks to stay untouched. For instance, in the “power conversion” concept,
groups that hold a privileged position under one political system through their control of
resources, are able to preserve their privileged status under a new system by shifting their
control to resources of a different kind. An example is the post-Soviet transition, when former
Soviet nomenklatura retained their dominant position through trading their political capital
for economic capital and taking control over the privatisation process.255 In our case studies
of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the pre-revolutionary Shevardnadze, Kuchma and
Akaev elites, respectively, managed to retain some of their assets.
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Godson develops a useful framework for analysing the impact of various variables on
organized crime. He identifies political, social and economic factors that facilitate or catalyze
the formation and evolution of a political-criminal nexus. Referring to political factors,
Godson mentions that the nexus develops when the state is too unitary or non-competitive,
and/or where the regime and bureaucracies are weak relative to society or other political
actors. In these circumstances, “inefficient premodern institutions, personalistic and/or
patronage systems, and governmental inability to compel citizens or officials to obey the laws
appear to explain the tendency.” 256
Referring to cultural factors, Godson identifies several subcultural traits facilitating
the political-criminal nexus. He speaks about strong family and cultural conditions,
widespread public perception that corruption is “normal” and public perception of criminals
as cultural heroes. He also mentions that mafia groups may be tolerated as “a means to
control public order.”257 Williams and Godson put the informal institutions like patronage
and clientelism in their cultural model of organized crime and argue that such “patterns of
behaviour place much more emphasis on contacts and favours as a means of getting ahead
and accumulating wealth than on norms, standards of behaviour, or the rule of law. Such a
cultural climate easily condones criminal activities so long as they are successful in the
acquisition of resources.”258
Godson also discusses economic factors; he thinks that the level of efficiency and “speed,
simplicity and confidentiality” of the services provided to legitimate actors by criminal
organizations and their political collaborators is an important variable promoting the nexus.
Also, “the demand for illegal goods and services and the effort to supply the demand can
contribute significantly to the creation of organized crime.”259 He stresses two contingent
factors facilitating the nexus: specific individuals and specific political circumstances.260 The
difference between the charismatic personality and Westernized outlook of the young and
energetic Mikheil Saakashvili, for instance, as opposed to the overbearing former Communist
party official Kurmanbek Bakiev, certainly played a role in the diverging policies against
organized crime in the two countries.
256 Godson (2003, p. 9).
257 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
258 Williams and Godson (2002, pp. 316-7).
259 Godson (2003, pp. 14-15).
260 Ibid., p. 15.
47
Chapter 4. Impact of Soviet and post-Soviet Organized Crime
Organized crime in the Soviet successor states has roots in the Soviet system, where
the corrupt communist elites and the swollen state that ruled both politics and economics in
an arbitrary manner became, we might say, one and the same. The entire state was run by a
single vertical executive power, that is, the Communist Party. It was this “state” that both
corrupted industrial managers and asked for the support of criminals.261 Since the breakup of
the Soviet Union, organized crime has been endorsed and supported by political and criminal
elites for various purposes; Underworld leaders avoided direct confrontation with the leaders
of newly independent states as had happened in Italy or Columbia at the end of the 1990s. As
Williams writes, most criminal organizations choose co-option rather than confrontation,
collusion rather than coercion, and the development of symbiotic rather than adversarial
relations with state authorities.262 Similarly, dominance has gradually switched to criminal
groups in a process which started in the 1960s and culminated during the breakup of the
Soviet Union, when state institutions collapsed and organized crime groups wielded power at
every level of society.
Hence, organized crime should be viewed as a process significantly delineated by the
Soviet system of governance. Contrary to the idea of the emergence of “a new form of
criminality,” post-Soviet organized crime is a logical continuation of the Soviet system and
has been significantly shaped by the Soviet past. In addition, organized criminality is not
viewed in this thesis as a separate phenomenon, but is embedded in the political and
economic environment, a crucial part of the Soviet and post-Soviet states. Viewing organized
crime as a process is significant in explaining the different patterns embedded in diverging
modes of governance and distinctive political cultures.
Three types of organized criminality were formed either in the Soviet Union or during
the transition of 1991-2 and continued to exist in the post-Soviet period: first, the traditional
or professional organized crime groups such as the so-called vory v zakone; second, the
functionally-based groups with a background in sports or common experience in Soviet
prisons that emerged during the post-Soviet transition, including newly established
entrepreneurs that frequently earned their initial capital through illicit means; third, “old
school ties” groups, i.e. former Communist nomenklatura and police/KGB networks.
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These three categories of criminals either competed for resources and influence, or
collaborated in organized criminal activities at different stages of the post-Soviet transition.
Initially, the professional criminals and bandits were more able to develop successful
racketeering schemes;263 yet, over time, the criminal kryshas (roofs) of the early and mid-
1990s were replaced with political (or administrative) kryshas. Earlier, various criminal
figures were providing protection for businesses from rival criminals and weak state law
enforcement structures. Afterwards, criminals as protectors were replaced by the
representatives of the legitimate sector. The officials of controlling and regulatory
institutions, especially law enforcement structures and different levels of the legislature,
became the main providers of protection.
These categories are not unconnected; for instance, some corrupt nomenklatura members
were simultaneously the managers of underground factories, and during transition they
became the heads of organized crime groups.
Several crucial Soviet legacies that affected the development of organized crime in the
post-Soviet period need to be stressed here. Firstly, the official Soviet planned economy
created the incentives for Post-Soviet shadow economies and contributed to the formation of
dual social norms. As Plekhanov notes, “society responded to the inefficiencies of command
economies by creating shadow economies.”264 The shadow economy developed as “an
alternative system” 265 in response to an irrational command economy. Moreover, private
industry existed in the Soviet Union under the cover of the state facilities. This hidden private
industry normally co-existed under the same name and under the same roof as the overt one,
with a state factory producing “left-hand goods” produced on the same equipment by the
same personnel (the managers of these factories were known as tsekhaviki) as the official
goods.266
The Soviet state simulateneously criminalized the activities which were considered
normal business practice in market economies, such as speculation, which was banned in the
Soviet Union as a “purchase or resale of goods with an aim of material profit.”267 Hence the
Soviet system made the easiest transactions illegal and in fact made illegality meaningless.268
Speculation was a natural by-product of the Soviet system, since there were items in demand
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which could not be easily bought in the stores.269 As a result, official propaganda created for
years an image of private businessmen as crooks, exploiters, black marketeers and swindlers,
in general “unjustly rich.”270 As a result, many in the post-Soviet context had a controversial
attitude toward the new emerging businesses that endures until today.271 The taboo on certain
types of legal behaviour also contributed to the formation of political-criminal links. For
instance some members of the nomenklatura loved to play cards. Unable to do so legally,
they frequently played for high stakes, secretly, in private apartments owned by the so-called
Husari, or professional card players. The latter commonly used the tactic of deliberately
losing to opponents as an alternative form of bribery of high ranking officials who could
potentially be used as protectors in other criminal activities that the Husari were engaged
in.272
Partially due to the condition of excessive state money being allocated for military
purposes,273 the command economy could not guarantee the flow of certain goods, and this
scarcity contributed to the flourishing of the black market. The problem became particularly
acute during the 1960s, just when the first political-criminal alliances emerged,274 including
the thieves-in-law, who established the links with nomenklatura and “red directors” of Soviet
factories. Also, corrupt party officials were sometimes using petty criminals to gather
kompromat on irritant figures.275
Corruption was a functional necessity in the over-centralized system.276 Bribery was
frequently the only way to circumvent the system. In the 1940-50s and the beginning of the
1960s, generalized corruption affected the entire legal system, from investigators in the
district prosecutor’s offices right up to the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the USSR.277
Corruption flourished most in the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) when everything was on sale,
including government positions and state awards (like that of Hero of Socialist Labour).278
At the same time, a ‘trade mafia’ developed which was a pyramid of payoffs
originating in the top ministries and the Central Committee, and trickling down to
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shopkeepers where everyone “got a piece.”279 In general, during the 1960s and 1970s, black
markets thrived in numerous fields: private manufacture of consumer goods in short supply;
currency speculation; and sale of grain and other primary food commodities that have been
diverted from the state supplies by illegal means.280 Naylor speaks about two main factors
promoting the development of black markets in the 1960s: first, the rise of a new generation
of Communist leaders who lacked ideological commitment to the principles of the Bolshevik
revolution, and second, the failure of the state planning model to meet consumer product
demands.281 Vaksberg says, “an oath of loyalty (to the Communist party) was now invalid
unless supported by its expression in material terms.”282 Fairbanks posits that after the death
of Stalin, the Soviet system, based on informal mechanisms of coordination, became more
loosely knit. Different centres of power resultously emerged on the national-level that were
based on patron-clientelist networks and were given political power by Stalin. Under the
conditions of weaker control these networks pursued their private ends.283
In the late Soviet period, Yuri Andropov (November 1982 - February 1984), who
successeded Brezhnev, tried to purge the Communist ranks of corruption, although it was
more about the desire of the Andropov administration to “invent” the politically useful threat
to fight, or to exaggerate the threat from the enemy in order to increase the legitimacy of the
government and help Andropov gain traction against his Kremlin enemies.284 This political
agenda, along with the image Andropov’s government tried to project as “intolerant of
official corruption”285 was more realistic than any actual measures against rampant bribery.
The second, most important element of the Soviet legacy is the tradition of informal
dealings. Many transactions were processed through personalized patronage systems based
on the exchange of favours. Alena Ledeneva thinks that blat started as an exchange of
“favours of access” that provided access to public resources through personal channels.286
Informal institutions like favouritism and nepotism were widely accepted practices in
the Soviet Union. Theft from the state was not regarded as real theft by the mass of the
population.287 As a result “contrasting perceptions of legal and illegal activities”288 developed
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in Soviet society that has repercussions for daily life and doing business in former Soviet
Union countries up to nowadays. At the same time, the Soviet state allowed “ordinary people
to manage on their own” and in case of conflict between individuals or organisations and the
State, the former always lost.289 Therefore, Soviet citizens felt the need to insure themselves
against loss. This survivalist culture flourished on the basis of the malfunctioning Soviet state
and gave birth to powerful informal institutions, which helped circumvent the inflexible
multi-layered Soviet bureaucracy. Connections based on family, relative, friend and
neighbour relationships were widely used for getting desired goods or services. The linkages
of blat, nepotism and cronyism survived in the weak post-Soviet states and perpetuated the
political-criminal nexus.
Officially, organized crime did not exist in the Soviet Union since Socialism and
Communism supposedly brought about the disappearance of crime.290 Crime was explained
as “a manifestation of the illnesses of capitalism.”291 From the late 1920s the statistical
records of criminal phenomena disappeared from public view, having been classified as state
secrets.292 In the 1970s, Nikolay Shchyolokov, the Minister of Interior (militsya) was
insisting that professional criminality had been eliminated in the 1950s.293 In fact, Stalin’s
totalitarian rule had eliminated much of the underground economic activity according to
some observers,294 though illegal businesses reportedly grew toward the end of Stalin’s
reign.295 It would also be difficult to deny the importance of the shadow economy since
Khrushchev’s tenure.
In 1980, one editor of a Soviet newspaper told a journalist, “we have no mafia in the
Soviet Union; get that into your head.”296 The existence of organized crime was only
officially admitted during the Gorbachev years. The 1983 decree on working with criminal
authorities instructed the Ministry of Interior and Secret services (KGB) to gather
compromising materials on professional criminals with the purpose of discrediting them
among their own peers, especially in the prisons.297 Another KGB instructional memo issued
on July 22, 1988, reported increasing relationships of vory (vory v zakone, or professional
criminals) with regulatory and law enforcement agencies and courts and recommended a
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number of measures to counter their influence. The directive advised using some of the vory
against the anti-Soviet activity among criminals.298
In 1989, reported crime had increased by 31.8 percent over 1988, while the
apprehension rate was up by only 1.4 percent.299 Overall, in 1989, 2 million crimes were
registered in the Soviet Union. The number increased to 2.7 million in 1990 and to 3 million
in 1991. However, these official statistics have been heavily criticized and experts estimated
15 times more than the reported numbers. In 1986-89, 12 million rubles worth of property
were looted and 15,500 cases of bribery were detected by law enforcement structures.300
Williams reported that old patterns from the Soviet Union survived and were revised to fit
new circumstances in the immediately post-Soviet space, with one crucial difference: unlike
Soviet times, criminal organization determined the rules of the game.301 Organized
criminality grew so strong toward the end of the USSR that one Kuchuuri, a thief-in-law of
Georgian origin, planned a terrorist act, an attempt to eliminate Mikhail Gorbachev, in
1987.302 Podlesskikh also describes how close the professional criminals were to controlling
the whole region of Ural in the heart of Russia in 1989.303
That was when “corruption, which in the old system was used to benefit the political
elites, became a major instrument used by organized crime to protect itself.”304 Corrupt links
between professional criminals and the representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura were
present early on. According to Serio “the vast majority of cooperatives and joint ventures at
the end of 1980s and beginning of the 1990s had been established by Communist party
officials and criminals primarily for signing fraudulent contracts with partners both in Russia
and abroad” as well as for money laundering and capital flight.305 These political-criminal
links carried over into the newly-independent states. Handelman uses Clausewitzian analogy
to describe post-Communist criminality, saying that crime in the post-Soviet era is often a
continuation of politics by other means.306
After the Soviet Law on Cooperatives, which permitted private entrepreneurship, was
enacted in May 1988, a new class of young businessmen emerged that started accumulating
resources and were frequently very entrepreneurial, which implied making money through
298 Ibid., pp. 70-1.
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any means, including extralegal. They were often under the influence and control of
professional criminals and bandits, with an estimated 50 percent of these new businessmen
under extortion, and paying 25 roubles daily to racketeers.307 In 1997-98 conflict kicked off
between new young entrepreneurs and old-line Communist bureaucrats.308 The former party
functionaries still in power either used legal power and the law to arrest them, labelling them
“mafia-profiteers,” or in other instances, joined them in previously banned “capitalist
endeavours.”309 Thus old and new came together “in the establishment of a variety of new
mercenary organized criminal adventures.”310
The simultaneous transition to a market economy and weakening of state institutions
gave rise to criminal groups’ trying to take over some of the state’s functions. These gangs,
whose members and leaders were mainly young people with shared backgrounds in sports or
as former inmates, initially engaged in predatory crimes such as protection rackets, debt
collection and contract enforcement. Gradually, they moved on to highly sophisticated
criminal activities such as drug smuggling and financial fraud, while developing collusive
and corrupting links with political and economic elites. Unlike newly-emerged gangsters, the
already-established professional criminals, vory v zakone successfully penetrated the
governments in covert or overt ways, for instance, the famous thief-in-law Jaba Ioseliani
became Georgian President Shevardnadze’s deputy. As a result, the distinctions between
legal and illegal business, politician, entrepreneur and criminal became highly blurred.311
VCIOM, Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, asked Soviet citizens in 1991,
“what do you understand Mafia to mean?’ Table 3 shows the results. Strikingly, more than
two-thirds of respondents referred to the state and the same number to the representatives of
state structures.
Table 3. Associations with the word Mafia (VCIOM)312
Actors of shadow economy 43%
Bureaucrats in ministries and public administration 36%
Party-State apparatus 34%
Criminals 25%
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Now we turn to elaboration of the specifics of the three groups of criminal actors
mentioned above.
1. Gangs and new criminal entrepreneurs
The Soviet Ministry of the Interior counted 30,000 members of organized crime
groups and 1300 crime groups in 1989-90. Interestingly, every fifth crime group had contacts
with state officials.313 All those who were professional criminals but not submitting to the
code of vory were labelled as “bandits.”314 The class of entrepreneurs with no roots in the
Soviet nomenklatura or in the Komsomol cycles had emerged already in the 1980s as a result
of Gorbachev’s liberalization policies. Many new kooperativs were run by young
businessmen with superb entrepreneurial skills, but because in the late Soviet period and the
early years of the post-Soviet transition running fully legal businesses was difficult due to
pervasive rent-seeking, vague legislation or weak criminal justice, many of these newcomers
to business gravitated to illegal activity.
Simultaneously, another class of young men trained in violence emerged to claim
their own market shares. Finckenauer and Waring described this category of post-Soviet
criminals:
These were young people – in their late ’teens, twenties and thirties – who
were not criminals before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but who did of
necessity have experience in the black market and the shadow economy. Some
were students and graduates of higher education; others were in the military.
None had attractive job prospects in the legitimate sector. They were a pool
for recruitment by criminal organizations in Russia or they operated with their
own small networks. Unlike that of the professionals, their criminal behaviour
was not very well entrenched. They were first generation criminals, and their
crimes were most often crimes of opportunity.315
The majority of these young criminals had a background in sports. Thus, the sports-
crime relationship merits some discussion here. Sports was highly valued and therefore
extensively funded by the Soviet state. Apart from professional training, the concept of
Soviet “mass sports” implied the involvement of every Soviet citizen in physical exercise.
313 Gurov (1995, p. 30).
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Athletics on any level was viewed by the Soviets as contributing to extrinsic functions for
Soviet productivity, health, national pride and military preparedness.316 The development of
sports was especially closely linked with the military goals of the Soviet Union throughout its
history. Stalin once remarked to Eisenhower that physical culture and sports enhanced the
fighting spirit.317
Since the late years of Stalin, the USSR appeared full-scale on the international sport
scene, outdistanced all other countries in medal counts at the Olympics and won more
international meets and championships than any other nation.318 Volkov argues that
“champions were role models for the young and symbols of success.”319 Unfortunately, the
involvement of high-ranking sportsmen in crime coined their new image as “social
bandits.”320 As Marat puts it, towards the end of the 1980s, “the physically strong criminal
figure became a cult image among younger people.”321 The evident lack of punishment for
powerful criminal groups further “corrupted the young generation by showing that crime
pays and signifies real power.”322 Thus, during Perestroika and the break-up of the Soviet
Union many young sportsmen, hoping to improve and reinforce their social standing, joined
“status communities” revolving around athlete-criminals.
In this period, the first groups of “racketeer sportsmen” appeared in the post-Soviet
republics. Funding for sports had been dramatically cut and many sportsmen trained in the
use of controlled violence lacked legitimate income. As Volkov argues, “the withdrawal of
state sponsorship and the relaxation of the constraints that had once turned the art of warfare
into a rule-governed nonviolent competition were sufficient to launch a dangerous process
whereby sportsmen started to look for alternative employment… the shared experience of
being one sport team, which involves regular training and competition as well as shared
victories and defeats is likely to create strong trust and group coherence… which provides a
social basis for the conversion of teammates into members of a racketeering gang.”323 Also,
underworld bosses were “quick to realize the importance of sportsmen and organized
associations and charities in order to attract them.”324
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The emergence of sportsmen-criminal groups was particularly evident in Russia,325
although other newly emerged states also experienced the same problem. Another portion of
the Soviet sportsmen, especially very successful and experienced ones, made sure that the
post-Soviet transition benefitted them. The “star treatment” of some performers and their
inclusion in the country’s “honour list” expressed by awarding the supreme award “the Order
of Lenin” to Soviet champions326 had made them into elites. Consequently, some of the
sportsmen successfully engaged in shadowy privatization deals during post-Soviet transition;
others entered politics and have been elected in the legislative bodies, while yet others
became criminal leaders, capitalizing on their vast connections to political and business
elites.
Hence, the involvement of sportsmen in organized crime can be divided into three
stages that overlap in time, though varying in degree of sophistication. First, engagement in
the protection racket in the late 1980s and early 1990s: in this period, the respect for
discipline and the physical force of sportsmen327 was of paramount importance, especially
given the limited availability of arms. The major weapons were fists and baseball bats in the
first violent conflicts between gangs, and sportsmen quickly proved their superiority.328 More
advanced weaponry was soon available, but the field of racketeering was already penetrated
by criminal-sportsmen. Second came a period of engagement in more sophisticated criminal
activities, such as debt recovery, dispute settlement and contract enforcement. As the market
economy was establishing itself while state capacity did not concurrently develop and
remained limited, and law enforcement was inefficient and courts corrupt, businesspeople
started using the services of sportsmen for collecting debts and enforcing contracts. Third, a
period emerged of engagement in political-criminal clans and penetration of state structures.
In this third phase, some sportsmen turned into the leaders of political-criminal clans, co-
opted and recruited representatives of government institutions—especially law enforcement
structures—and legalized themselves through becoming politically active and winning seats
in legislative bodies. In sum, sportsmen have played a key role in organized crime in all three
countries. The crucial distinction between Georgia on the one hand and Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan on the other is that sportsmen held leading positions in criminal groups in
325 On Russia see also Kryshtanovskaia (1996).
326 Riordan (1980, pp. 2, 48).
327 Volkov, “Security and Rule-Enforcement in Russian Business: The Role of the ‘Mafia’ and the State,”
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328 Volkov (2002, p. 7).
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Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, while in Georgia they are mainly subordinated to thieves-in-law and
act as operational/field leaders.
2. Professional criminals (Vory v Zakone)
Vory v zakone (“thieves-in-law”) are senior criminal figures in the former Soviet
Union who “maintain, interpret and enforce a ‘thieves code.’”329 The very term vory v
zakone, in translation thief-in-law, reportedly comes from their function of maintaining order
based on illicit norms.330 Such criminal leaders first came on the scene in the Soviet Union
during the 1920s. They shared similarities with the early Sicilian mafia godfathers by
providing an alternative power structure to the State, operated within a defined honour code
and maintained strict secrecy. “Vor” had no right to work either in prison or at large, to serve
in the army or to collaborate with state representatives.331 Importantly, vory were supposed to
show contempt towards the accumulation of assets and were not expected to own property.332
As Handelman notes “no thief of the old school was interested in getting rich.”333 Over time,
and particularly in the 1980s, the role and code of the vory v zakone evolved, but such leaders
remain important within former Soviet bloc organised crime groups, especially in Georgia.
Avtoriteti are the more numerous and entrepreneurial gang leaders334 not necessarily
belonging to the “Thieves World” of the “Vory.” However, avtoriteti can be a “transformed
vor” as well, of those who moved to more risky spheres of criminal activity, such as drug
trafficking and financial fraud. Some of these avtoritety were more influential than vory. This
new type of criminal did not pay attention to the vory. 335 In 1985 and 1986, sixty percent of
newly authorized cooperatives were run by the avtoritety.336
Vory can be compared to Sicilian mafia godfathers, based upon the power the two
institutions have wielded in the Soviet Union and Italy. Regardless, a few important
distinctions need to be made. First, the origin of the institution of vory v zakone is in gulags,
the Soviet labour camps.337 Thus vory are the product of prison culture that distinguishes
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them from Sicilian Mafiosi.338 Second, there is no strict vertical hierarchy in the vory’s world
as in Sicilian mafia clans. The vory’s world can be described as “egalitarian.” However,
individuals differ in terms of their power, resulting from their criminal influence and
financial capacity. As Varese argues, the vory are a fraternity of equals, although a distinction
can be made between junior and senior vory (pakhany).339
Oleinik enumerates all the functions of the thief-in-law: developing new norms in
joint local, regional or national meetings (skhodka); the exercising of “justice;” propaganda
about the criminal lifestyle; the organization of a joint fund (obshiak); material aid to
inmates; the organization of the rackets of the players in the illicit economy; the diffusion of
information/communications; and contacts with the outside world.340 The vory exerted a
special hidden power in Soviet life and were regarded as men of honour and authority, who
“acted like judges, politicians, and diplomats.”341
Gurov cites data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, concluding that vory were
“firmly established by the beginning of the 1930s.”342 The penetration of legal economies and
political elites was initially achieved through contacts made in Soviet prisons with other
criminals, underground entrepreneurs and Soviet dissidents.343 Initially the vory’s code
prohibited any collaboration with the authorities344 and called for punishment by death
penalty of those vory who would do so.345 The world of professional criminals nonetheless
sometimes displayed striking similarities with that of the Soviet nomenklatura. For instance,
the oath sworn by the thieves-in-law started with a phrase similar to the oath sworn by a
member of the Communist Party.346
As Galeotti mentions, a minority of truly criminal inmates were successfully co-opted
into helping the authorities to control millions of dissident intellectuals, out-of-favour
Communists and other political prisoners.347 Glazov argues that three percent of criminals
controlled the rest of the criminal world in prisons.348 Certainly 500,000 inmates in 1930
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were difficult to control otherwise.349 Apparently, this cooperation has been institutionalized.
Oleinik shows that no criminal can become a supervisor in a prison without the consent of
and collaboration with the authorities.350
The changes in this rule first came about as a result of the Bitches War in 1947-53. 351
The bitches (suki, meaning criminals who snitched or collaborated with the authorities) won
with the apparent support of prison administration,352 and the new thieves’ code no longer
proscribed collaboration with authorities.353 Authorities began to consider the thieves useful
for “keeping the prison population more dependent on the authorities.”354 Those vory who
still did not collaborate with Soviet authorities were kept in adverse conditions in the Siberian
prison Belyi Lebed.355 Those vory who would write a renouncement of the title of
professional criminal were relocated to detention places with better conditions.356 Also, an
official decree of the Supreme Soviet dated June 4, 1947 stated that stricter punishments
contributed to greater cooperation of professional criminals with the authorities, and
produced more collaborators (otkazniki in Russian).357 Additionally, two gatherings (skhodka
in criminal slang) of the major vory v zakone in Russia, one at the end of the 1970s and one in
the mid-1980s, had a significant influence on the development of the nexus between
professional criminals and nomenklatura and the “red directors” (the managers of state-
owned factories) of the Soviet Union. At their first meeting in Kislovodsk, agreements with
the tsekhaviki, a Russian slang word denoting Russian private entrepreneurs banned by Soviet
law, was forged, in which their activities would be assisted in return for payments of roughly
10 per cent of their income.358 This working relationship across the black economy would be
“repugnant to any right-thinking vor.”359
As a result, well-entrenched illicit networks developed, comprising professional
criminals and banned businesses. The flourishing corruption in party structures of the Soviet
Union360 and the paralysis of the command-administrative economy361 in the 1970s facilitated
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the process. Another meeting in Tbilisi in 1982 was convened to discuss the future of the
criminal world. Two views dominated the meeting: several influential thieves-in-law wanted
to remain loyal to the traditional rules of the Soviet underworld and stay away from politics,
but another faction advocated a path of penetrating Soviet political and economic life.362 The
supporters of the latter view ruled the day.
In the late 1980s, the Russian Ministry of the Interior estimated that 20 percent of all
professional criminals had associations with cooperatives, private or semi-private businesses
(restaurants, cafes and art galleries).363 In 1985, an order of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior
deplored the merging of shopkeepers with the elite of the criminal world, the increasing
activity of professional criminals and the involvement of sportsmen and former policemen in
criminal groups.364 Hence, during the Soviet period vory controlled a large part of the
underground trade in spare parts, automobiles, timber, caviar and gems. In the final year of
the Soviet Union’s existence, this black economy was valued at 110 billion rubles.365
In 1991-1993, there were 600 vory v zakone operating in the former Soviet Union,
according to the Russian Ministry of the Interior. The figure increased to 800 in 1999.366
Roughly one-third of these were ethnic Russians and another third were ethnic Georgians.
The remainder represented various nationalities such as Armenian (8.2%), Azerbaijani
(5.2%), Uzbek, Ukrainian, Kazakh and Abkhazian, among others (21.9%). 367 There are now
an estimated 400 Georgian vory v zakone (the figure almost doubled after the break-up of the
Soviet Union). In 1999 Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin complained that 40 percent
of the thieves-in-law and criminal group leaders in Moscow were Georgian.368
Presently, the vory v zakone in post-Soviet Eurasia can be divided into three
categories: the so-called pikovie, those who remained loyal to the traditional rules or code of
conduct of the vory (Gurov calls all Caucasian criminals pikovie);369 the polskie or
atashedshie (those who defected and now disregard traditional rules); and the apelsini (those
who have bought the title of thief-in-law for an amount estimated at between 100,000 USD to
150,000 USD 370). The thieves also got younger. In the traditional code of vory there was a
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proportional relationship between prison time served and level of respect in the criminal
community.371 Already, in 1988, every eighth vor had no previous or current prison sentence,
according to the Soviet Ministry of the Interior.372
Importantly, the professional criminals maintain the obshiak, the criminal cash desk
that accumulates money mainly from criminal activities, or from contributions by ordinary
inmates. For instance, during Soviet times, every inmate paid 1 ruble out of every 5 rubles
spent on products to the obshiak. Twenty percent of the money sent to him from outside of
prison and 20 percent of the money won playing cards was also transferred to the obshiak.373
Oleinik reports that these terms appeared in the late 1940s and early 1950s, designating an
illicit tax imposed by the blatnye. It disappeared in 1959 after the Soviet authorities started to
separate the prison regimes in line with the new code for applying sentences.374 This
illustrates how the underworld practices change in reaction to policy changes by the legal
authorities.
These obshiaks were accumulating large amounts of money. In 1987-88 law
enforcement structures confiscated 350,000 rubles belonging to obshiaks.375 Initially obshiaks
were only maintained and operated in the prisons, although in 1970s they appeared outside of
the prisons as well.376 As a result, every city in the Soviet Union had its own obshiak
accumulating money in the range of 50,000 to 1 million rubles depending on the size of the
city.377 The funds gathered were used for several purposes: they were sent to prisons for the
care of incarcerated fellow professional criminals; used for bribing officials in and outside of
the prison; or used for planning and implementing new criminal activities. The money was
also spent for the families of dead professional criminals. For instance, families of the vor
who passed away in 1979 were getting 300 roubles every month from the obshiak.378
The vory were influential during Soviet times, since they controlled the prison
population as well as the majority of the criminals outside of prison. According to Gurov, 80-
100 percent of the inmates in Georgia and Central Asia were supporting vory, while the
figure was lower in Russia, amounting to only 50 percent.379 Gurov recounts an interesting
case when the secretary of the district Communist party convened the heads of district law
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enforcement structures as well as vor v zakone to discuss the problems of criminality.380 This
started changing during the breakup of the Soviet system, and the influence of vory peaked in
the early 1990s. In 1989, the law enforcement structures appeared unable on their own and
without the assistance of professional criminals, to appease inmates in several prison
uprisings.381
The mid-1990s witnessed major conflicts between professional criminals and other
types of criminal actors, such as former nomenklatura networks and new criminal
entrepreneurs. In Russia, first the Uralmashevskaya criminal grouping refused to declare
loyalty to professional criminals and did not pay money to the obshiak. Other groups of
young criminals followed their example.382 The influence of professional criminals has
proved most resilient in the prison system. For instance, in Russia and Ukraine, where vory
had already by the mid-1990s lost much of their influence, they still maintain a certain degree
of control over the inmates. Similarly vory remain influential in Kyrgyz prisons. The
situation changed in Georgia since Rose Revolution because all professional criminals have
been put in a separate prison, thus isolating them from the rest of inmates.
3. Nomenklatura and police/KGB networks
Rosner showed that the major source of Soviet crime was the Soviet regime and the
Communist party. Party leaders at central and regional levels, officials of the special services,
factory managers and other officials looted state-operated industries for their personal gain.383
Also, access to the good life in an environment of goods scarcity depended on political
power, not on income.384
Kelly, Schatzberg and Ryan argue that the Communist Party could be thought of as a
great crime family.385 By the same token, Simis reports that organized crime in the Soviet
Union was “everything that may be lumped together as the Soviet regime.”386 Nikiforov
points out the key difference between Western and Soviet organized crime, arguing that in
the USSR the crime “figures occupied key positions within the state bureaucracy.”387 Hence,
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criminal activities in the Soviet Union qualified as corruption rather than as Mafia, as was
convincingly argued by Varese.388 In fact, the Communist party did not recognize the rule of
law, as Nikita Krushchev’s statement shows:
“Who’s the boss: we or the law? We are masters over the law, not the law over us –so
we have to change the law; we have to see to it that it is possible to execute these
speculators.”389
All institutions, including law enforcement, media and enterprise, were subordinate
neither to the law nor to the government, but to the will of the Party First Secretary.390 The
highest ministerial posts were for sale. Simis estimates that the going rate for ministry
positions would range from 100,000 rubles for less important posts (such as Minister for
Social Security) up to 250,000-300,000 rubles for more important positions such as the
Ministries of Trade or Light Industry.391 Corruption pertained to all levels of government
both centrally and in the Soviet Socialist Republics. Corruption was tolerated on local and
regional levels since the ruling elite were not capable of “providing the lower levels of the
gigantic ruling apparat with the same privileges.”392 Clean-up was impossible because that
would entail “the total and constant purging of the ruling apparat throughout the country”
that would destabilize the apparat itself.393 Gurov reports, based on Soviet Interior Ministry
statistics, that in 1976, 986 cases of state asset looting were reported and the figure increased
to 13,314 cases in the period of 1983-87.394
These corrupt networks acted very flexibly during the post-Soviet transition. Los and
Zybertowicz showed, regarding the example of Poland in their seminal work Privatizing the
Police-State, how the Soviet nomenklatura has preserved power through initially trading their
political capital for economic gains and then using these gains to recapture political power.395
The Soviet nomenklatura managed to keep its power in the post-Communist period in most
countries, and where it failed to do so immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it
returned to power after a short interval, as happened in Georgia after the ouster of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, former dissident and democratically elected President.
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The Communist nomenklatura successfully gained a crucial stake in the economies of the
former Soviet Union republics through privatization during the transition to a market
economy. The most lucrative sectors of the economy, such as major factories and plants, fell
into the hands of former Communist elites and individuals related to them through friendship
or kinship ties. These people then became the core of the “new” political elite of the newly
independent states. As one scholar argues, former apparatchiks became new
entrepreneurchiks.396 The party members were soon catapulted with relative ease from
“politburos into boardrooms of many companies.”397 The nomenklatura attained a new role as
property holders with their private property rights guaranteed by the state, something they
could never have hoped to achieve under Communism.398 These shadow economic elites
have been frequently referred as red directors or tsekhaviki and deltsi.399
Some even argue that the Soviet elite/Communist party never lost their predominant
influence in the underworld.400 The black economy did not operate independently from the
state apparatus: state officials retained control over enforcement agencies as well as
production.401 The Soviet nomenklatura has been left with administrative control of most of
the assets of Soviet power.402 Glinkina argues that corrupt officials and nomenklatura
representatives have become the key new owners during the post-Soviet transition.403
Not only did the nomenklatura networks hijack the process of privatization, but they
also moved into the leadership of purely criminal gangs. Handelman estimates that 80 percent
of the chiefs of small criminal groups in the mid-1990s were former deputy directors or
administrators of factories and enterprises. Crime leaders were also former bureaucrats,
industrial managers, procurators, or judges.404
The same applies to the networks by “old school” connections, such as former
officers of the militsia, the Soviet police and the KGB (Soviet secret police). Many of the
officers of these structures resigned after the break-up of the Soviet Union and moved into
the newly emerging business of private security companies. Capitalizing on their strong ties
with former colleagues still widely represented in law enforcement structures, these networks
managed to get their share of the post-Soviet economy and gradually evolved into the main
396 Tarkowski (1990).
397 Frydman, Murphy and Rapaczynski (1998, p. 43).
398 Ibid., p. 44.
399 Russian slang words denoting private entrepreneurs banned by Soviet law.
400 Kelly, Schatzberg, Ryan (1995, p. 261).
401 Varese (2002, p. 187).
402 Handelman (1995, p. 7).
403 Glinkina (1994).
404 Handelman (1995, p. 57).
65
providers of protection, as discussed below. Louise Shelley argues that after the Soviet
collapse, legitimate opportunities to participate in trade arose. But the import-export sector
was often dominated by former and current KGB personnel who had developed ties
overseas.405
The intermingling of politicians and businessmen, or apparatchiks and
entpreneurchiks, created crucial ground for major organized criminal activity in post-Soviet
Eurasia. Two parallel processes of political elites becoming businessmen and businessmen
being co-opted into politics led to the confusion of public and private interests. Enterprises
having direct (owned by) or indirect (being protected by, based on family/friendship or any
other form of patron-client relationship) connections with powerful politicians were better off
as they could secure the most lucrative government contracts and remain undisturbed by the
tax collectors and law enforcement agencies.
The term oligarchs, which still holds negative connotations for many in post-Soviet
countries, was first used in the early 1990s in relation to the emerging class of rich
businessmen referred to as “New Russians,” “New Georgians,” or “New Kazakhs” depending
on their country of origin. Oligarchy was first discussed in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s
Politics and was defined as a form of government by a small group.406 Puglisi’s modern
definition of oligarchs is “powerful economic actors who interact with political institutions to
pursue their own narrow interests.”407 These actors in post-Soviet context are the archetypical
descendents of Robber Barons in the United States, oligarchs being described by DeLong as:
Those lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time, driven and smart enough
to see particular economic opportunities and seize them, foresighted enough to have
gathered a large share of the equity of a highly-profitable enterprise into their hands,
and well-connected enough to fend off political attempts to curb their wealth (or well-
connected enough to make political favours the foundation of their wealth).408
Some of the practices used by the oligarchs to control resources have been based on
conflicts of interest at the very least or were outright illegal, such as loans-for-shares.409
Guriev and Rachinsky divide oligarchs in two categories. First, older oligarchs usually have a
background in the nomenklatura and were either working as managers of state enterprises or
as the representatives of government supervisory structures for these enterprises. Second, the
405 Shelley (2003, p. 204).
406 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005, p. 132).
407 Puglisi (2003, p. 101).
408 DeLong, Bradford (1998).
409 For more on Russian privatisation see Black, Bernard, Kraakman, Reinier and Tarassova (2000, pp. 1731-
1808); Lieberman and Veimetra (1996, pp. 737-768).
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younger oligarchs are entrepreneurs who started from scratch in the late 1980s taking
advantage of “the co-existence of regulated and quasi-market prices” and then investing this
money in industrial enterprises.410 The relationship between oligarchs and the state shows
different patterns across different countries. In Russia, the oligarchic business-dominated
system of Yeltsin has been changed by Vladimir Putin’s bureaucrat-dominated political
system.411 In Kazakhstan, like other Central Asian countries, the control of large capital was
more personalized412 and has always been under the strict control of the Nazarbayev ruling
family and Nursultan Nazarbayev himself.413 In the countries lacking a large base of natural
resources or industrial production, like Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, large capital has always been
closely intertwined with politics, controlled by informal networks of individuals from the
ruling regime or closely related to it. In Ukraine it is more difficult to discern the clear
patterns of the oligarch-state relationship since the distinction is frequently lost. If in the
immediate aftermath of the Soviet breakup politics was used to get money, now the trend is
changing, and the money is used to influence politics instead. Even now, the legislatures of a
number of post-Soviet countries are dominated by wealthy businessmen.
Roughly seventy to eighty percent of the members of the Kyrgyz parliament elected in
2005 had their own businesses.414 Despite debates in the Kyrgyz Parliament, the draft laws on
financial disclosure and conflict of interest have never been passed.415 Interestingly enough, a
research group from the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies found that the
respondents in Kyrgyzstan did not always differentiate between criminals and
businesspeople.416
The Georgian parliament that was elected in May 2008 contains a number of wealthy
businesspersons. In a 2001 study of the Ukrainian Rada (legislature), Kalman found that 350
of the 450 Rada deputies have some kind of economic interest in over 700 Ukrainian
businesses.417 Three-hundred of the Rada deputies were dollar millionaires,418 and more than
half of Ukraine’s richest men have been or are now active in politics419 and the rest are
indirectly involved supporting various political groupings. Some oligarchs switch from party
410 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005, pp. 138-139).
411 Ibid., p. 147.
412 Glaesera, Scheinkmanb, Shleifer (2003, p. 213).
413 Freedom House (1999, p. 257); Collins (2004).
414 Interviews with K1, K4, K5, K9, K10, K18, K23 March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
415 Gleason (2003, p. 73).
416 MacFarlane and Torjesen (2007, pp. 41-42).
417 Kalman quoted in Williams and Picarelli (2002).
418 Wilson (2005, p. 149).
419 Kiev Post (2006b).
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to party depending on who is in power, for instance Vasyl Khmelnytsky and Andryi Ivanov.
In general, almost all Ukrainian oligarchs have earned their fortunes through various semi-
legal or illegal activities, such as commodity trading that involved several elements of fraud
and rent seeking, or skimming. As Humphrey argues, the “inviolability of deputies”
protections led to the “deputies’ roof” (krysha) for crime.420 This usually involved such
activities as non-payment of taxes, extracting discounts on barter deals, acquiring illegal
monopolies through shady transactions, or extensive lobbying.421
Two opposing views are discussed in organized crime literature on the implications of
oligarchic control of capital for rule of law and property rights. On the one hand, the
oligarchs, as private owners, should be interested in the establishment of private property
rights and contract enforcement. On the other hand, given the immaturity of the political
system the incentive to use political influence for redistribution from other economic agents
is great.422 The latter process, referred to as King John redistribution, involves the reverse of
“Robin Hood” redistribution by taking from the “have nots” and giving to the “haves”
through subverting legal, political and regulatory institutions. This process works in favour of
the “haves” through political contributions, bribes, or just deployments of legal and political
resources to get their way.423 Thus this amounts to state capture by wealthy businessmen. In
these cases, I am convinced that wealthy businessmen favour the establishment of the rule of
law and private property only to the extent that it remains ineffective enough not to
counteract their interests. The interest of oligarchs would be in lowering their own costs for
safeguarding their businesses through more efficient law enforcement structures, while at the
time leaving law enforcement open to outside interference and vulnerable to manipulation by
powerful informal networks. In this case, the interests of organized crime groups coincide
with the interests of oligarchic business groups.
4.Criminal networks in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
Blood kinship relationships such as tribalism, family relationships, and close friendship,
survived the Soviet “modernization project” and emerged as the most powerful social bonds
in informal networks in the post-Soviet period. After all, the Soviet system of governance
was also based on similar patron-client relationships. As Fairbanks argues, Stalinist cadre
420 Humphrey (2002, p. 123).
421 Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 10).
422 Hoff and Stiglitz (2004, pp. 753-763); Guriev and Rachinsky (2005, p. 146).
423 Glaesera, Scheinkmanb, Shleifer (2003, p. 210).
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politics had promoted groups based on primordial ties and made them a flexible
instrument.424 After the breakdown of the Soviet system these informal networks pursued
private ends, often through illicit means.
Several main factors or connecting nodes have played a role in the formation of crime
groups with links to the upperworld. Organized crime groups in Central Asia and the
Caucasus are more based in extended family and blood kinship identities (tribes in
Kyrgyzstan, or sub-ethnic groups such as Svanetian or Mingrelian in Georgia), while in
Ukraine the key determining factor for forging links is regionalism and material interest.
In Kyrgyzstan blood kinship based on tribal allegiance, ethnic origin and regionalism
predominate. Tribes are defined as an “imagined community of people who construct
relatedness not only through charted biological links, but also through memories attached to
shared ancestors and their relation to history.”425 The boundaries of the tribes may sometimes
coincide with villages, towns and regions.426 Organized crime groups are frequently based
either in the North or the South of the country. The representative of Saribagish tribe’s elite
explained to a local academic that it was important to promote Rysbek Akmatvayev because
he is also from the same tribe and this would serve the tribe’s interest once Akaev fled and
Saribagish was no longer represented in the government.427
The importance of the North-South divide in Kyrgyz organized crime groups is not clear,
mainly because many criminal relationships are initiated in prison and certainly the inmates
are not divided according to the regions they come from. Ethnic origin plays a limited role, as
well, but is not decisive: for instance in Bayman Erkinbaev’s grouping, the lawyer was
Russian and financial director-Uzbek. There are Chechen criminal groups in the North428 and
Uzbek in the South. Uighur crime groups were active in the late 1990s. Also the group had
many Tajiks because Bayman was involved in drugs trafficking from Tajikistan, but these
were supervised by Bayman’s close relatives because they were not trusted fully.429 Certainly
the general liberal environment in Kyrgyz state in 1990s and its perception abroad as the
freest state in Central Asia invited the criminals of different backgrounds and origin to get
involved.
424 Fairbanks (1983, p. 374).
425 Gullette (2006, p. 5).
426 Jones Luong (2002, p. 78).
427 Interview with Alexander Zelichenko, April 17, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
428 Numbers roughly 200 individuals according to Kairat Osmanaliev, former police officer and freelance crime
reporter, March 27, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
429 Interview with local observer, May 30, 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
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According to the majority of respondents in Kyrgyzstan, the determining connecting node
is zemliachestvo, meaning the formation of illegal networks by people from the same village
or town. Collins defines zemliachestvo as “localism,” the patronage of one’s family, kin and
close friends from one’s birthplace (i.e. one’s clan).430 Roy argued that zemliachestvo was the
dominant principle for government appointments in Central Asia.431 Certainly, the infamous
criminal leader from the Issyk-kul region, Rysbek Akmatvaev, was protected by the Minister
of Internal Affairs, his cousin from the same tribe.432 Likewise Almaz Bokushev, the leader
of the Karabaltinskaya group is also linked with another former Minister of the Interior who
is now in political opposition to President Bakiev, and his brother was a member of the
Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyz Parliament) from the Karabalta region.433 However, it can be
argued that tribalism only provides a context for the formation of criminal networks and
ultimately it is material interest that keeps the networks together. For instance, many
members of the Jogorku Kenesh maintain paramilitary groups of sportsmen under the cover
of sports clubs, in case they need them to advance their own political goals. However, all
these sportsmen are chiefly on the payroll of the deputies regardless of the presence or
absence of relative links.434 The significance of material interest is also illustrated by several
incidents of a split between close relatives, who were fellow collaborators in crime groups,
due to a disagreement over the division of spoils.435
There are only two known vory in Kyrgyzstan: ethnic Chechen criminal leader Aziz
Batukaev436 (although his title of vor is contested) and Kamchy Kolbaev. Other criminal
figures are considered avtoritety by the Kyrgyz media and police.437 In contrast Georgia, a
small nation that comprised 2 percent of the Soviet population, contributed 31.6 percent of
the professional criminals, compared to Russian contribution at 33.1 percent.438 The various
reasons will be discussed below. Like in the Kyrgyz case, Georgians are likely to derive
support from and engage in crime with blood relations or lifelong friends rather than an
430 Collins (2006, p. 104).
431 Roy (2000).
432 Interview with Kyrgyz experts, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The possible link is also discussed
in Delo No (2006).
433 This is widely known in the Karabalta region and is also corroborated by several respondents; also see
Komsomolskaia Pravda (2006).
434 On the use of paramilitary groups of sportsmen for political purposes, see Marat (2007) and the Weekly
Bulletins of the Foundation for Tolerance International (Issue 15, 2005, and Issue 71, 2007).
435 Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002, p. 66).
436 He was born and raised in Kygyzstan.
437 Among the general public there is confusion between avtoriteti and vory.
438 Serio and Razinkin (1995, p. 77).
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unrelated criminal brotherhood.439 The importance of “godparenthood” in Georgia contrasts
with the dominant modes in Kyrgyzstan or Ukraine but is similar to Sicily.440 Godparenthood
relationships are closely related with friendship because it is usually close friends who
baptize each other’s children. Because religion is very strong in Georgia, some say that the
godparenthood link ”reaches the seventh generation,”441 and friendship coupled with
godparenthood links is even closer than blood kinship or friendship alone. Godparenthood
plays a major role in informal power networks and is often employed to strengthen the
already existing links. The child of the late Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was christened by
the former State Minister (under Shevardnadze) Niko Lekishvili. The latter also christened a
child of Mr. Tedo Isakadze, former Deputy State Minister. Mr. Zhvania’s wife christened a
child of President Mikheil Saakashvili.
The infamous paramilitary criminal group “Mkhedrioni,” (The Horsemen) operating
in the early 1990s, was formed on the basis of various district brotherhoods, composed of
childhood friends from the same districts/suburbs, such as the Borotebi brotherhoods of Vake
district in Tbilisi, or rival criminal gangs Kulinarielebi and Iosebidzelebi from the capital’s
Saburtalo district. Ethnic and sub-ethnic identities are also important, as seen in the Svanetian
and Mingrelian criminal groups.442 Nodia notes that patronage networks, in line with general
civic identity, are created on the regional principle,443 while other researchers note the
importance of common economic interests and point out that blood ties may bind clans and
networks, or not.444 According to Aves, networks are based on family or regional affiliation,
as well as groups of mostly male friends who follow unwritten codes of honour that all
Georgians, regardless of class or education, feel it shameful to breach.445 These patterns have
been perpetuated.
Thus, in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, criminal networks are built on mixed ties ranging
from blood kinship, such as tribal and family allegiance, and the loyalty of friendship, all the
way to business exchanges of favours and money. On the contrary, in Ukraine, material
interest unites crime groups that are largely “pragmatic coalitions of convenience”446
organized on the basis of regional political-economic networks, and especially “old school”
439 Ibid.
440 For the importance of the godparenthood relationship in Sicilian mafia networks see Ianni and Reuss-Ianni
(1972, pp. 19, 123).
441 The seventh generation ideal rarely works in practice.
442 Shelley (2007a, p. 56).
443 Darchiashvili, Nodia (2003, p. 20).
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ties from former work places. The blood kinship networks are more important in rural areas
of Ukraine447 and therefore less important for organized crime, which in Ukraine is an urban
phenomenon. The East-West divide in organized crime is founded on regional political-
business networks.
In Ukraine, criminals penetrate legal businesses, such as restaurants, casinos,
gambling organizations, discos and the like. These are the sectors traditionally used for
laundering money from illicit activities, such as drug trafficking.448 In Ukraine, unlike
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the main flow of illicit funds originates not in the criminal sector of
trafficking in drugs, arms or humans, but rather in the “grey” shadow economy, consisting of
financial fraud, shady privatization, or tax evasion.449 This is due to the strategy of organized
crime groups to benefit from lax supervision of economic reforms and privatisation in the
early 1990s.450
In Ukraine, like the rest of the Soviet Union, sportsmen, often from the martial arts
and some former inmates, emerged as the first criminal gangs engaged in the protection
racket and control over retail markets. Infamous racketeers in Kiev, such as Kupets451 and
Avdish, had backgrounds in sports. Violent confrontations eliminated many of these
criminals; survivors forged links with the upperworld. Unlike Georgia, the racketeer gangs
did not submit to professional criminals and were not loyal to the code of vory.
The vory were trying to exert some influence over the underworld and were mainly
competing in illicit markets with the rest of the criminal groupings. In the mid-1990s, a clash
arose between traditional “vory” criminals and new “criminal entrepreneurs” who were
related to and protected by former nomenklatura networks, special services and police, with
the “criminal entrepreneurs” prevailing. Most of the “vory” in Donetsk were assassinated in
the 1990s in these turf wars,452 and others nationwide were imprisoned or killed. Some who
survived the turf wars “legalized.” Now the Ministry of Interior estimates that Ukraine hosts
around 17 thieves-in-law. Crime groups developed corrupting and collusive relationships
with law enforcement officials or politicians nationwide and throughout the government.
Beginning in the Soviet period, 60 percent of organized crime groups had established links
with corrupt government officials as of the late 1990s, mainly through co-optation by means
447 Williams and Round (2007, p. 434).
448 Organizovanna zlochinosts v Ukraini ta krainakhevropi (2006, p. 10).
449 Corporativ.info (2007).
450 Kalman (2004, p. 92).
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of bribery.453 Ukrainian organized crime groups spend 50 percent of their illicit incomes for
bribing government officials.454 By comparison Galeotti estimated that the Russian mafia
invests 30 percent of their funds in government “roofs.”455 This suggests stronger links
between underworld and upperworld in Ukraine.
Over time police officials, criminals and politicians collaborate more closely, co-
owning stakes in joint businesses. As a result of collusion, criminal cases against criminal
figures are rarely raised, or never reach the court. In 2000, 90 percent of commercial
structures had corruptive relationships with government officials.456 The survey by the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences found that the perceived influence of “mafia and organized
crime” increased from 33.9 percent in 1994 to 43.9 percent in 1999. This perception changes
depending on who is in power and was at one of its lowest points during the first half of
2005, at 30.7 percent. During Yanukovych’s premiership it hit 40.2 percent.457
In Georgia, infamous for its large contribution to the world of Soviet organized crime,
vory v zakone took the lead. There was no similar presence of professional criminals in
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, though sportsmen emerged as the main criminal actors. While the
vory were well established in Georgia, newly emerged criminals in the other countries were
less adherent to the vory’s codes and traditions. Because, among other reasons, the vory’s
code was weakly enforced in the two other countries, sportsmen took the criminal initiative
by capitalizing on their physical strength. Other individuals also enjoyed criminal successes
that would not be permitted under the vory’s code.
This leads to another distinction between Georgian and Ukrainian/Kyrgyz organized
crime. Georgian thieves-in-law mainly were trying to infiltrate the politics from the
beginning, meaning the break-up of the Soviet Union. We recall that a “vor” became the
Georgian president’s deputy in the early 1990s. However, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz criminals
initially relied on physical intimidation since their main activity was racketeering, and they
gradually developed political connections. Furthermore, in Georgia most of the sportsmen
have been co-opted by the government with law enforcement jobs, while in Kyrgyzstan and
Ukraine, sportsmen work as bodyguards of politicians or entrepreneurs more often than in
law enforcement.
453 Kamlik, Gega, Viletskyi (2000, pp. 23-24).
454 Kalman (2003, p. 152).
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The intricate question of why Georgia, which made up only 2 percent of the Soviet
Union’s population, contributed 31 percent of the overall number of professional criminals,
remains largely unanswered in the literature, and an interdisciplinary approach is needed,
taking into account anthropological, economic and socio-cultural considerations. The ideas
provided in this section are only tentative.
Much like outlaw peasant bands in Russia,458 the predecessors of modern organized
criminals in Georgia (as well as Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) arose in political resistance and
social protest movements against first, the local feudal system and afterwards, Russian
imperial rule. These movements became indistinguishable from criminal activity, and include
Basmachestvo in Kyrgyzstan, Banderovtsi in Ukraine and Abragi in Georgia.
Abragi in Georgia were similar to freewheeling bandits in Chechnya, as described by
Galeotti.459 The resistance to colonialism coupled with the opportunities provided by
organized crime turned many of the “freedom fighters” into outlaws. Originally, the abragi
were defined as “partisans who live in the mountains and fight the king’s dominion.”460 After
the Russian empire came to the South Caucasus, abragi denoted those resisting the Russians.
These circumstances cultivated romanticism towards criminality, which then served as the
basis for similar attitudes toward the thieves-in-law. One of the most celebrated pieces in
contemporary Georgian literature is the book Data Tutashkhia by Chabua Amirejibi, which
paints a heroic image of a Georgian peasant outlaw fighting Russian imperial injustice.
Hobsbawn coined the term “social bandits” which is relevant to post-Soviet Eurasia.
Social bandits are “bringers of justice and social equity” who are considered by their people
as heroes and avengers, worthy of admiration and support.461 The romanticized view of the
criminals and their social status means that, by contrast to most Western countries, criminals
do not evoke social discouragement. Criminals in all three countries are involved in
providing welfare for local communities through orphanages and schools, building
mosques/churches and supporting regional sports events. All of these charity activities carry
positive social significance which secures public support, 462 but also open the criminals to
political use.
In Kyrgyzstan, local “Robin Hoods” usually address problems that are considered as
high priority issues by the local residents. For instance they have been building bridges in
458 Handelman (1995, p. 31).
459 Galeotti (2005, p. 56).
460 Provasi (1998).
461 Hobsbawn (1969, pp. 13, 35).
462 Marat (2006, p. 72).
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Osh.463 Kyrgyzstan shows a trend, initiated by crime boss Erkinbaev, of opening sports
complexes intended for training high school age young men in martial arts. Schools and
training centres are used for recruiting younger members to criminal groups. At least two
members of parliament in the south with alleged links to organized crime run sport centres
for this purpose.464
Returning to Georgia, resistance to colonialism and the political and cultural clash
between Georgia and Russia can partially account for the vast representation of Georgians in
the Soviet underground economy465 and organized crime.
Like in Sicily, in Georgia there is a distrust of government and governmental power
due to the history of frequent invasions. Under these conditions a survivalist culture
developed of reliance on family and communal ties as resources for sustaining life.466 Here,
professional criminals could be viewed as rational actors who use criminality as an
alternative channel of social and economic mobility. The adoption of the egalitarian “vory’s
code,” would allow them to circumvent the outnumbering Slavs and get access to scarce
resources. One of the key rules of vory, the one banning cooperation with authorities, also fits
with Georgian traditional mistrust of state institutions.
Gurov argues that initially, vory were mainly of Slavic origin with few from Central
Asia, Georgia or the Baltics.467 When the vory first emerged, Georgian presence was minimal
but then mushroomed afterwards, largely, according to the Russian language literature, due to
the sale of vory titles. Gurov argues that the cases of paid entry into the vory grew since the
mid-80s.468 According to Serio and Razinkin, for enough money, Georgians could avoid
prison time and, even at a very young age, be counted among the vory. Kuchynskyi reports
that the first vory who started to sell their titles or commercialize the vory institution were
criminals from the Caucasus.469 The title also brought with it status, influence and money.
Ethnic differences did not play a major role in the Soviet underworld and the vory cooperated
across ethnic, cultural and religious divides. However, Slavic and Caucasian factions of vory
clashed over areas of influence.
463 Interview with local observer, May 30, 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
464 Interview with a journalist, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 30 May 30, 2007; also, see Weekly Bulletins of Foundation
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This sort of conflict became especially tense closer to the breakup of Soviet Union
when glasnost and perestroika showed the failings of proletarian internationalism, prompting
the strengthening of ethno-national movements, especially in the Caucasus and the Baltics.
The fight to divide resource between different ethnic-based groups intensified as vory trusted
their own “kind.” This led to Slavic vory’s asking the prison populations to oppose
professional criminals from other countries, especially Georgia, “give back glory to the
Russian vor.”470 The conflict has since only intensified.471
Certainly Georgian criminals were trying to expand their influence and for this
reason, they accepted many newcomers, giving them the title of vor in exchange for their
continued loyalty and support against Slavic competitors.
The flourishing second economy in Georgia helped the professional criminals to achieve
success. While Soviet official statistics indicated that Georgia and Armenia were below the
Soviet national average in living standards, the republics were actually much better off
relative to other republics because of the shadow economy.472 The major centres of
underground entrepreneurship were Moscow, Odessa, Riga and Tbilisi and many shadow
entrepreneurs were Armenians, Georgians or Jews.473 Georgia was distinctively notorious for
its levels of graft, corruption and bribery.474 180,000 people were tried for the abuse of office
and looting of state-owned property in Georgia between 1958 and 1972.475 Despite the fact
that between 1960 and 1971 Georgia’s national income grew by only 102 percent (the third
lowest rate in the USSR) in 1970 the average Georgian savings account was nearly twice as
large as the Soviet average.476
Wheatley thinks that many Georgians joined the Communist party for better career
opportunities and access to Party resources.477 While Georgia profited legally by trading
citrus fruits and other agricultural goods with the rest of the Soviet Union, it also developed
an extensive underground economy by siphoning off raw materials from the official
economy.478 Kim writes that Georgia had the largest shadow economy among all Soviet
republics, followed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The Baltic
470 Ibid., p. 167.
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states featured least, and Moldova and Ukraine ranked in the middle.479 So, the Georgian
professional criminals were most powerful partially because they had extensive resources
drawn from profits from the shadow economy.
By the same token, alliances between the nomenklatura and professional criminals had
been formed in Georgia during Soviet times. Wheatley claims that the density of interactions
between the political elite and the shadow economic elite and criminal underworld was
particularly great in Georgia.480 The collusion was already high during Mzhavanadze’s
(Chairman of the Georgian Soviet 1953-1972) rule when the ruling clique “dabbled in the
black market, lived a grandiose life-style and had solid working relationships with the
Mafiosi.”481 The bribery was so rampant that Babunashvili, a criminal millionaire, secured
for himself the post of Minister of Light Industry.482
Eduard Shevardnadze, the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist party after
Mzhavanadze and later President of Georgia, initiated an anti-corruption campaign, although
as shown elsewhere in this thesis the fight was selective and did not yield long-term results.
Later Shevardnadze admitted that he had been meeting with criminal gangs since the 1960s
in order to ensure that their political demands would remain unmet, indicating the political
ambitions of the criminals which has existed since the 1960s.483 In general, the criminals had
no ambition to penetrate the nomenklatura, but the members of nomenklatura were buying
themselves advancements with criminals’ money instead.484 The links between party officials
and criminals greatly facilitated the success of the latter.
Many professional criminals started to move to Russia as a consequence of
Shevardnadze’s crackdown. The side effect of this anti-criminal drive was the strengthening
of Georgian crime groups in Russia and the establishment of strong links between Georgian
and Russian criminals.485 Crime and corruption did not abate at home, though, with Farnaoz
Ananiashvili, a former Minister of Finances of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and
many others like him arrested over the years for bribery.486
The underground economy and political-criminal links help account for why
Georgian professional criminals were the most powerful in the Soviet underground. In what
479 Kim (2003, p. 546).
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follows I try to indicate a few cultural factors, while not presuming that they take the place of
the extensive anthropological research required or drawing any definite conclusions. In an
anthropological study Mars and Altman found that by virtue of permanently seeking peer
approval and “use of goods in display and consumption” to that ends, Georgian was pushed
to obtain resources which were practically non-existent in the Soviet formal economy, this
providing the Georgian’s “underlying personal motivation.”487 More cultural reasons should
be considered here in explaining of why Georgians did well in criminal careers, because
thieves-in-law are “an institutional design embedded in local culture.”488 This quotation from
one of my interviews with a former criminal is helpful:
The vory’s code is in the mind of a Georgian man. The unwritten rules of the thieves’
behaviour depicts the life of every normal person. That’s how every good and kind
man should live.489
However, going into the details of cultural context is considered as beyond the scope
of this study, as it would require extensive anthropological research. Hereby, I limit myself to
pointing out several striking analogies between Georgia and Sicily, since Sicily’s
contribution to Italian organized crime was as disproportional as that of Georgia to the Soviet
underworld. As in Sicily where the rule of silence, Omerta, played an important role in the
flourishing of Mafia networks, Georgians also are reluctant to betray relatives and comrades
who commit crimes.490 Similarly, the thieves’ code forbids giving any truthful testimony or
informing on anybody, including enemies.491 The code of “honourable men” or ”men of
honour” has crucial importance in both societies, in which family must be defended,
respected and feared by the use of any means including illegitimate ones.492
Importantly, the notion of being Mochaliche is highly valued in Georgian society.493
The word signifies someone who is apt, cunning and resilient and able to find the easiest way
to achievement and acquiring material goods in circumvention of the formal rules, and indeed
often outside legal and ethical norms. I think this overall mentality helped Georgians to
operate in a Soviet system where private initiative was discouraged and thus ways of
487 Mars and Altman (1983, p. 549).
488 Derluguian (1999, p. 3).
489 Interview with former professional criminal, January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
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achievement were limited. In Sicily, the concept of furbo494 (smart, wily, astute and cunning
according to Webster’s dictionary)495 is a good synonym of mochaliche.
Furthermore, Georgian culture accepts male aggression and sometimes even endorses
it. Violence plays an immensely important role in the thieves’ world, especially by the vory,
to control prison populations.496 In general Georgian criminals have shown “violence and
absence of restraint against their enemies,”497 an attribute essential to organized crime’s
development.
The popularity of vory in Georgia was once so high that more than 25 percent of
school children surveyed in 1995 said they aspired to be vory v zakone.498 Certainly the
youngsters who were observing the lavish lives of vory and the level of respect they enjoyed
in society desired similar rewards. This is not only a post-Soviet phenomenon. Wheatley
observes that during Soviet times “in contrast to the perceived hypocrisy of those who joined
the Komsomol and embraced an ideology they hated for personal gain, the criminal was seen
as somehow more honest, more noble.”499
The situation has been changing since the anti-organized crime efforts of the
Saakashvili administration. The aspiration of youngsters to join organized crime has
reportedly decreased, with the diminishing influence of professional criminals. However, one
lasting impact of organized crime is linguistic: vory slang engulfed the prisons, then spread
throughout the rest of society, and is now being used by all social classes.
Importantly, a general cultural note about our three target countries is that what is
elsewhere branded as illegal and corrupt is there accepted as being part of normal friendship
and solidarity.500 There is a common belief in the slogan “everything can be bought and sold”
in Ukraine.501 In Georgian the term pativistsema literally means respect, frequently is used to
denote giving a gift or paying certain amount of money in exchange for a favour done by
close relative or friend. In Kyrgyzstan traditional solidarity such as tooganchilik means the
obligation to help relatives and community members and which frequently provides access to
power and resources for particular individuals. 502 In a similar vein, nepotism is considered by
494 Shelley (2007a, p. 54).
495Webster’s Online dictionary, available online at http://www.websters-dictionary-
online.org/translation/Ladino/furbo
496 Samoilov (1993, pp. 32-58).
497 Shelley (2007a, p. 55).
498 Serio and Razinkin (1995, p. 76).
499 Wheatley, “Group dynamics and institutional change in Georgia: a four-region comparison”.
500 See Huntington (1968, p. 60).
501 Kalman (2004, p. 96).
502 Temirkulov (2008, pp. 319-21).
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some a moral duty in Georgia.503 From the point of view of local communities there is
nothing illicit or even unethical in this behaviour. This cultural relativist argument has
significant implications on perceptions of corruption. Aprasidze observes:
If the owner of a stolen car goes to the police he obviously trusts the state
institutions. If he prefers to deal with a criminal boss because this is absolutely
acceptable in his society as the most efficient way to deal with problems, this means
that this person and the society he lives in prefer informal structures.504
The perception of “normality” in standards for corruption and crime further blurs the
boundaries between unofficial and informal on the one hand, and corrupt and illicit on the
other. Traditional kin and friendship networks were a catalyzing factor in the establishment
of political-criminal links in post-Soviet republics, especially the Caucasus and Central Asia.
A 2000 corruption study in Kyrgyzstan showed that the general public endorsed as normal
such practices as getting a job through blat (53%); using acquaintances or relatives for career
advancement (51%); accepting gifts from the patients in case of doctors, and pupils in case of
teachers (55%), thanking someone through a gift (71%); or paying for the drink of someone
who helps solve problems (61%).505 In Ukraine, 53 percent of the population sees corruption
as an acceptable way to get things done.506 Former Prime Minister Lazarenko said that
corruption allegations were not considered as illegal in Ukraine since everything was
sanctioned by President Kuchma.507
Much criminal activity is nonetheless described as illegal, and labelled as “mafia.”
For instance in Kyrgyzstan many of the poor describe those who have money as “thieves,
crooks, or cheats.”508 Monopolies over certain businesses are described as “mafia” in many
countries of former Soviet Union. During Soviet times the term Mafia referred to
“occupationally specific corruption” (hotel, transportation or fishing mafia) that diverted
goods from certain sectors of economy to grey or black market.509
4.1. The Shadow economy in the three countries
503 Mars and Altman (1983, p. 555).
504 Aprasidze (2004, p. 45).
505 UNDP and the Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Forecasting (2000, pp. 17-18).
506 Grossmann and Palyvoda (2009).
507 Krushelnysky (2006, p. 126).
508 Kuehnast and Dudwick (2002, p. 78).
509 Naylor (2002, p. 38).
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All three countries have a tradition of illicit activity and shadow economies. Georgia
was a leader in this regard, having been one of the richest republics in the USSR, due to its
hidden economy. Today’s estimations of the current size of the shadow economy varies in
each country from 40-80 percent of GDP, according to the methodology used; nonetheless, it
may be safely argued that the shadow economies in all three have shrunken since the
1990s.510
In the former Soviet Union, the business environment was set up so that all businesses
were implicated in illicit activity in small (minor bribes) or large (trade in illegal goods)
ways.
These illicit habits persisted after the fall of the USSR. In 2000, every entrepreneur in
Georgia was paying an average of 233 Georgian Lari (approx. 117 USD) per month in bribes
to the authorities. Corruption accounted for around 9 percent of turnover and about half of an
average company's profit.511 According to 2003 reports, 73 percent of the tobacco market was
in the shadows, and nearly every businessman involved in the cigarette industry traded
illegally.512 The Omega Tobacco case study is illustrative.
Two large companies dominated Georgian tobacco since the early 1990s. Both were
using various informal protection structures to counteract each other. Kakha Targamadze was
widely believed to be the krysha for Omega.513 Omega was closely allied to Aslan
Abashidze, the head of the Adjarian autonomous republic, and the company’s owner and his
wife were both members of parliament in Abashidze’s Agordzineba political party. After the
2004 revolution, the company came under scrutiny from the new authorities. In the
publishing house owned by the Omega group the police discovered machines used for
counterfeiting excise stamps.514 Double accounting books were being run in Omega,
according to an inside informer. The first book registered all financial transactions for
monitoring by the owners, and the second only reported part of the financial operations for
official reporting to tax authorities. Illicit profits were hidden from the state and channelled to
foreign banks, and reinvestments were made in the Georgian economy via offshore shell
companies.515
510 See for instance UNDP (2006, p. 10); Machavariani (2007); Kyiv Post (2007).
511 Economist Intelligence Unit (2000).
512 Nogaideli quoted in Katz (2006, p. 188); Khvalindeli dge (2003).
513 Akhali 7 Dghe (1999).
514 Katz (2006, p. 257).
515 The practice is not confined to Georgia. In Russia, analysts report similar behaviour of companies. See, for
instance, Kryshtanovskaia (1996).
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In most post-Soviet countries, tax rates have been so high that no businessman could
pay them fully. These forced entrepreneurs to seek a “state roof” or protection of a state
official, to avoid paying full taxes.516 The great number of required official procedures
increased the opportunities for public officials to profit from corruption and bribery, as well
as temptations for businesses to “jump queues” through bribery.517 According to the
respondents in Kyrgyz businesses, the refusal to engage in corrupt practices results in poor
business development (28%) or delays in business activity (13.6%).518
This excessive red tape, coupled with other variables, has frequently led to the shift of
legal companies to illegal transactions, rather than the “legalization” of criminal capital. As
Tulyakov observes, in Ukraine, legitimate business lacks general support, which pushes it
into the shadows. Large businesses buy immunity and influence through bribery and winning
legislative seats. Thus, they push out smaller firms to monopolize markets, and are
invulnerable to law enforcement.519
In addition to these roof and bribery tendencies, krysha520 has its origins in Soviet
society, where access to scarce resources in a shortage economy was dependent on the “right
connections.”521 Translated from Russian, krysha signifies a “roof” or protection provided by
one state or non-state individual or organization to another in the post-Soviet context, and is
defined by Vadim Volkov as criminal or legal protection services provided to both protect the
client physically and minimize their business risks.522 Kryshas can be grouped into two broad
categories: state (politicians) and non–state (crime groups). In Krysha relationships, a
criminal group could protect a businessman, or a politician might protect a criminal group, in
addition to many other variations according to geographical location (centre or periphery),
level of bureaucracy (the position in the chain of leadership), and extent of sophistication
(street gangs or mafia-like structures).
Kryshas differ from blat,523 or everyday bribery, insomuch as it entails a “structured
mechanism of corruption”524 or “gatekeeper extortion.”525
516 Wheatley (2005, p. 106).
517 Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003, p. 19).
518 Ibid.
519 Tulyakov (2004, p. 122).
520 There are very few academic articles and books on the subject, to the extent that it can be argued that hardly
any comprehensive work has yet been conducted. See for instance, Humphrey (1999, pp. 199-232); Shlapentokh
(1996, pp. 393-411).
521 See for instance, Humphrey (2002).
522 Volkov (2001).
523 On blat see Ledeneva (1998b).
524 CSIS (1997).
525 Shelley (2007b, pp. 41-61).
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Chapter 5. Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions
The Rose Revolution was the first of its kind in post-Soviet Eurasia. It bloodlessly
toppled the ruling regime and brought to power mostly Western-educated “young reformers.”
The protest following the rigged parliamentary elections on November 2, 2003 lasted for
several weeks and resulted in the downfall of Eduard Shevardnadze, incumbent president, on
November 23, 2003.
The Rose Revolution was followed by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine one year
later. The stand-off in the Presidential election between Viktor Yushchenko, a young
reformer, and Viktor Yanukovich, the nominee of the outgoing president Leonid Kuchma,
ended up in massive public protest in the capital Kyiv, bringing together millions of
Ukrainian citizens in a protest against perceived fraud and injustice. The rerun of the second
round left Viktor Yushchenko victorious, with the old guard, at least temporarily, retreating
into the shadows. Some experts suggested that the parallels of these two revolutions with the
chaotic events of March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan are misplaced; however, the inspiration the
Tulip Revolution drew from the Georgian and Ukrainian events shouldn’t be underestimated.
Public protests following the rigged Parliamentary elections toppled the Askar Akaev regime,
the only incumbent President among the three cases who was forced to leave the country and
seek refuge in Russia.
In contrast to the common view of the revolutions, I suggest that these events lacked
planning. The Tulip Revolution was a “pure coincidence” as several analysts referred to it.526
Khamidov demonstrates that it resulted from “poorly coordinated events by an improvised
alliance of informal elites” and lacked planning and cohesiveness within the opposition.527
The Rose Revolution started as a protest against the faked election results and the best
concession the leaders offerred was the repetition of parliamentary elections.528 The stance of
the opposition radicalized in the process and it requested Shevardnadze’s resignation, but
with little hope. Opposition leaders were ready until the last moment for agreement with the
authorities. Later, Zurab Zhvania said that before his resignation “Shevardnadze still had a
chance to avoid the most dramatic scenario. People were not looking for a revolution.”529
Similarly, in Ukraine, the negotiations that followed the rigged elections defined the outcome
526 Interviews with K1, K2, K12, K18, March - May 2007.
527 Khamidov (2006, p. 87).
528 Interview with G31, 3 August 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
529 Interview with Zurab Zhvania in Karumidze and Wertsch (2005, p. 35).
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of the protest. “There is little indication that initially the Orange camp had hoped for a change
they achieved in the end,” said one Ukrainian analyst.530
The revolutions were regarded as the crucial stage of third wave democratization that
could lead to consolidated democratic systems in these countries. However, results were
mixed, and hopes were stunted.
1. United and fragmented oppositions
One of the most important variables in explaining post-revolutionary developments in
criminality and corruption is the structure of opposition to the incumbent regimes of
Shevardnadze, Kuchma and Akaev.
According to a January 2005 poll of the Kyrgyz elite, Bakiev was the most popular
politician in the country.531 However, in general, the political opposition challenging the
Akaev regime was fragmented and lacked financial resources, because resources were
controlled by Akaev’s close relatives. Moreover, the political opposition “consisted not of
established parties or civil society groups, but of elites, lacking broad-based support, that had
banded together for tactical reasons.”532 Collins argues that “the protesters were a motley
coalition of disparate factions and leaders... as well as clan, regional, ethnic and ideological
factions that had not united previously... and that could not even agree on the colour and
flower of their revolution.”533 The newspaper Independent wrote “unlike Ukraine and
Georgia where crowds rallied round and listened to influential opposition politicians,
Kyrgyzstan’s demonstrators have no single leader, a fact that may make their behaviour more
unpredictable.534 Some observers noted that “Bakiev himself was afraid of the crowds in
central Bishkek and tried to find safe refuge.”535
The Saakashvili-Burjanadze-Jvania alliance in Georgia possessed significant political
and financial resources to counteract the ruling regime. The direct financiers of Saakashvili
included David Bezhuashvili a businessman in the natural gas trade and brother of the then-
Deputy Defence Minister; Kote Kemularia, a former law enforcement official and
530 Interview with U16, 10 November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
531 Poll results quoted in Nichol (2005).
532 Radnitz (2006, p. 133).
533 Collins (2006, p. 347).
534 The Independent (2005).
535 Marat (2006b, p. 90).
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businessman involved with the sometimes semi-illicit “disabled individuals” associations.536
Another supporter was the Silk Road Group, a company owned by former members of the
crime lords Mkhedrioni, with close links to Nika Rurua, a long-time personal friend and
associate of Saakashvili. Burjanadze and Jvania also had significant funders. Anzor
Burjanadze, Nino Burjanadze’s father, dubbed the “Georgian Bread King,”537 was a wealthy
former Chairman of the State Bread Corporation and allegedly a close friend of Eduard
Shevardnadze.538 Another Burjanadze/Jvania funder, David Salaridze, was a former
ombudsman of Georgia and high ranking tax official who allegedly enriched himself through
bribe-taking. Finally, it is likely both the National movement and the Burjanadze-Jvania
alliance benefited from hidden contributions, for instance from wealthy businessman Badri
Patarkatsishvili, who financed all major parties to safeguard his business interests in case of a
changing political environment.539
Notably, one of the key channels of funding was not business or criminal, but
reportedly international aid. Over the late 1990s and early 2000s thanks to their image as
young, reformist, leaders of the progressive elites, both Saakashvili and Zhvania emerged as
the main allies of civil society stakeholders in the Shevardnadze administration. Many
influential NGOs had very close ties with the two, shown in the fact that many civil society
leaders assumed government positions after the revolution.540 Undoubtedly, the Kmara
movement, funded by the Soros foundation,541 made a great contribution toward the final
demise of the Shevardnadze regime.
Additionally, despite reported controversies and diverging views the three leaders of
the revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, united after the
election.542 The youthful opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili’s ability to deliver fervent
speeches, his deliberation and decisiveness and his weak loyalty to the ancien regime made
him the best candidate to be the “revolutionary leader.”
In Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko already had a well-established power base. His
political party, “Our Ukraine,” got more than a quarter of the popular vote in the 2002
parliamentary elections. This success made him a focal point of the United Front, although he
536 These associations were exempt from paying taxes and custom duties, and therefore developed into business
structures with controversial and sometimes illegal activities.
537 Katz (2006, p. 121).
538 Allegedly, Anzor Burjanadze was best man at the wedding of President Shevardnadze.
539 Stefes (2006, p. 132).
540 Author’s personal communication with G10, 14 January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
541 Just before the revolution an official from the Chamber of Control mentioned to the author that the Kmara
movement received 4 million USD from the Soros Foundation.
542 Chikhladze and Chikhladze (2005, p. 4).
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was less charismatic than Saakashvili or his key ally in the revolution, wealthy gas trading
oligarch and politician Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko did not run independently and
backed Yushchenko, a move that greatly strengthened the united opposition front against
Kuchma.543 Several major businessmen joined Yushchenko’s political party in 2002 and did
not defect despite pressure from the authorities, among them confectionary magnate Petro
Poroshenko; trucking company owner Yevhen Chervonenko; David Zhvanya; and Mikola
Martynenko.544 The resources of these businesspeople and Tymoshenko aided the opposition.
Importantly, changes in Ukraine came from the bottom545 and the grassroots element
meant that mobilization was funded by the protesters themselves. For instance, in the first
two days of the Maidan protest alone, donations by Kyivians totalled 1 million Ukrainian
hryvnas (roughly 200,000 USD).546 The Ukrainian community abroad contributed USD 4
million.547 These figures are nothing compared to the overall USD 150 million spent on the
Yushchenko campaign and accompanying public protests.548 This figure greatly surpassed
funds spent in Georgia or Kyrgyzstan. This leads to the next very important variable, the
extent to which organized criminals were involved in the revolutions.
2. The role of organized crime groups in the revolutions
Civil society groups participated in all three revolutions in various degrees. The youth
movements “Pora” in Ukraine and “Kmara” in Georgia were especially significant,549 while a
similar movement in Kyrgyzstan, “Kelkel,” was established just weeks before the Tulip
Revolution, had only 300 members,550 and played a more limited role.551 By comparison,
Georgia’s Kmara had at least 3,000 activists552 in a country with roughly the same population
as Kyrgyzstan. Ukraine’s Pora numbered 10,000 activists by 2004.553
As Akaev “was not overthrown by the mobilization of civil society,554 the revolutionary
process was hijacked by various groups of “uncivil society”555 that included organized crime
543 Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 173).
544 Ibid., p. 19.
545 Polese (2009).
546 Sylina, Rakhmanin, Dmytrycheva (2004, p. 525).
547 Himka (2005, p. 115).
548 This figure has been reported by D. Zhvanya, the former so-called “cashier” of Our Ukraine quoted in
Zerkalo Nedeli (February 5-11, 2005)
549 Laverty (2008).
550 Khamidov (2006).
551 Author’s interview with K2, 22March 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
552 Corso (2008).
553 van Zon (2005, p. 19).
554 Tudoroiu (2007, p. 334).
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groups. Despite the relative strength of civil society in Kyrgyzstan compared to its Central
Asian neighbours, organized crime proved to be even more powerful and took the lead in the
revolutionary process. Kyrgyzstan was widely referred as an “island of democracy” in
Central Asia; however, many of the NGOs did not represent the grassroots movements in
nature, but were rather created from top to bottom. They were linked to the state, and
established with the sole purpose of attracting foreign funding.556 The most powerful NGOs
were concentrated in the capital Bishkek, while the Tulip Revolution began in the southern
city of Jalalabad. This Southern origin contributed to the weak involvement of civil society
groups, and the March 2005 events have been referred to as a “village revolution,”
emphasizing the perceived greater importance of rural mobilization557 as opposed to the well-
organized efforts of a civil society.
Capitalizing on weaknesses in the Kyrgyz opposition, elite disunity, and the limited civil
society role, organized criminals provided essential material and technical support for the
Tulip Revolution. Widely influential and popular criminal authorities, like Rysbek
Akmatbaev, mobilized their business resources and garnered public support against the
Akaev regime.558 Rysbek later admitted his involvement in the revolution without offering
any specifics.559
Another influential politician-turned-criminal, Bayaman Erkinbaev, member of the
Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyz Parliament) and South Kyrgyzstan drug trafficker, played a major
role in the Southern uprising. He contributed financially and provided logistics for the
demonstrations. He also mobilized 2,000 men from his Alysh sports association for
traditional wrestling560 who stormed the state offices in Jalalabad and Osh.561 About 5,000 of
Erkinabev’s supporters also travelled to Bishkek to help spread protests in the North.562
Shortly after the revolution Jengishbek Nazaraliev, famous Kyrgyz doctor and revolutionary
activist, stated that “drugs money did play a part in the revolution,” estimating that 50,000
USD of drug money would keep a 2,000-strong rally going for 25 days.563
555 Since the early 2000s the term has been a “catch-all for a wide range of disruptive, unwelcome and
threatening elements” deemed to have emerged in the spaces between the individual and the state, and which
have become increasingly difficult to control and regulate, particularly when they extend across national borders
see Rumford (2001).
556 Petric (2005, p. 327).
557 Author’s personal communication with K1, K11, K23, March - May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
558 Marat (2006, p. 91); Galeotti (2005, p. 56); Serio and Razinkin (1995, p. 76).
559 Akmatbaev (2006).
560 For more information on the federation, see http://www.wrestling-belts.org/index2.php.
561 Cornell (2006); Author’s interview with local observer, May 30, 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
562 Khamidov (2006, p. 90).
563 Nazaraliev quoted in Komsomolskaya Pravda (2005).
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Bayaman’s popularity peaked during the March events and the period afterwards when
Erkinbaev became actual governor of the region. In this period, slogans like “Bayaman is our
batir (hero)” and “Bayaman is the hero of Kyrgyz nation” were common in Osh and Batken,
the latter being his home district. He controlled the staff policy of the regional and city
administrations as well as the law enforcement agencies in the direct aftermath of the
revolution. Interestingly, unlike Bishkek, no looting occurred in Osh after the ‘Tulip
Revolution” due to Bayaman’s efforts and his ability to control the situation, according to
local residents.564
The support of the underworld leaders for the revolution can be explained by their search
for more power, as in the case of Rysbek Akmatbaev and/or by their defence of their own
business and a desire to expand it as in the case of Bayaman Erkinbaev. The latter’s business
was jeopardized by the growing interest of the ruling family, in particular Aidar Akaev.565
These illicit actors were already powerful prior to the revolution and were in a position to act
independently from the ruling elite, articulating their own interests. In short, Akaev’s regime
lost control over the criminal underworld during its last years, contributing to its ouster.
Unlike Kyrgyzstan and more similar to Georgia, the role of criminals was less
important in Ukraine. Ukraine lacked the criminal figures who would act independently of
political elites in defence of their own interests. Most of the crime figures or former crime
figures were amalgamated with political and economic elites. However, both camps, blue
“elites” as well as Orange “revolutionaries” used the services of criminals and other quasi-
legal paramilitary groupings, although they were largely under the control of the elites, which
used criminals for ballot stuffing and intimidation at polling stations.566 The Kravchuk-led
SPDU and its leaders Medvedchuk and Surkis first used gangsters to intimidate political
rivals and voters.567 The latter two also organized groups to threaten supporters of the
opposition “Our Ukraine” candidate Viktor Baloha, during the 2004 Mukachevo city mayoral
elections. In an interesting aside, some criminals volunteered for the opposition:
Krushelnycky says that an Ivano-based criminal figure from Frankyvsk said that although he
was a criminal, he didn’t want Ukraine to be run by criminals.568
In Georgia the opposition triumvirate of Saakashvili-Burjanadze-Jvania, replete with
financial resources and public support, and aided by civil society groups, did not need
564 Author’s field research in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2007. Interviews with K20, K23, March-Mary 2007,
Kyrgyzstan.
565 Graubner (2005).
566 Krushelnycky (2006).
567 Ibid., p. 107.
568 Ibid., p. 297.
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collaboration with criminals, whose involvement was therefore low.569 Arguably the
opposition leaders did not venture into criminal alliances for three main reasons: knowledge
of the consequences of dependency on criminals; absence of past cooperation; and personal
morals. Saakashvili and Zhvania in Georgia and Yushchenko in Ukraine frequently made
anti-organized crime statements before the revolution, rejecting cooperation with them.
Criminal collaboration would greatly damage their public image as “clean” reformers and
fighters against corruption, and links would furthermore be used as compromat by
Shevardnadze or Kuchma and immediately publicized. The absence of such allegations may
serve the argument about the absence of such links. Importantly the opposition leaders in
Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, were closely associated with
Western non-governmental organisations, affecting links with organized crime.
569 Broers (2005, pp. 340-342).
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Chapter 6. Post-revolutionary state-building and democratizing
Parsa argues that after removing the authoritarian regimes, “large-scale mobilization
and collective actions will threaten the established rights and interests of privileged social
groups and classes. Under such conditions, the latter may favour limiting democratic rights
and even the re-imposition of authoritarian rule.”570 This does not imply that the pre-
revolutionary regimes in the three countries were strictly authoritarian; however, regimes
brought to power through revolutions are more aware of the “dangers” mass mobilization can
create for their hold on power. Logically, they might limit those pre-conditions that were
instrumental in Coloured Revolutions, such as free media and strong civil society.
The Polity IV data on democratic change, as developed by Ted Gurr, does not reflect
changes immediately since “general traits are difficult to identify in current information” and
only reveal themselves over the span of years.571 Yet, minor improvements are shown in the
Combined Polity Score of the dataset, changing from 6 to 7 in Ukraine in 2006, from 5 to 7 in
Georgia in 2004 and from 3 to 4 in Kyrgyzstan in 2006.572 The Kyrgyz case, the democratic
score changes notably from -3 in 2004 to +3 in 2005, a 6 point improvement. Furthermore,
the dataset records a regime change (defined as a 3 point change in the POLITY score over a
period of three years or less) only in the Kyrgyz case.573
Public attitudes towards democracy also show some interesting trends. In Kyrgyzstan,
52 percent of the population was satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy was
developing in the country in April 2005, although this figure increased to 56 percent in
November 2007. Georgian respondents’ satisfaction with democracy indicates the opposite:
68 percent was satisfied or somewhat satisfied with democratization in the direct aftermath of
the revolution, but this figure dropped to 38 percent in September 2007.574 Revolutionary
euphoria had by then significantly withered, and the Saakashvili government was employing
more authoritarian means. The same is true for Ukraine, where an overwhelming 82 percent
of respondents were dissatisfied with the political situation in September 2007, up from 76
percent in November 2005 and 71 percent in October 2004. In 2007, nearly half (47%) of
570 Parsa (2003, p. 81).
571 Marshall and Jaggers (2007, p. 14).
572 The score is computed by subtracting the Autocracy score from the Democracy score; the resulting unified
polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
573The datasets are available online at the website of the Center for Global Policy
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
574 For Kyrgyzstan see IRI (2007b); for Georgia see IRI (2007a).
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Ukrainians believed that the country was on a path towards instability and chaos. In
November 2005, only roughly a quarter (27%) of Ukrainians said that Ukraine was a
democracy, while 49 percent said it was not.575
The Freedom House Democracy Index reinforces the above findings. In the case of
Georgia, the political rights score only showed improvement in 2005, two years after the
revolution, while the civil liberties score only improved in 2006. This supports the claim that
the revolution did not have much impact on democracy in the country. In Kyrgyzstan the
impact was immediate and both indices improved by one point in 2006 compared to 2005,
the year of the Tulip Revolution. The impact was more profound in Ukraine, where the civil
liberties score improved by two points compared to 2004.576
The World Bank Voice and Accountability indicator measures “the extent to which a
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”577
Chart 3. Voice and accountability indicator for Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (World
Bank)
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Again, Georgia shows some improvement since 2003, but Ukraine’s advance in 2005-
2007 is far more abrupt and significant. Kyrgyzstan’s freedom rating is showing slower, but
575 Sharma, Holzwart, and Abdullatif (2007, pp. 16, 22, 39).
576 For the country data and more information on the index see http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
577 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007, p. 5).
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steady improvement. The downward trend in Georgia might relate to the 2007 case of Imedi
TV, discussed below.
According to media independence data from Nations in Transit reports, the Ukrainian
case shows substantial improvement (from 5.50 in 2004 to 3.50 in 2008578). Media freedom
in Kyrgyzstan improved to 5.75 in 2007 from 6 in 2004. Georgian data, though, show less
media independence in the post-revolutionary period, than in Shevardnadze’s times. The
score in 2008 was 4.25, compared to 3.50 in 2001, and 3.75 in 2002.579
The press freedom index compiled by Reporters without Borders580 shows
groundbreaking improvement in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution, a sharp reversal in
media freedom in Kyrgyzstan in the immediate aftermath of Tulip Revolution, and a
significant deterioration in Georgia, again related to the November 2007 events.581
Chart 4. Press freedom index for Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Reporters without
Borders)
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Free media is essential to hold the new government in check and to keep new elites
from making old mistakes. The division of spoils after the revolutions also touched media
578 The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7
the lowest.
579 “Nations in Transit” reports, Freedom House.
580 Available online at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29031
581 The index measures the state of press freedom in the world. It reflects the degree of freedom that journalists
and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the authorities to both respect and ensure
respect for this freedom. The index measures every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as
murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) as well as news media censorship, confiscation of
newspaper issues, searches and harassment. 1 is the best score and 100 is the worst. See Reporters without
Borders (2008a).
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outlets. New governments, being aware of the crucial role the media and civil society played
in ousting previous regimes, tried to co-opt and gain control over the independent media
sources. Certainly, this would decrease the extent of public awareness of and social control
over government activities, allowing the rise of corruption. In Kyrgyzstan, media outlets once
critical of the Akayev regime now show little criticism of the new government.582 The reform
of State Television into a publicly funded channel has been initiated but never completed.583
The situation is worse in Georgia. By June 2008 the Saakashvili government had
monopolized control over all major television stations in the country. The remaining
independent ones, like Kavkasia TV, reported continuous pressure from the authorities.
Shalva Ramishvili, co-founder of the independent TV station 202, was sentenced to four
years in prison in March 2006 for extortion. In November 2007 Imedi, the most popular of
the three privately owned (Rustavi 2, Mze, Imedi) TV stations, with two-thirds of the national
audience and owned by tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili, went off the air when special security
forces entered its studios, cut off the power584 and destroyed the equipment. Initially,
Patarkatsishvili was supporting Saakashvili’s government and allegedly contributed
financially to the Rose Revolution. The political divorce of the two started in late 2005 and
early 2006 when the sides made the statements critical of each other in an apparent
confrontation over the division of resources. Patarkatsishvili accused the authorities of
pressuring his television station, Imedi TV.585 In response, influential MP Giga Bokeria said
Patarkatsishvili wanted to become the “Don Corleone of the Georgian economy.”586 The
company was accused of conspiring with foreign intelligence services to topple the legitimate
government and was kept off the air until Saakashvili had secured victory in snap elections.
Soon, after Patarkatsishivili’s death, the ownership of Imedi changed hands and cut critical
reports about the Saakashvili administration.
In sum, Georgia slid back on the democracy scale while significant improvements
were made in the two other countries.
582 International Crisis Group (2005, p. 22).
583 Interview with Edil Baisalov, leader of political party, March 26, 2007, Tbilisi, Georgia.
584 Reporters without Borders (2008b).
585 “Civil Georgia (March 29, 2006).
586 Ibid.
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1. The presence of the “Old Guard”
Weakness or unwillingness of new administrations in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan to
confront criminal networks was the major factor preventing the punishment of the ancien
regime’s wrongdoings. By contrast, in Georgia the influence of the “old guard” has been only
nominal since the revolution.
Political will at the highest level is a crucial variable in determining the increase or
decrease of organized crime. Although Yushchenko’s “reform credentials were
impeccable”587 he appears to be a “natural centrist who has not pursued the revolution’s goals
with the partisan fervour expected”588 because, according to his critics, of his instinct to
compromise.589 All indications to date imply Yushchenko wants to reconcile with Kuchma’s
elites, while Tymoshenko maintains an antagonistic approach. Kuzio compares Saakashvili to
Timoshenko, and Burdjanadze to Yushchenko.590 Arguably, in addition to solid legitimacy
based on public support, the political will of the strong Georgian leadership cadre was the
driving force behind the swift and thorough reforms that significantly reduced corruption.591
Yushchenko’s power base was eroded from the very beginning, since the “Orange” camp had
to cope with numerous backlashes by rival politicians and the old guard. In the process, the
criminal justice system became increasingly politicized and the key institutions, like the
SBU, were used as political tools to counteract rivals’ power. The politicization of law
enforcement absorbed vast resources, to the detriment of fighting organized crime.
Both the Georgian and Kyrgyz revolutions followed rigged parliamentary elections, while
the Orange Revolution was a result of dissatisfaction with the result of Presidential elections.
Georgia held new parliamentary elections, but Kyrgyzstan kept its old legislature, allowing
some criminals to retain parliamentary immunity.592 The Kyrgyz Parliament consisted of
cronies of former President Askar Akayev, and local potentates with illicit business and
organized criminal links, who bought themselves seats.593 Despite an early inclination to hold
new elections,594 the new political elite decided not to dissolve parliament because they
believed domestic security would deteriorate, due to lawmakers’ connections with the
587Kravchuk (2005, p. 56).
588 Laverty (2008, p. 155).
589 Wilson (2005, pp. 148-149).
590 T. Kuzio quoted in Burwell, Aslund, Kuzio, Pifer (2006, p. 25).
591 World Bank (2006).
592 Kommersant Daily (2005).
593 Cornell (2006, p. 64).
594 Topchubek Turgunaliyev, an activist in the opposition People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan, said new
parliamentary elections would be held in the fall, as quoted in The Jerusalem Post (2005).
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criminal world.595 Hence, the new authorities kept the existing parliament to avoid further
destabilization.596 It was estimated that roughly ten members of parliament were linked to
crime groups. These individuals are either direct leaders of crime groups or provide kryshas
for them.597 For instance a member of parliament from the South was involved in smuggling
cotton on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border,598 and another MP of Uzbek origin works with the
mayor of a southern Kyrgyz town to provide a krysha for a group smuggling goods to and
from Uzbekistan.599 In early 2006, the speaker of parliament resigned after President Bakiev
said deputies were corrupt and obstructing the work of his administration.600 Most of these
parliamentarians were re-elected on the ticket of the ruling party in the snap elections of
December 2007.
Despite promises from the Prosecutor General’s office,601 no real steps were made to
prosecute high-ranking officials and return property seized by Akaev’s elite to the state.
Akaev still maintained influence considering “how readily the interim government returned
some of his personal belongings.”602 Moreover, anti-corruption efforts in Kyrgyzstan as in
Ukraine were undermined by the weakness or unwillingness of Presidential administrations,
due to rent-seeking by the new authorities. For instance the Ministry of the Interior, which
was fighting white-collar crime, brought only eight criminal charges against customs
employees and twenty six against tax officials in the first eight months of 2006, as compared
to sixty eight cases against employees in the education, cultural and scientific sectors.603 In
2008, a Ministry of Interior official admitted that tax officials were among the most corrupt,
and were followed by officials in the Prosecutor’s Office, courts, State Agency for
Registering Real Estate, State Architecture Directorate, and the Education and Health
ministries.604 Simultaneously the penitentiary system of the Ministry of Justice reported that
only 14 individuals convicted of white-collar corruption are sentenced in Kyrgyz prisons.605
In Georgia new parliamentary elections were held, but the results of the majoritarian
ballot were not annulled and deputies elected in city councils in November 2003 stayed in
parliament. The former governor of Imereti region alleged that as a result, several MPs might
595 Marat (2006a, p. 99).
596 Ibid.
597 Author’s interviews with K4, K9, K10, March-May, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
598 Graubner (2005, p. 17), also confirmed in the interview with a crime analyst in Osh region, May 2007.
599 Author’s interview with K4, 17 April 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
600 Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2006).
601 International Crisis Group (2005, p. 22).
602Ibid., p. 41.
603 Department Fighting White-collar Corruption, Ministry of the Interior of Kyrgyzstan (2007).
604 Kyrgyz Television 1 (2008).
605 Newspaper Delo No (2009b).
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be linked to thief-in-law Tariel Oniani.606 Such allegations were not groundless, as in
February 2006 it became clear that professional criminals were extorting money from factory
director Parmen Daushvili. Those extorting Daushvili included very influential vory such as
Lasha Shushanashvili and Shakro Kalashov. He also alleged that the extorters had protectors
in Parliament and gave one name of Vasil Chigogidze, an MP from Chokhatauri district.607
Chigogidze, formerly a deputy to Akaki Chkhaidze, corrupt head of railways under
Shevardnadze, was a member of the Parliamentary faction headed by former banker and
Minister Vano Chkhartishvili. Later on Merabishvili, the Minister of the Interior, mentioned
that at least 5 MPs were linked to the case.608
In Ukraine, the legitimacy of the legislative body was not questioned since the
revolution had contested the Presidential poll. The outgoing Kuchma administration tried to
keep the Rada as “a safe haven for the old elite.” It was also hoped by revolutionaries that all
concessions regarding the Rada would be won back after the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko bloc
won the elections in 2006.609 Hence the Parliament remained active, which derailed many
reforms.
Under Kuchma, Parliament became the instrument of various interest groups to
project their influence. Frequently, oligarchs either bought seats for themselves or for their
clients, guaranteeing them immunity from prosecution.610 Just before the Orange revolution
Hryhoriy Omelchenko, a member of the Parliamentary committee on fighting organized
crime and corruption, predicted that several MPs would face criminal charges if stripped of
immunity.611 Between 1990 and 1994, over 500 deputies were not put on trial because a local
council or the parliament failed to grant approval.612
Thus, there was a significant interest to maintain some of the bad institutions and
opaque systems that permitted bribery.613 This vested interest as well as reluctance in the
Orange camp on Yushchenko’s part to take radical steps aided in the survival of old
practices. There was a significant willingness on both sides to negotiate a peaceful way out of
the crisis. Both sides also knew the capabilities of their opponents. Kuchma’s regime was still
strong enough to be reckoned with, and Yushchenko’s public support could not be dismissed
606 Former governor of Imereti region quoted in Akhali Taoba (2004).
607 Rustavi 2 news coverage (2006).
608 24 Hours (2006).
609 Wilson (2005, p. 149).
610 Shelley (1998, p. 658).
611 Krushelnysky (2006, p. 121).
612 Turchynov (1996) as quoted in Puglisi (2003, p. 110).
613 Balmaceda (2008, p. 140).
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as unthreatening by the incumbents. Hence the opposition was unable or unwilling to press
harder, and accepted the incumbents’ conditions for the re-run of the second round of
elections. During subsequent negotiations the re-run of the second round was traded for
constitutional changes to limit the President’s powers614 and other concessions resulted in
“built-in political and legal contradictions.”615 As a result, a semi-presidential system was
changed to a parliamentary-presidential republic. The protracted negotiations also allowed
the outgoing elites to siphon some of the state resources. Wilson describes suspicious
property transfers, and an estimated one and a third billion USD left the country in
November-December 2004.616 Some local observers attribute the post-revolutionary
instability to the presence of the parliament that was elected before the revolution.617 Indeed
the pact of 2004 was full of ambiguity,618 and despite its labelling as “democratic” also
sustained an environment conducive to corruption and organized criminality.
Importantly, Yushchenko got only 52 percent of the presidential vote, compared to
Saakashvili’s 96.3 percent. Hence the former was constrained by significant opposition and
had to negotiate with rival Yanukovich. In this way, the country’s East-West division played
into the hands of organized crime and corruption and exploited the rivalry among the political
elites. Political rivalry and infighting has stalled important legislative changes and widened
the gaps in state capacity, making room for organized crime to flourish. The political-
criminal-business nexus carried over from pre-revolutionary times, and was strong in the
Donbas region, where a clan that opposes the pro-Western president has deep roots. The
Donetsk clan continues to host and protect the old guard officials and oligarchs. Hence an
overall environment of illegality, including the influence of organized criminals on politics,
embroils society, and may be directly traced to the pacted transition or “negotiated
revolution.” Despite the impressive democratic progress Ukraine made, it has fallen short in
fighting criminality.
It has been argued that democracies are more vulnerable to penetration by criminal
groups.619 Eisenstadt argues that revolutionary elites with close ties to other elites are more
likely to build a more open, pluralist and less coercive system.620 The political system which
emerges after a negotiated revolution is accommodating, accepting and enhances civil
614 See for instance Pifer (2007).
615 Financial Times (2008).
616 Wilson (2005, p. 158).
617 Author’s interview with U3, U4, U6, October-December 2007, Ukraine.
618 Harasymiw (2007, p. 20).
619 Moran (2001, pp. 385-386).
620 Eisenstadt (1978).
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liberties and market economies.621 At the same time, as Lawson concludes, negotiated
revolution leads to a weak state in terms of “despotic authority and infrastructural
capacity.”622 This argument holds true for my empirical cases, and I learned that what is good
for democracy is not necessarily instrumental in decreasing corruption and fighting organized
crime.
Despite some criminal charges brought against mid-level Kuchma officials,623 the
Orange Revolution slogan of sending “Bandits to Prison!” has not resulted in a single senior
official’s being charged, a major source of disillusionment according to Taras Kuzio.624
Kuchma and Lytvyn were questioned soon after the revolution in relation to the Gongadze
affair,625 but Wilson writes “it was only cursory, as [Kuchma] still seemed too powerful to be
investigated.” However, several influential figures in Kuchma’s government, some linked to
organized crime or illicit business, were obliged to flee the country due to their fear of
prosecution by the new authorities, including: Serhii Kivalov, former head of the CEC and
oligarch; Ihor Bakai, former Interior minister; Mykola Bilokon, former Sumy governor;
Volodymyr Shcherban; and Ruslan Bodelan, former Odessa mayor.626 Some of the arrests
and prosecutions in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions were politically motivated,
according to some sources, but this does not obviate the possibility of these individuals’ illicit
activities.
For instance, Boris Kolesnikov was arrested after the revolution in April 2005 for
unclear reasons. In one “official” version, he was arrested for extortion of shares from
Donetsk’s largest shopping centre, “White Swan.” Another version of events said he had
ordered three assassination attempts, and a third story said he had been involved in a criminal
“separatism case.”627 In another example, Volodymyr Scherban, former Sumy governor, was
charged with extortion. Viktor Diadchenko, former governor of Transcarpathia was charged
with faking the results of the controversial Mukachevo election in April 2004. Hryhorii
Surkis was accused of a bizarre transfer of UAH 6 million from the football club Dynamo
Kyiv to Kuchma’s charitable fund.628 However alleged criminals have been mostly left
621 Kamrava (1999, pp. 317-245).
622 Lawson (2005, p. 227).
623 Kuzio (2005e, p. 6).
624 Kuzio (2006).
625 Giorgi Gongadze, Ukrainian journalist and critic of the Kuchma regime, was assassinated in 2000 with the
alleged complicity of Ukrainian law enforcement officials who were allegedly acting on orders of President
Kuchma.
626 Wilson (2005, pp. 156-7).
627 Ibid., p. 168.
628 Ibid., pp. 168-9.
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untouched. Even Tymoshenko, known for her decisiveness and antipathy for the Donetsk
clan, demonstrated a hands-off attitude to Rinat Akhmetov. Reportedly she was making a
political deal with the Donetsk clan.629
Only recently Mykola Rudkovskyi, former Transport Minister and member of the
Socialist Party, was arrested on allegations of bribery.630 But the arrest happened only after
the Socialist party has marginalized, unable to secure Parliamentary seats. Political parties
have long been the protectors of corrupt officials and illegal businesses. The Socialist party
was then defending the shadow business of Rudkovskyi,631 a major party funder in the early
2000s.
Some anti-corruption measures have been enacted but not implemented because of the
absence of institutional transformation and fully-fledged reforms. Just after the Orange
Revolution, anti-corruption measures, particularly in the energy sector, returned more than
US 2 billion to the state budget.632 In the first four months of 2005, customs duties increased
by 50 percent and the state budget grew by 26 percent due to anti-corruption measures.633
Thus there were major improvements immediately after the revolution, but these changes
eventually halted. As one former judge mentioned, “there was panic in the highly-corrupted
court system after the revolution and many judges were afraid of prosecution; however, the
new authorities made no reforms.”634 Power struggles within the Orange camp, continued
presence of the reform-opposing “old guard,” and the break-up of the Yushchenko-
Tymoshenko alliance undermined reform momentum.635
The main base of the Party of Regions, which received the most votes in the last
parliamentary elections, is cronies of former President Kuchma. Yanukovich’s team,
especially since Tymoshenko left the post of Prime Minister in 2006 and Yanukovich took
over, uses this base to derail anti-corruption efforts.
629 Ibid., 171.
630 Ukrainian News (2008).
631 Wilson (2005).
632 Kuzio (2005b, p. 119).
633 Kuzio (2005d, p. 359).
634 Author’s interview with Yurii Vasilenko, former judge, November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
635 D’Anieri (2005, p. 82).
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2. The survival of patrimonialism
Most post-revolutionary democratizing or state building efforts occurred in a political
culture that watered down many initiatives and derailed reform efforts. Unfortunately,
various forms of clientelism and patrimonialism survived. Nepotism affects government staff
policy heavily in all three countries. Additionally, a merit-based achievement and promotion
system has not overcome tribalism and regionalism in making professional or government
appointments.
The Soviet experience of relying on informal social networks to survive in a shortage
economy made a deep impact on the post-Soviet setting. The cultural traditions of respect
toward one’s own kin based on blood relations and friendship are also significant, especially
in the Georgian and Kyrgyz contexts
Most often, workers are selected not by objective criteria, but by accidental,
subjective, narrow and provincial criteria. Most frequently so-called acquaintances are
personal friends, fellow countrymen, people personally devoted to someone,
masters of eulogizing their patrons, regardless of their political and business
suitability. 636
This is an extract from Stalin’s speech at the February-March Plenum of the
Communist party in 1937. Nepotistic, patron-client relationships have since then survived in
all former Soviet republics to different degrees.
The staff policies of the post-revolutionary governments are largely influenced by
patronage, nepotism and corruption. This was exacerbated by the problem of revolutionary
activists lacking experience occupying public offices, especially in Georgian case. The
Georgian government in the direct aftermath of the revolution was frequently referred to as
the “kindergarten” due to the young average age of its members. These new officials
frequently lacked experience to competently deal with problems. Also, the activists of the
youth Kmara movement that played a crucial role in the Rose Revolution, and the young
supporters of the new ruling party, came into the middle level of government after the
revolution. Kelkel, the youth resistance organization to Akaev’s regime is not greatly
represented in the government, unlike Kmara.637 Only a few cases of Kelkel in government
are known, such as the head of Kelkel becoming the director of a state TV channel after it
636 Stalin quoted in Fairbanks (1983, p. 345).
637 Nichol (2005).
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was re-privatized.638 In Ukraine, the context of negotiated revolution prevented the country’s
Pora activists from obtaining government appointments. In Ukraine, the elite changeover was
not as great as in Georgia and the administrative personnel was not reshuffled either, leaving
no open spots for Pora.
The crucial factor that distinguishes Georgia from the two other cases is the capacity
of the new authorities to employ in leading positions in state structures the highly-qualified
professionals that preferred to work either in the private sector or in international
organisations before the Rose Revolution. Many of these individuals were young and
educated in various universities of Western Europe and the United States. The new
authorities created a fund that was paying the salaries of 11,000 public employees in the
direct aftermath of the Revolution.639 This allowed for competitive salaries in government
structures, decreasing incentives for rent-seeking and attracting highly qualified
professionals. Side effects include the loss of institutional memory, since many old
employees were dismissed,640 and the weakening of civil society, since many of their leaders
moved to government positions. Contrastingly, in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, government
institutions are not attractive to highly educated young people, who prefer either to work
abroad or seek employment in the private sector or international organizations based in these
countries.641
In Kyrgyzstan, nepotistic and tribalistic appointments in politics have been strong
ever since Soviet times.642 Soviet policies of promoting local cadres were always undermined
by tribalism, family connections, and cronyism.643 For instance, the Communist Party
secretary Razakov brought Southern Ichkilik clans to power from 1950 to 1961; the advent of
Turdakun Usubaliev to the highest position in the Republican Party resulted in the
domination of the Northern Kochkor clan (Naryn) during the Brezhnev era. Over the years,
Masaliev/Southern Adygine and Ichkilik clans, and finally the Askar Akaev/Northern
Sarybagysh clans have dominated.644 Now people from the South, especially Bakiev’s
birthplace of Batken, are receiving key state positions, according to many interviewees.645
638 Marat (2006, p. 67).
639 Nodia (2006, p. 95).
640 Papava (2007).
641 Author’s interview with K5, K9, K10, K18 in Kyrgyzstan and U3, U9, U16, Ukraine, 2007.
642 Koichumanov, Otorbayev, Starr (2005, p. 32).
643 Anderson (1999, p. 10).
644 Collins (2006, pp. 106-7, 116).
645 Author’s interviews with K1, K7, K8, K9, K10, K18, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
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Similarly, in the Shevardnadze period, the people from his home region of Guria were widely
represented in the bureaucracy. In 1997, 14 percent, and in 1999, 36 percent of government
employees were from Guria, considering that Guria contributes only 3 percent of Georgia’s
population.646 After Kuchma was elected in 1994, some 206 individuals moved from
Dnipropetrovsk, Kuchma’s hometown, to Kyiv to occupy key state positions.647
Nowadays the significant distinction between the cases is that loyalty to the new
ruling political party and nepotism based on friendship and family links are the main
determinants of appointments in Georgia,648 while in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan these are, most
importantly, bribery, as well as regionalism and in Kyrgyzstan, blood kinship. Kyrgyz
journalists and NGO representatives have alleged that the illegal cost of the position of
Minister has increased from 100,000 to 300,000 USD.649 Another NGO leader also reported
that some 300,000 USD were distributed to deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh to approve the
appointment of a high-level official.650 Other estimates include: 30,000-50,000 USD for the
position of judge depending on the region and district; or 20,000 USD for a position in the
central tax department, while a regional tax position costs only 5,000 USD.651
Much like the Kyrgyz case, in Ukraine various regional groups get stronger or weaker
according to who is in power. Since independence, first the Kyiv clan, Medvechuk-Surkis
grouping, came to power led by Leonid Kravchuk. That was followed by Leonid Kuchma
and his powerbase, the Dnepropetrovsk clan. During the final years of Kuchma’s tenure, the
Donetsk group rose due to the membership of two titans of contemporary Ukrainian politics,
Viktor Yanukovich and Rinat Akhmetov. The Donetsk group suffered a major blow during
the Orange revolution, when it lost the elections to Viktor Yushchenko. After the Orange
revolution, political infighting continued between the Donetsk and Zakarpathia groupings,
the latter being the main powerbase of Viktor Yushchenko. However it should be mentioned
that the strict regional base of these political-economic clans is withering away, as they try to
expand to regions where they have traditionally lacked public support. For instance in the
immediate aftermath of the Orange revolution, the Zakarpathia clan tried to expand its
political and economic influence in the East by using its government leverage to bid for
additional stakes in the regional economy. During the Premierships of Yanukovich, the Party
646 Kikabidze and Losaberidze (2000, p. 40).
647 Puglisi (2003, p. 112).
648 According to Simis (1982, pp. 36-7) these connections always played important roles in staff policy.
649 Author’s interview with a K5, K19, April-May, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
650 Author’s interview with K19, April 4, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
651 Author’s interview with K5, May 10, 2007.
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of Regions likewise reached out to the Western regions. However, the political kryshas of
regional business interests primarily benefit their financiers.
Since the Orange revolution several high-ranking appointments looked very
promising initially: for example, Yuri Lutsenko, the new Minister of the Interior who
promised tangible improvements like honest traffic policemen, and Mykola Syvulskyi,
formerly jailed with Yulia Tymoshenko, and the new corruption-fighting Chief of the
Auditing and Inspection Commission.652 However, many hopes did not materialize either due
to the prevailing system of illegality that waters down individual efforts, or to the temptation
of engaging in lucrative rent-seeking.
3. Redistribution of spoils
The re-division of resources in the post-revolutionary period was a violent process in
Kyrgyzstan, unlike Georgia where the formal state institutions played a key role in the
process. In Kyrgyzstan, the political elites, acting in their private and not the state’s interests,
and a number of non-state actors, among them criminal groups, were involved in property
redistribution. Thus the process remained outside of the control of legitimate public
institutions. Formal means failed in Kyrgyzstan due to the collapsing state institutions, rent-
seeking by the new regime, and weak and fragmented elites, factors largely absent in the
direct aftermath of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. In Ukraine, again unlike Georgia, the
greatest part of the redivision was outside of formal or informal government control and like
in Kyrgyzstan the process was occasionally violent. The businessmen related to Orange camp
elites tried to reach out to the Eastern regions, the traditional sphere of influence of the Blue
camp. Because private individuals and companies were using the state to take over certain
businesses rather than the state managing the redistribution process, raiding increased after
the revolution.
Firstly, in all three cases, representatives of the political elites used non-state actors or
even the state itself to get their share of the spoils, the list of Daniar Usenov being a good
example. Usenov, a businessman who had had a disagreement with the Akaev regime, was
appointed as deputy prime minister after the Tulip Revolution. Usenov also headed a
652 Wilson (2005, pp. 162-3).
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commission for investigating the Akaev family’s alleged illegal assets.653 The list soon
comprised over seventy enterprises, many unrelated to Akaev’s family, and yet they were
scrutinized by incoming elites. For instance, a German-owned company, Interglass,654 was
put on Usenov’s list of illegally privatized companies, without any proof. In fact, this list was
a racket, and businesses were paying to be removed, according to one observer.655 The others
fell into the hands of incoming elites.
Secondly, much of the redistribution was manipulated by non-state actors, with the
government unwilling or unable to play a role. In the case of the Karakeche coal mines,
Nurlan Motuev, a local journalist who played an active role in the Tulip Revolution, brazenly
took over the mine, claiming it was was illegally privatized, and declared himself director.656
Thus, the process was mainly unregulated, with nearly every transfer of shares resulting
from informal negotiations, corruption, violence and the threat of violence. For instance, the
post-revolutionary re-division of the Karasuu market in the Ferghana Valley resulted in at
least three contract killings. In June 2005, MP Jirgalbek Surabaldiev, one of the most
successful businessmen in Kyrgyzstan and owner of two car markets, was killed in
Bishkek.657 A Ministry of the Interior spokesperson stated that his assassination was related
to the re-distribution of property.658 Much of the property changed hands several times. For
instance Malabaev, former customs chief under Akaev, lost control of a casino in Bishkek
when it was seized by Rysbek Akmatbaev, though he recovered control when the latter was
assassinated.659
In Georgia, the new political elites played a key role and the process was more
centralized and bureaucratically controlled. Saakashvili showed great determination in re-
nationalising a lot of illegally privatized property. What is truer for Georgia is the new quasi-
legal role of the state: those who managed to keep their businesses were obliged to make
large payoffs to the new government. Much of the money paid by businessmen for their past
wrongdoings went to newly-established special state funds, the operations of which were far
from transparent and accountable. Allegedly, some of the money went to the new ruling
party, the rest for financing different off-budget activities. Moreover, business circles have
653 RFE/RL (2008).
654 For information on the company see http://www.interglass.kg/
655 Author’s interview with Elena Avdeeva, Chief editor, Newspaper Belyi Parakhod, March 28, 2007, Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan.
656 ICG (2005, pp. 7-9).
657 Delo No (2006).
658 Tazar News Agency (2007).
659 Author’s interview with Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyz politician, March 26, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
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been continuously reporting pressure from the state. Hence in post-revolutionary Georgia
“state racketeering” has replaced extortion of businesses by criminals. Thus, the crucial
distinction here is that the process of re-distribution in Georgia was better managed by the
new authorities than in Kyrgyzstan, where many of the deals remained in the shadows, with
non-state, among them criminal, groups playing a key role. Thus, more violence erupted
around re-distribution in post-revolutionary Kyrgyzstan.
Violence also accompanied the redistribution process in Ukraine. The difference
between Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan is that in the latter, much property was owned by the ruling
family directly, not like in Ukraine where much property was of dubious origin and difficult
to trace. This lack of transparency in ownership contributed to various informal negotiations
and forceful takeovers.
One of the most violent cases of spoils redistribution after the Orange revolution was
the dispute between Ihor Kolomoyskyi, owner of Privat, and Maksim Kurochkin, over the
market Ozerka in Dnepropetrovsk. Kurochkin was the head of the Russia Club, allegedly
funded by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and other businessmen like Aleksandr Babakov,
Hryhorii Surkis, and Viktor Medvedchuk.660 The Russia Club was notorious for its crooked
finances. Kurochkin was linked to Yanukovich and funded Natalia Vitrenko’s Progressive
Socialist Party. Allegedly he was linked to the Russian Izmailovo gang and involved in the
Russian protection racket.661
Reportedly, the conflict over the market started in 2004, when Kurochkin bought 94
percent of the shares from the State Property Fund of Ukraine. Since then, control over the
market changed hands a few times, culminating in the 2006 murder of Vladimir Vorobev, the
director of the market and associate of Kurochkin, and the 2007 assassinations of three
Vorobev associates. Kurochkin was arrested in Kyiv in November of 2006. In March 2007, in
what has been called the loudest murder in Ukraine after the revolution, Kurochkin was killed
in the courtroom by a sniper.662 Numerous media reports attributed this assassination to the
dispute over the Ozerka market. Much more violence accompanied spoils distribution all
across Ukraine, including assassinations and destruction of property, indicating the strength
of the political-criminal-business nexus.663
660 Wilson (2005, p. 88).
661 Author’s interview with U4 and U6, October-November 2007.
662Ura inform (2007).
663 Obozrevatel (2007).
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4. Corruption and collusion: before and after the Revolutions
As already discussed, a strong correlation exists between corruption and organized
crime. Various scholars have argued that organized criminality thrives in the environment of
rampant corruption, and pointed out an increase of corruption during transitions. Their main
argument is related to power vacuums, or the breakdown of the centralized pyramid of bribe
collection and consequent multiplication of bribe-takers. The presence of more corrupt
officials has direct implications for organized crime.664
Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington both assert that transition periods are marked by
conflict between old customs and new legal standards, when corruption is bound to result
from the deviance of behaviour from accepted norms.665 Nelken and Levi argue that attempts
of political elites to “re-legitimize the State” through enforcement of laws involving
corruption and crime often involve major incursions into civil liberties, including selective
targeting to settle political scores or punish those who refuse to pay bribes.666
This section covers the impact of the revolutions on corruption. Periods of democratic
transition may also be associated with higher corruption if old norms and institutions are
eroded before new norms and institutions are in place. Monitoring and enforcement may be
weakened in the turmoil of regime change, increasing bribery opportunities.667 In sum, the
three different trends in corruption are consistent with my overall argument that the
revolutions saw a decrease of crime in Georgia, with the reverse effect in Kyrgyzstan and
Ukraine.
During the post-Soviet transition, informal channels of illegal payments were
institutionalized in all three countries. The practice of asset-stripping in the Soviet Union
continued in the newly independent countries and reached its peak under Kuchma, Akaev and
Shevardnadze, when bribery and corrupt lobbying became general business and public
practice. Then, corruption controlled every level of bureaucracy. Bribes were collected for
personnel purposes (appointments, promotions); they were also paid to the government by
businesses (for turning a blind eye to violated regulations; avoiding checks or investigations;
and getting favourable decisions).
The role of ruling families needs to be stressed here. In Kyrgyzstan, the more than
decade-long rule of Akaev resulted in rampant corruption throughout political and economic
664 See for instance Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 13); Goorha (2000, p. 1189); Huntington (1968).
665 Huntington (1968, p. 60).
666 Nelken and Levi (1996, pp. 1-17).
667 Olofsgård and Zahran (2007).
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life, heavily based in rent-seeking and corruption by the ruling family. Almost all business
activity in Kyrgyzstan needed Akaev clan endorsement.668 Prosecutor General Azimbek
Beknazarov estimated corruption by Akaev’s family cost the Kyrgyz economy more than 50
million USD, and 80 criminal proceedings were launched after the revolution,669 though with
little real outcome. Like in pre-revolutionary Georgia, the Akaevs did not monopolize
corruption, but allowed competition between different interest groups, occasionally
intervening as an arbiter.670 The process got out of control when this capacity to balance was
lost, similar to what happened in Georgia.
In Georgia, the members of the Shevardnadze family monopolized control over a number
of businesses. Chiaberashvili and Tevzadze divide those in subgroups: first, the group headed
by Guram Akhvlediani, father-in-law of Shevardnadze’s son, Paata. He was the Chairman of
the Chamber of Commerce with business interests in minerals, oil and aircraft, and he
controlled the port of Poti, directly or indirectly dominating the seaport’s infrastructure.671
The second group of Gia Jokhtaberidze, Shevardnadze’s son-in-law, owned one of the two
major cellular communication companies, Magti, and held interests in the state Rustavi
nitrogen plant and Zestafoni non-ferrous metallurgy plant. The third sub-group, headed by
Nugzar Shevardnadze, Shevardnadze’s nephew, played a main role in the import of consumer
goods, chiefly fuel.672 All groups made sure that their private interests would be guarded by
the state through appointing close friends and relatives to government positions. For instance,
Zurab Urotadze, Deputy Interior Minister, was a childhood friend of Nugzar Shevardnadze.
Jokhtaberidze’s best man, Gia Kakuberi, was a deputy minister of communications.673
In Ukraine, the Kuchma family, especially Kuchma’s son in law Viktor Pinchuk, emerged
as major oligarch. Pinchuk’s accumulation of initial capital raised legal questions, such as his
infamous joint purchase with Akhmetov of Kryvorizhstal for much lower than market
price.674 In Ukraine, however, the presidential family was not as important as in the other two
countries. This is due in part to the large territory and population that was instrumental in
668 Interviews with K2, K4, K9, K16, K23, March-May 2007 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
669 Marat (2006c, p. 46).
670 Aslund (2005a).
671 See for instance Mtavari Gazeti (2004). Cross-checked with the interview with the official of Poti seaport, 25
August 2006, Poti, Georgia.
672 Chiaberashvili and Tevzadze (2005, p. 191).
673 For detailed discussion of anti-corruption policy in Georgia during Soviet times and afterwards see Appendix
2.
674 Kryvorizhstal is one of the most important industrial sites in Ukraine and a global steel producer. It was re-
privatized in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and, though initially bought for 800 million USD, has been
sold for 4.8 billion USD to Mittal Steel.
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creating several competing regional groups. This competition precluded the emergence of
monopoly by one family.
In all three countries, corruption channels were temporarily disrupted in the direct
aftermath of the revolutions, and businessmen were confused to whom, how much and when
they should pay the regular illegal amounts. This is in line with the transitologist argument of
uncertainty and chaos prevailing after rapid transition. In Kyrgyzstan there was uncertainty
over the market shares, ownership of profitable assets, and the legality of business
practices.675 The post-revolution normlessness left legal and illegal markets in limbo. Engvall
states that in Kyrgyzstan there was “no actor in a position to define the rules of the game.”676
With Akaev’s family and its operatives removed from informal control, the power centre
became vague. Eventually, the corruption pyramids were restored, and the new ruling elites
became the new kryshas for legal as well as illegal businesses.677 Hence, only the officials
changed while the mechanisms of bribery remained in place.
Unlike Kyrgyzstan, where power was monopolized by Bakiev’s regime, in Ukraine the
formerly highly centralized system of Kuchma has been destroyed. Hence, the most
significant change in Ukrainian corruption trends would be their diversification due to the
newly emerged, post-Orange Revolution, multiple power centres. As one local observer
noted, “before the revolution Kuchma was the real centre of power, although afterwards the
power vertical has been decentralized, affecting corruption schemes.” 678 Now everyone is
getting “a share of the pie.” In the system of public procurements, all major pre- and post-
revolution powerholders reap illicit benefits, including the associates of Yushchenko,
Tymoshenko, Yanukovich, Moroz and Lytvyn.679 In 2006 President Viktor Yushchenko
wrote in the Washington Post that “on my watch, the corruption that has historically
emanated from the president’s office ceased.”680 Nevertheless, allegations of corruption
surrounding the president’s close allies have repeatedly surfaced since the September 2005
crisis when mutual accusations in corruption between various officials led to the dismissal of
Yulia Tymoshenko's government. There are now allegations of corruption concerning the
president’s family, including his brother’s dealings with gas transportation company
675 MacFarlane and Torjesen (2007, p. 58).
676 Engvall (2007, p. 37).
677 Author’s interviews with K3, K5, K11, K23, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
678 Author’s interview with Stas Rechynskyi, 1 November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
679 Author’s interview with U7 and U8, October-November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
680 Yushchenko (2006).
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RosUkrenergo.681 Unsurprisingly the fight against corruption is “now the source of acerbic
jokes and sarcastic smiles.”682
In Georgia, one month after the revolution, a businessman appeared in the state
chancellery bringing a bribe payable monthly to the previous authorities and he was trying to
find an official in the new government that would accept the money.683 The pre-revolutionary
corruption pyramids have never been restored in Georgia and even the outmost critics of the
Saakashvili government agree that petty corruption has been reduced.684 However, high-level
corruption remains a problem. The top manager of one of the largest state enterprises said
“the winner in every public procurement tender exceeding USD 50,000 is pre-determined
from above.” In one case this person received a call from a close relative of President
Saakashvili “recommending” a certain company to win a public tender.685 In 2007, a scandal
involving former Defence Minister Okruashvili illustrated how high officials were awarding
public contracts via nepotism and cronyism.
The extent of public trust in authorities is a useful explanatory variable when
determining whether corruption increased or decreased post-revolution. Hagan and Radoeva
show that “extraordinarily high levels of social capital, characterized by unmonitored trust,
can result in political corruption, white collar and corporate crime,” and yet “extremely low
levels of social capital, which frequently involve a disconnection from and distrust for
society, often are associated with crime in less advantaged settings.”686 Consensus in
academic literature indicate that a general lack of trust in society and between citizens and the
government contributes to the success of organized crime.687 Saakashvili garnered some 96
percent of the votes in January 2004 elections and his political party won an absolute
majority in the Parliament. The OSCE, which sent one of the largest election observer
missions, stated “the authorities showed the political will to conduct democratic elections”
and generally elections brought Georgia close to meeting international standards.688 Hence
the results are still a good indicator of public trust in Saakashvili despite the possible,
although minor, fraud. The new leader shortly made the statement that “voters had given him
a mandate to fight corruption.”689
681 Kyiv Post (2006a).
682 Kyiv Post (2007a).
683 Author’s interview with G16 and G26, Tbilisi, Georgia, June-July 2006.
684 See for instance Dolidze (2007).
685 Author’s personal communication with G11, 19 January 2009, Georgia.
686 Hagan and Radoeva (1998, pp. 195-211).
687 Levi (2007, p. 786).
688 OSCE (2004).
689 Carlson (2004).
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In Kyrgyzstan it is widely accepted that the volume and extent of the bribery is
greater than before the Tulip Revolution.690 Entrepreneurs and representatives of the non-
governmental sector, the media and academic institutions report that the value of illegal
payments requested by officials is higher now.691 For instance, as Kyrgyz journalists and
NGO representatives have alleged, the illegal payment for various positions in the
government has tripled.692 The most common explanation corroborated by the majority of
respondents is that the new people who have come into the government are ”hungry” for
money and are trying to earn as much illegal revenue as possible, since they were deprived of
this opportunity before. This is exacerbated by continual reshuffles in all state structures.
Under conditions of uncertainty and, with reshuffles, chronic risk of dismissal, officials try to
earn a fortune as quickly as possible.693 Barbara Christophe attributes the frequent
replacement of leaderships in various institutions to the attempt of the ruling cliques to
counteract the emergence of independent power centres and thus maintain their own
influence. She argues that the constant restructuring of government agencies is the means to
block the emergence of uncontrollable networks of patronage.694
In Ukraine, most of the experts interviewed report that, similarly to Kyrgyzstan,
corruption has remained the same or increased.695 However, there was an initial improvement
in immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution. According to the EBRD, the Tymoshenko
government carried out significant reforms related to the tax regime and social security for
entrepreneurs.696 However, some of the reforms have been reversed or watered down
afterwards when Yanukovich returned to power as a Prime Minister.697 According to some
estimations, now 60 percent of incomes of public officials constitute bribes.698 Since early
2007 the organized crime fighting unit of the MIA has registered 230 cases of bribery among
government officials; among them only 30 bribes paid exceed 30,000 hryvnas (roughly 6,000
USD).699 According to law enforcement officers, it is rare for a government official to be
690 See for instance Report on the Survey Results (2007, p. 7).
691 Author’s interviews with K5, K7, K9, K11, K16, K23, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
692 Ibid.
693 Author’s interviews with K1, K5, K7, K9, K11, K14, K16, K17, K23, March-May 2007, Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan.
694 Christophe (2004, p. 14).
695 Author’s interviews with U3, U4, U6, U7, U8, U16, September-December 2007.
696 EBRD (2007, p. 23).
697 See for instance Aslund quoted in Burwell, Aslund, Kuzio, Pifer (2006, p. 11).
698 Author’s interview with Valeryi Glushkov, Professor, Head of Criminology Department in Shevchenko
National University, November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
699 Grazhdanskaya prokuratura Ukraini (2007).
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convicted in bribery involving large amounts of money. Usually the cases are ceased by
courts with the lowest punishment or even no sentence at all.
Corruption remains in many branches of the government in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. In
the former, the police, tax department, customs, security service (SNB, the successor to the
Soviet KGB) and courts are especially corrupt, with customs considered the worst.700 The
heads of customs departments are widely assumed to be the main illegal financiers of the
ruling families. The highest bribes are paid by the companies involved in producing and/or
distributing electricity, gas, and water. The next on the list are businessmen involved in
industries such as processing, construction and telecommunications. Bribes below the
average level are typical for companies involved in trade, health, education, utility services,
car repairs and hotel and catering.701 The average bribe702 paid to officials by businesses is
5,000 som (one hundred and twenty USD).
In Ukraine, a USAID study found that many institutions are rated as widely corrupt, with
law enforcement topping the rankings. These include the state auto inspection unit (DAI)
(57.5 percent of the respondents think that it is corrupt), the police (54.2 percent), healthcare
services (54 percent), the court system (49 percent), universities (46.3 percent), the
Prosecutor’s Office (42.9 percent), customs authorities (42.8 percent), and tax authorities
(40.3 percent). 703 Corruption is mostly noted in acquiring business licenses, tax collection,
and customs.704 Recently the sectors of construction and land distribution showed high
vulnerability to bribery.705 Researchers have found that the corruption cases detected by law
enforcement do not exceed 1 percent of overall corruption-related crimes committed.706
Certainly, one of the underlying problems in modern Ukraine is political corruption,707
exemplified by the President’s claims in 2007 that MPs have been lured into rival political
factions through corrupt deals.
700 Report On the Survey Results (2007, p. 22).
701 UNDP (2006, p. 10).
702 The study quoted does not clearly define what an average bribe is, though it states that it is “average by data
from the survey,” most probably meaning an arithmetic average.
703 USAID (2007, p. 19).
704 OECD (2006, p. 10).
705 Author’s interview with Oksana Kuziakiv, Chief Executive, Institute for Economic Research and Policy
Consulting, October 2007, Kyiv.
706 L.M. Sudba, “Koruptsyia v Ukraine: sastayanie i problemi”, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2005.
707 Yushchenko’s speech (April 2007), quoted in EBRD (2007).
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One of the most cited corruption measurements is the Corruption Perception Index by
Transparency International (TI). The following chart shows the dynamics of corruption in the
three countries.
Chart 5. Dynamics of the Corruption Perception Index in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
(TI)708
The chart shows some trends: Georgia was the most corrupt country before the
revolution, and now it is least corrupt among the three countries. The revolution resulted in a
rapid breakthrough and quick improvement in the Georgian case. In Ukraine, the situation
improved in 2006 compared to the previous years; however, progress stalled in 2007.709 In
2007, 52 percent of Ukrainian respondents thought that there was no change in the fight
against corruption compared to 2006.710 According to TI data, the situation remained
unchanged in Kyrgyzstan and even deteriorated, what is also confirmed by numerous
interviews and conversations with citizens during field research.
The corruption measurement indicator of the World Bank corroborates these trends.
The indicator measures “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
708 Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/
709 Donchev and Ujhelyi (2008) find that corruption perception indices maybe sensitive to absolute level of
corruption (number of occurrences of corruption) rather than just relative corruption levels (percentage of
population affected by corruption). Hence the perception maybe biased upwards for large countries in cross-
country comparisons..
710 Sharma, Holzwart, and Abdullatif (2007, p. 13).
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including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites
and private interests.” 711
Chart 6. Control of corruption indicators in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan (World Bank)712
The chart shows rapid and significant improvement since Georgia’s revolution,
deterioration in the Kyrgyz case and, in Ukraine, an improvement in the direct aftermath of
the Orange Revolution, followed by a reversal. Thus, the most "corruption-captured" state
now, according to this indicator, is Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia is doing best among the three.
This clearly correlates with other variables from EBRD and World Economic Forum’s
Opinion Surveys. The EBRD survey, showing the percentage of firms stating unofficial
payments are frequent, demonstrates that the number of unofficial payments decreased in
Georgia and Ukraine while it increased in Kyrgyzstan.
Chart 7. Bribe frequency (EBRD data of 2002 and 2005 compared)713
711 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007, p. 5).
712 World Bank (1996-2007).
713 EBRD (2002-2005).
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This data from the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum
measuring irregular payments in tax collection714 also show that Georgia715 and Ukraine did
well, while the situation in Kyrgyzstan is worse compared to 2005 and in 2006 the country
was ranked 4th from bottom among more than 130 countries.
Table 4. Irregular payments in tax collection in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (World
Economic Forum)
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan Russia Finland
2003 N/A 3.4 N/A 4.4 6.8
2004 2.9 3.9 N/A 4.5 6.7
2005 3.9 4.2 3.0 4.6 6.5
2006 4.3 4.3 2.8 4.9 6.7
National surveys by various organizations positively correlate with the above data.
The situation in Georgia in 2007 is not much different from that of 2006 and a very high
percentage of respondents, 97 percent, reported that they had not been in a situation over the
last 12 months when they had to bribe for a service or decision. According to the same survey
in Kyrgyzstan, 21 percent of the respondents cite corruption among the most important issues
the country is facing,716 while in the Georgian case corruption717 is not listed at all.718 In
March 2006, only 36 percent of respondents in Kyrgyzstan thought that corruption had
increased. This figure went up to 47 percent in May 2007.719
In Ukraine, the 2007 USAID study found that 42 percent of respondents believed that
corruption levels remained unchanged, while 35 percent believed that corruption had
increased since 2004.720 However, the quarterly enterprise survey carried out by the Institute
for Economic Research shows interesting trends: in 2005 the average size of bribes was
recorded as 1.4 percent of annual sales, down from 6.5 percent in 2004. However, in 2006
714 The question asked in the survey is the following: “in your industry, how commonly would you estimate that
firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with annual tax payments?” (1=common,
7=never occurs). Source: World Economic Forum (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).
715 Again, significant improvement following the revolution is notable in the Georgian case.
716 Corruption ranks third most important issue after unemployment (57% of respondents) and economic
development (27%).
717 Unemployment (60%), territorial integrity (33%) and economics (30%) top the Georgian list of most
important problems.
718 For Kyrgyzstan see IRI (2007b); for Georgia see IRI (2007a).
719 IRI (2007b).
720 USAID (2007, p. 19).
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this indicator increased again and reached 3.4 percent of annual sales. Strikingly, the share of
respondents who were asked whether it was common for enterprises like theirs to pay bribes
in order “to get things done” decreased from 76.8 percent in 2004 to 34 percent in 2005 and
then increased to 55.1 percent in 2006 again.721 Clearly, improvement occurred immediately
after the revolution, while in 2006 the situation deteriorated. Although there is not enough
evidence to speak about clear causation, it can be argued that the rising corruption rates
correlate with the return of the Blue camp to executive power. The Atlantic Council study
that examines corruption since the Orange revolution concludes that “anti-corruption efforts
simply are not a priority for the Party of Regions.”722
However, this should not downplay the importance of bribery among the “Orange”
elites. Kuzio found some public perception of the ‘mafia’ and organized crime “ruling”
Ukraine when Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have been in power, as Prime Minister and
vice-Prime Minister in 1999–2001, and as President and Prime Minister in 2005.723 Some
empirical evidence shows that factions of the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko teams are
heavily involved in bribery, such as in the Ukrainian energy sector. Balmaceda demonstrates
that new rulers accommodate the old bribery mechanisms by installing their own personnel to
control the significant rents from energy.724
Georgia’s improving indices, and the initial progress of Ukraine may be partially
associated with revolutionary euphoria and optimism, coupled with relatively strong
economic performance.725 Importantly, the decreasing public awareness of corruption, due to
the limitations on free media in Georgia can also account for the changes in indices (for a
comprehensive overview of efforts to combat corruption in Georgia see Appendix 2).
721 Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (2006).
722 Neutze, Karatnycky (2007, p. 28).
723 Kuzio (2005, p. 358).
724 Balmaceda (2008, pp. 120-125).
725 Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2004).
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Chapter 7. Former smuggling heavens or permanent black holes?
This section concentrates, first on uncontrolled territories, such as the post-conflict or
conflict areas Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, that are now entirely outside the
control of the central authorities and are significant actors in transnational organized criminal
activity. Second, I discuss semi-separatist areas loosely controlled by the central government,
such as Adjaria in Georgia before May 2004. Third, I address lawless territories such as the
Pankisi Gorge in Georgia before 2003, and the Osh region in Kyrgyzstan. The threat from the
Pankisi Gorge ceased as a result of the US-funded Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
and subsequent anti-terrorist operations. At the same time, allegedly the Osh region is still a
“grey zone” on Kyrgyz territory. In September 2005, Uzbek authorities claimed that the
Andijon unrest was planned by Islamic militants at a terrorist base in southern Kyrgyzstan, a
claim dismissed by the Kyrgyz Defence Ministry as groundless. Ruslan Baibolsunov, an Osh-
based military analyst, said some bases may exist in the country’s mountainous regions that
are hard to control.726 No parallel exists in Ukraine, i.e. Ukraine has no “grey zone” on its
territory; however, it has a “black hole” in its border that is the Transdniester breakaway
republic in Moldova. In addition to lawless zones in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, I will discuss
Transdniester’s role in smuggling through Ukraine, and how this strengthens regional
criminal networks.
1. Transdniester: “Black hole” in the Ukrainian border?
The region of Transdniester seperated from Moldova after a violent conflict in 1992
and gained de-facto independence. Transdniester is landlocked between Moldova and
Ukraine, and like other separatist regions in the post-Soviet space became a smuggling hub,
with much of its contraband goods transited through Ukrainian territory and destined for the
Odessa seaport in Ukraine for further export.
Vladimir Smirnov, the son of the President of Transdniester, heads the customs
department of the region. It is assumed that he is the main leader of the consortium called
Sheriff, which controls literally everything in the region, from mobile communication and gas
726 RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism (2005).
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stations to supermarkets.727 The company has also constructed a gigantic sports complex near
Tiraspol that by the estimation of Western diplomats is worth USD 200 million, twice as
much as the annual budget of Moldova.728 Due to Sheriff’s monopolistic nature,
Transdniester was nicknamed “Respublika Sheriff.”
Contraband items from Transdniester reach world markets through Ukraine in two
ways. The first is through the Ukraine-Transdniester border, and the second through the
Moldova -Ukraine border, which seems to be the most profitable route for smugglers because
it leads to the Black Sea port of Odessa. Odessa is known as the smugglers’ “life route.”729
This smuggling has long contributed to the transnational political-criminal nexus, especially
in illicit arms when the various ethnic conflicts erupted in former Soviet republics in the
1980s and 1990s. According to a letter obtained during my field research in Moldova in
2004, among those involved in organized crime in Transdniester are Polish crime groups,
officials of Transdniestrian de-facto state institutions, high-ranking officers of the Russian
Ministry of Defence and several major professional criminals.730 “With the support of Odessa
city authorities, arms were transported by trucks to the Odessa seaport, where weapons were
loaded onto the ships of a Ukrainian company, “Ascoflot,” and sent to Chechnya, Armenia,
Abkhazia and Tajikistan,” the letter alleges.731
Ukraine’ border with Transdniester is 386 km,732 and remained porous and open for
smuggling. Besides the legally established customs posts, there are dozens of secondary
pathways at the border which are not guarded. In 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Odessa
Region denied any smuggling occurred between Transdniester and Odessa.733
In March 2005 Kyiv announced that it would only accept imports that are stamped by
customs officials in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau. In parallel, a border monitoring
mission under the auspices of the European Union was established to end arms smuggling
and customs fraud. As a result, the trafficking of illegal goods between Ukraine and Moldova
through Transdniester has decreased, causing turmoil among interested criminal groups on
both sides of the border.734
727 Interview with professors of Transdniester State University, Tiraspol, Transdniester, April 14, 2004.
728 George (2004).
729 Provokacia (2003).
730 Letter of the former Rector of the Transdniester State University (1999).
731 Ibid.
732 Perepelytsya (2003, p. 277).
733 Author’s interview with Deputy Prosecutor of Odessa region, April 8, 2004.
734 Lavrov (2006).
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1.2. Odessa
The major Black Sea port city of Odessa, known informally as the “Mama of
corruption”, has long been a centre of illegal sea trading and various forms of organized
crime, especially in the oil transportation business. Proximity to Transdniester has only
exacerbated the organized crime problem.
In the early 1990s, Viktor Kulivar aka Karabas was dominating the underworld and
the oil business. After his assassination in 1997, conflict over the division of spoils started
between the groups of Angert and Stoyan.735 The former won through the collusion with
regional and city law enforcement structures and local politicians.736 Angert was allied to
Aleksandr Zhukov,737 local entrepreneur, in controlling the oil business. They broke the
opposition of Chechens competing for illegal oil profits. 738 In the mid and late 1990s, Angert
changed political affiliation several times, and was allied at one point with Ruslan Bodelan,
regional governor, then defected to Eduard Hurvits, Odessa mayor. The latter had extensive
links in both the local and Kyiv underworlds. In the late 1990s, Eduard Hurwitz publicly
confirmed that he is acquainted with Aleksandr Nikolayevskyi, aka Batsila.739 Batsila is a
criminal with business interests in Ukrainian real estate and bodybuilding.740
Ruslan Bodelan controlled both regional power structures and trade until he lost this
control after the Orange Revolution.741 Hurvits, though, entered the Orange coalition and got
re-appointed as city mayor in 2005. In general, despite the anti-criminal rhetoric and the
assertion that “convicts will not rule Ukraine,” some of the senior appointments in Odessa by
President Yushchenko were questionable. For instance Mykola Bondarenko, Yushchenko’s
classmate and deputy governor of Odessa, had a record for criminal embezzlement and
forgery, and a conviction for cooperation with criminal spirits trading.742
735 Arkusha (2003, pp. 7-12).
736 Author’s interview with U1 and U2, October-December 2007. See also RFE/RL (2002), Pirovich (2004).
737 In 2001, he was implicated in illegal arms trafficking in Italy but the court dropped the charges. On the link
between Angert and Zhukov see Cande and Ozon (2006), Agenstvo federalnikh isledovanyi (2001), Association
of Investigative Journalism of Bulgaria (2003).
738 Author’s interview with U2, 22 October 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
739 Zerkalo Nedeli (1998).
740 Author’s interview with U1, 10 December 2007, Odessa, Ukraine. He is referred as the vice-president of
Odessa regional branch of bodybuilding federation of Ukraine on the website of real estate company Alians that
is allegedly co-owned by him. See http://www.alians.com.ua/?pid=bodysport3, accessed 6 April 2008.
741 Williams and Picarelli (2002, p. 157).
742 Zerkalo Nedeli (May 7, 2005).
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2. Smuggling through Georgia’s uncontrolled territories
2.1. Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Smuggling through the uncontrolled territories of Georgia arguably best depicts the
impact of regime transition on criminality and corruption. The smuggling networks that
formed in post-conflict settings were disrupted immediately after the Rose Revolution as a
consequence of government change in Tbilisi and reforms in the law enforcement system.
Due to armed civil conflicts in 1990-1993, two of the secessionist regions, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, remained outside the jurisdiction of the Government of Georgia. These post-
conflict areas emerged as the most influential geographic factors facilitating the movement of
contraband through the country. In both regions, well-established smuggling networks
emerged comprising corrupt officials, law enforcement structures, crime groups from both
sides (Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian), Russian peacekeepers, and an
impoverished and marginalized portion of the population (primarily IDPs, proper refugees,
and people still residing in conflict zones).743
Organized crime groups from both sides have cooperated with each other in smuggling
activities, with occasional outbursts of violence over division of spoils. Frequently, Georgian
officials and criminals cooperated with their counterparts in the breakaway republics in illicit
trading. As a result, the cease-fire lines have become criminal zones before 2004, with strong
signs of the criminalized “shadow economy” discussed by Goodland that is characterized by
the presence of “conflict profiteers,” extensive extraction of natural resources and smuggling
of various commodities.744 These kinds of interest groups often may “find the continuation or
institutionalization of war at a certain level of intensity desirable,”745 as Berdal and Keen
would argue. This shadow economy was partially damaged in the aftermath of Rose
Revolution mainly due to the reforms of criminal justice system in Georgia and
disengagement of criminal actors from Georgian side.746 The smuggling has decreased to
minimum after the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008.
Thus, much like the civil and ethnic wars in the Balkans and Africa, the separatist
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have developed into smuggling-based post-war
economies; these conflicts remained “frozen” because numerous actors, including the
743 For a comprehensive analysis of the issue see Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze (2003)
744 Goodhand (2004).
745 Berdal and Keen, (1997, p. 798).
746 Kupatadze (2005).
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breakaway regions’ authorities and the members of the central government in Tbilisi, had
material interest in the trafficking of contraband goods and wanted to maintain the status quo.
As Keen argues, the parties involved were “more anxious to prolong a war than to win it” due
to their potential illicit earnings from continued warfare.747 The majority of the
assassinations, kidnappings and infighting across the ceasefire lines (CFLs) in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia have been linked with smuggling, that certain corrupt authorities profited more
from by allowing than curtailing.748
The situation began to change in 2004, when the new “Rose Revolution” government
attempted to “de-freeze” the conflicts. The policy of the new authorities stressed what
Ballentine and Nitzschke would call “attacking the financial lifelines of combatants, by
targeting white-collar and organized criminal activities through which their financing is
channelled.”749 Consequently, much of the smuggling-related violence decreased and
politically-motivated violence increased.750
Various armed groups, including Georgian guerrillas in Abkhazia,751 paramilitary militias
and law enforcement structures of the breakaway republics752 and Russian peacekeepers,
were heavily involved in smuggling. Generally all actors involved in smuggling fall under the
category of “spoilers” discussed by Stedman.753 Spoilers sabotage the peace process for
personal gains. For them, disruptions to peace and alliances with organized crime networks
guarantee income.754
The turnover of illegal and legal goods was protected by kryshas (influential government
officials) both in and outside the secessionist territories. Pyramids of corruption assured the
distribution of illegal incomes to the protectors. Some of the organized criminal groups
controlling the trade in the Ergneti market755 had patrons in the State Chancellery and in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Shevardnadze era.756 High-ranking officials were
747 Keen (2000, p. 27).
748 Kupatadze (2008).
749 Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005, p. 6).
750 See Kupatadze (2008).
751 Before the Rose Revolution, armed groups on the Georgian side could be divided into two camps: guerilla
groups, and so-called Zviadist groups (armed followers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, ex-president of Georgia, ousted
as a result of the coup d’etat in January 1992). Two major guerilla groups on the Georgian side were the “Forest
Brothers” and the “White Legion.”
752 For instance, some of the Abkhaz armed groups operating in the Gali district had an “official” status,
representing secessionist law enforcement structures. The largest and most powerful group that is still functional
is headed by Valmer Butba.
753 Stedman (1997).
754 Hartwell (2005, p. 2).
755 The market was situated on the administrative border between South Ossetia and Georgia, close to
Tskhinvali.
756 Kukhianidze, Kupatadze and Gotsiridze (2003), Kupatadze (2008).
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engaging in everything that would generate high profits, legal or not. One law enforcement
officer reported a case in the early 2000s when he detained trucks of contraband spirits going
to South Ossetia for further delivery in Russia. Soon, he said, he knew that the trucks were
moving under the custody of the Minister of this law enforcement structure.757 Berdal and
Keen demonstrate the importance of clandestine, informal and criminal links between the
security sector and various economic interests. According to them, “the persistence of these
linkages does much to explain the continuation of violence and the lack of progress” in the
process of conflict resolution.758
The most popular contraband of the Ergneti market was cigarettes, fuel, and wheat flour.
According to the estimates of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre in Georgia,
more than 70-80 percent of the breakaway republic’s budget income was derived from illegal
business sources. De-facto government officials and criminals also owned shares in, and
benefited from the contraband business, the market nevertheless played a crucial role in
confidence-building between Georgians and Ossetians. Roughly 2,000-3,000 people – both
Ossetians and Georgians – worked there and even more residents of the conflict zone were
indirectly engaged in activities related to its operation.759 The market was closed down by
Georgian law enforcers after the Rose Revolution. Interestingly the closing down was one of
the major factors that led to resumption of violence in August 2004. However, the
involvement of state representatives continued. According to Shida Kartli’s governor, nearly
250 of the region’s policemen were sacked in the aftermath of regime change for alleged
participation in smuggling.760 The closure of Ergneti market has several other implications.
First, smuggling increased throughout the other parts of Georgia. Second, the organization of
smuggling through South Ossetia has degenerated. Third, business relations between
Georgians and Ossetians were damaged to an uncertain extent. Although illegal, the Ergneti
market was convenient and useful for exchange between Georgian and Ossetian traders.
In Abkhazia smuggling mostly involved cigarettes, fuel, food and scrap metal. Also,
several isolated cases have been reported of illicit trafficking in arms and drugs. Many were
benefiting from the illicit trade, including the local population, who paid less for the most
frequently consumed items. However, those benefiting most were political-criminal clans.
The motive behind illicit smuggling has been profit for most of the actors, however, political
motivations was also a relevant causative element, that would be in line with the argument of
757 Personal communication with G20, 26 June 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
758 Berdal and Keen (1997, p. 814).
759 Civil Georgia (June 22, 2005).
760 Civil Georgia (March 14, 2005).
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Nikos Passas.761 For instance, guerrilla activity was motivated by both criminal and
ideological zeal combined in one campaign. Georgian guerillas had a dual role: first, a
political part in fighting Abkhaz separatism, and second, a criminal objective with pecuniary
incentives for them to cooperate with Abkhaz militia and criminal groups in smuggling.762
The elimination of guerrilla groups substantially damaged the smuggling networks across
ceasefire lines. In early 2004 a large anti-criminal operation was conducted in the Zugdidi
region that led to the arrest of 30 guerrillas and recovered large stockpiles of arms.763
Interestingly, some guerrilla leaders took refuge on the Abkhaz side, indicating their
cooperative links on the other side of the ceasefire line.764
As a result, Abkhazian and Ossetian paramilitary and criminal groups (as well as average
Ossetians) lost their “partners in the business” on the other side of the cease-fire lines (CFLs).
This significant change of affairs eventually led to a decrease of organized smuggling765
though the demand for cheaper, smuggled products remained constant inside Georgia. As a
result, petty smuggling increased to satisfy the demand. Smuggling operations have become
the domain of petty traders, also known as “women with bags” in 2004-2005.766 These
shadow business heirs are former peddlers of contraband cigarettes that were once transferred
to them by police, guerrillas, and other criminal groups. The smugglers paid them on the
other side of the ceasefire line only after they sold the goods on the territory of Georgia. After
the anti-smuggling operations conducted by the Georgian police, most of the smuggling
groups were bankrupted.767 Additionally after the smuggling networks were successfully
targeted by Georgian law enforcement it did not make sense to smuggle goods in large
quantities from Russia to South Ossetia or Abkhazia since local markets are small and yield
little profits. Furthermore, rapid rises in prices on oil and certain consumer goods in Russia
since 2005 do not make smuggling profitable into Georgia.
Reforms following the Rose Revolution of 2003 disrupted many ties between
organized crime and law enforcement. As a result police were able to better detect and
prosecute criminals. Additionally, the Financial Police under the Ministry of Finance was
established to centralize the fight against economic crime, including smuggling. Before the
Rose Revolution, fighting economic crime was dispersed among various law enforcement
761 Passas (2002, p. 32).
762 Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze (2003, p. 24).
763 Kupatadze (2008).
764Khvalindeli dge (2004).
765 Findings of TraCCC group’s field research in Zugdidi and Ergneti market, March 2004.
766 Kupatadze (2005).
767 Kupatadze (2008).
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structures, resulting in poor coordination and ineffective combat against contraband. Reform
of the police, and the Ministry of the Interior, had a dual effect on smuggling. First, many of
the dismissed 16,000 policemen moved to the smuggling business, thereby professionalizing
the criminal groups involved in illicit trade. For instance, in Shida Kartli next door to South
Ossetia, former policemen were arrested several times for smuggling cigarettes out of the
conflict zone.768 The operational and logistical capabilities of law enforcement have
improved, and a clean up of the Georgian legal system means more success against
corruption in the highest echelons of government.
2.2. Adjara
Over a twelve-year period ending on May 6, 2004, all economic activity in the Adjarian
Autonomous Republic was controlled by a small group of local government officials, headed
by the autonomous republic’s chief, Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze tightly controlled the law
enforcement system and the strategic resources of the autonomous republic, particularly the
Batumi seaport and the Sarfi customs point on the Georgian-Turkish border. Furthermore,
Kikabidze and Losaberidze demonstrated that 57 percent of executive and 54 percent of
legislative government were close relatives of Aslan Abashidze or his wife.769 Soso
Gogitidze, the brother-in-law of Abashidze, was Minister of State Security of Adjaria, and
other relatives filled the posts of Deputy Minister of State Security and of Internal Affairs. In
short, given the family monopolies, Adjarian politics and its economy were closed to all but
those approved by the Abashidze clan.770
Security and law enforcement officials owned and controlled front company Basri
Limited in Adjaria. Officially, the firm’s activities involved graphic design and providing
internet services. These activities, however, were a cover for the Abashidze clan’s illicit
activities, including drug trafficking and car smuggling from Chechnya into Adjaria, directed
by Soso Gogitidze.771
Abashidze retained extensive criminal and public official connections within Russia.
They include Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, and Grigory Luchansky. Luchansky is a
Latvian-born, Israeli citizen who Time magazine described as “the world's most investigated
768 Author’s interview with Vladimer Jugeli, Head of the Regional Police of the Shida Kartli region, July 14,
2005, Gori, Georgia.
769 Kikabidze and Losaberidze (2000, pp. 40-1).
770 Interview with former Deputy Head of Abashidze’s Guard, May 2004, Batumi, Georgia.
771 Author’s interview with officer of State Security, November 2004, Georgia.
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man”772 and who is “an old and very close friend” of Abashidze who advised the Adjarian
leader on business matters.773 Luchansky used the Batumi seaport for private purposes, and
large companies operating in Adjaria and registered in offshore zones are related to him.774
The rule of Abashidze was terminated by a public uprising in May 2004. Several of
his accomplices, including Gogitidze, fled to Russia. The Georgian court ruled that
Abashidze misappropriated 99 million Georgian lari from the state budget between 1997 and
2004.775
2.3. Pankisi Gorge
The Pankisi Gorge, located on the border with Russia, became a haven for terrorist
training camps, drug trafficking and other illicit activity since the second Chechen war which
began in 1999. Several refineries in the Pankisi Gorge processed high-quality heroin for retail
sale.776 It also became a centre of kidnapping and the illicit arms trade, and its illicit economy
involved the Georgian power structures.777 In fact, the rent-seeking of high-ranking officials
was a large contributing factor to the criminalization of the gorge. Kakha Targamadze,
Minister of Internal Affairs, together with key officials in the Interior and Security Ministries,
allied themselves with Chechens and trafficked drugs through the Pankisi Gorge into
Georgia, Russia, and on to Europe.778 Organized criminal groups also transferred arms and
munitions through the Pankisi Gorge to Chechen fighters.779 Targamadze’s police personnel
escorted Chechen fighters through the territory of Georgia to Turkey and the Middle East and
back.780
The criminalization of the Pankisi Gorge was one of the major reasons for the launch
of the US-funded Train and Equip Programme for the Georgian armed forces in 2002.781
Continuous pressure from Russia as well as Georgia’s western allies, especially the United
States, and the increasing capabilities of Georgia’s military allowed the authorities to clamp
down on criminality in the gorge. In 2002-3 the area ceased to be a smuggling hub and
772 Time (1996).
773 Ignatius (1999).
774 TraCCC group’s field research in Adjara, May 2004.
775 Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, briefing on Abashidze’s court sentence.
776 Author’s personal communication with law enforcement officers , May 2004, Georgia.
777 Darchiashvili (2003, p. 11).
778 Author’s interview with G7 and G8, June 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
779 Ibid.
780 Ibid.
781 Darchiashvili (2003, p. 12).
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shelter for terrorists. Presently, the criminal situation is largely under the control of Georgian
authorities, but state institutions remain weak, allowing local traditional institutions to
maintain influence in the population’s everyday life.782 Russian accusations of Islamic
militants in the Pankisi Gorge are made frequently.783 However, Georgian Border Police
believe that the Russian special services staged terrorist incursions from Georgian territory
for political purposes.784
3. The Fergana Valley and its role in smuggling through Kyrgyzstan
The smuggling of legal and illegal goods in Kyrgyzstan is closely related to bribery
and collusion between official and unofficial structures. The geopolitical location of the
country; its insecure borders; presence of organized crime groups; and corrupt and inefficient
law enforcement are the main factors facilitating illicit cross-border trade. Government
statistics indicate that the Kyrgyz national budget loses USD 19 million annually through
smuggling,785 although the real figures may be much higher.
Networks of smuggling in legal goods and trading illicit goods frequently overlap in
Kyrgyzstan. Smuggling channels for Chinese goods, for instance, can easily be used for drug
trafficking, or vice versa. Representatives of law enforcement structures are either directly
engaged in smuggling, or take bribes and facilitate it. High-level interest in sustaining
smuggling is clearly shown by corruption in the structures that are supposed to fight
smuggling and the ownership of markets by high-ranking officials.
Some Kyrgyz experts argue that smuggling scales are greater than officially
estimated.786 Now the main problem is illicit trade on the Kyrgyz-Chinese border. In 2005 the
Minister of Finance emphasized that the main source of illegal income from customs was
trade with China and Turkey.787 Smuggling from China has been on the rise in recent years,
though official figures reported by the Chinese and Kyrgyz authorities show discrepancies.
The Kyrgyz statistics committee reported that imports from China in 2005 amounted to USD
103 million, while Chinese official statistics stated that Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan
amounted to USD 972 million.
782 Author’s interviews with G7 and G8, June 2006.
783 See for instance the statement of Russian Border Service Lt. Gen. Anatoly Zabrodin (2008).
784 Author’s personal communication with G9, 7 June 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
785 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (2008).
786 Segodnia (2007); IWPR (2003).
787 Finance Minister quoted in DeloNo (2005).
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Chart 8. Comparison of Kyrgyz and Chinese sources on trade with Kyrgyzstan (in millions of
USD)788
This chart shows huge volumes of unrecorded imports from China to Kyrgyzstan.
Many of the smuggled Chinese goods do not stay in Kyrgyzstan, but are re-exported illegally
to Kazakhstan and onwards to Russia, or to Uzbekistan. Only Kyrgyzstan, alone of its Central
Asian neighbours, belongs to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and imposes customs
duties of just five per cent – three times less than Kazakhstan. Thus, traders prefer to bring
Chinese foodstuffs and consumer goods first to Kyrgyzstan and then onwards to
Kazakhstan.789 The increasing problem of illicit trade on the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border has
obliged Kazakh authorities to tighten control over the border with Kyrgyzstan.790
According to a UNDP study, the main forces behind re-exports are shuttle traders
through two large centres, Dordoi market in Bishkek, and Karasuu market near Osh.
Commodities imported from China, Turkey and some other countries are sold there to shuttle
traders from neighbouring countries or Kyrgyz traders serving these countries.791 Petty
smuggling/shuttle trading is largely tolerated, because it provides hundreds of jobs for
impoverished people. Given the extreme poverty of the population, smuggling is considered
“normal”: a financial police officer was urged by the governor of one Southern region “to
give the green light to smuggled goods,” justifying his position by the relatively low prices of
smuggled goods and low purchasing capacity of the population.792
Nevertheless, apart from petty smuggling by shuttle traders, some of the illegal trade
in legal goods is organized. It is very difficult to give any estimates of the proportion of
organized smuggling in the overall smuggling of legal goods, which is certainly less
788 Kyrgyz data comes from the State Department of Statistics of Kyrgyzstan (2007); Chinese data retrieved
from the State Department of Statistics of China (2007).
789IWPR (December 14, 2004).
790 Akipress (June 28, 2007).
791 UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (2004, p. 24).
792 Author’s Interview with K15, May 3, 2007.
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compared to drug trafficking. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that unsuprisingly the
illegal flows of goods are protected, and sometimes directly controlled, by high-ranking
officials, organized crime groups with political connections and representatives of law
enforcement structures. Overall, four structures are responsible for combating smuggling:
SNB, MIA (Ministry of Interior Affairs), the Customs Committee and the Financial Police.
There is no formal division of functions between the agencies and little collaboration between
them at an official level; they frequently fight with each other to control lucrative contraband
flows, or sometimes collaborate to levy illegal payments on smugglers.
Generally, the Customs department is considered to be most corrupt.793 The heads of
customs departments, dubbed “kashilioks” (purses) are widely assumed to be the main illegal
financiers of the ruling families. For instance it was alleged that Muratbek Malabaev, a high-
ranking official in the customs department from 1998-2003 was paying a share of illegal
customs revenue (around twenty per cent) to Akaev’s family.794 Also a businessman,
Malabaev won a seat in the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) in 2000. He was re-elected in 2005,
obliged to flee after the Tulip Revolution and expelled in absentia from the legislative body
in 2006.795 Malabaev had been linked to a number of former and current officials, including a
former General Prosecutor, former Minister of Interior, and the assassinated drug baron
Bayman Erkinbaev.796 He used his contacts to avoid prosecution and even to keep some of
his casinos and other property after the Tulip Revolution, despite his pro-Akaev stance.
The two subsequent customs chiefs under Bakiev were widely referred to as “Kashiliok
II” and “Kashiliok III.”797 After the Tulip Revolution, the Minister of Finance stated that the
new power holders wanted to continue the illegal customs revenue flow.798
The top officials in the customs, police and special services frequently act as kryshas for
various illicit trade operations and legal and illegal businesses, such as casinos, nightclubs
and prostitution rings. State agencies’ illicit roles are divided according to their official ones,
according to a former analyst at the SNB (Kyrgyz National Security Service). For instance,
the structure officially in charge of fighting human trafficking would most probably sell
protection to legal tourist companies unofficially engaged in human smuggling. A former
SNB analyst said that "in the early 2000s, these tourist companies registered in Osh were
793 Report on the Survey Results (2007, p. 22).
794 Author’s interview with K3 and K4, April 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. See also Aslund (2005a);
Xexpress.org (2009).
795 RIA Novosti (2006).
796 Author’s interview with Edil Baisalov, 26 March 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. See also RFE/RL (2006);
797 Author’s interviews with Elena Avdeeva, K10 and K11, March-May 2007, Kyrgyzstan.
798 Finance Minister quoted in Delo No (April 13, 2005).
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receiving a few thousand ‘students’ each year from Afghanistan and Pakistan, a clear
indication of human smuggling.”799 This legal-illegal interface is further reinforced by
collusive links between underworld and upperworld actors over the most lucrative sectors of
the Kyrgyz economy, such as the Karasuu market, which is owned by a group including three
criminally-linked members of parliament; the wife of a murdered drug baron (who also works
in the secretariat of a major opposition political party); the daughter of a former high-ranking
court official; and a former criminal and racketeer who has “gone legal” and is now an
affluent businessman.800 The daily turnover of the market is estimated at roughly 500,000
USD, and Erkinbaev dominated the market’s ownership from the mid-1990s.801 After his
assassination, re-division of market profits resulted in deadly infighting. In Kyrgyzstan, due
to limited industrial production and other economic opportunities, legal-illegal alliances have
formed around markets/bazaars and smuggling in legal and illegal materials, especially drugs.
The drug trade will be discussed later. Now, it is important to mention that corruption
pyramids can be seen in every structure that fights smuggling. As a result, influential
political-criminal clans maintain an interest in keeping contraband goods flowing, making the
fight against smuggling hopeless. Therefore, only petty smuggling is fought and highly
organized contraband frequently goes unimpeded. The following chart based on the data of
the customs committee proves this observation:
Chart 9. Criminal cases of smuggling filed by the Customs Department of Kyrgyzstan,
January – November 2006802
Many influential politicians own shares (frequently in cooperation with criminals) in
various markets/bazaars in Bishkek as well as in the regions. Because large amounts of
799 Author’s interview with Nur Amorov, political scientist, former Analyst with National Security Service 18
April, 2007, Bishkek.
800 Author’s interviews with K1, K9, K11, K23, March-May 2007, Bishkek and Osh, Kyrgyzstan. For more
information on ownership structure see Weekly Bulletin of the Foundation for Tolerance International, Issue 55,
Review of January 17-21, 2007; for more information on corporate conflicts over the market see Weekly
Bulletins of the Foundation for Tolerance International 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41;
available online at http://www.fti.org.kg/was/eng/_op_bullet.php.
801 Author’s field research in Osh, May 2007, Kyrgyzstan.
802 State Customs Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2007).
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contraband are sold at the bazaars, high-level politicians are interested in sustaining
smuggling.
At a lower level, law enforcement representatives take bribes to ignore contraband
activities. A parliamentarian told the press in December 2006: “I have evidence that
representatives of the SNB take bribes from the head of customs checkpoints and the latter let
the contraband goods enter Kyrgyzstan.”803 Sometimes, law enforcement representatives
escort illegal goods to their destination themselves, as when a financial police officer was
arrested in Osh in April 2007 for escorting a truck loaded with contraband metal pipes.804
Allegedly officers of the same organisation escort trucks of contraband goods from Dordoi
market in Bishkek.805
Some of the smuggling is organized by crime groups, politicians, or a mixture of both.
In the Fergana Valley, an Uzbek organized criminal group is involved in smuggling legal
goods to and from Uzbekistan. The group is linked to and protected by an MP of Uzbek
origin from the South and the mayor of Karasuu, site of the Karasuu market.806 A. Jumabaev,
an influential criminal from the town of Jalalabad in the South is involved in the smuggling
of burr walnut807 to Uzbekistan.808
White-collar complicity, as well as collusion of government officials, also aid the
smuggling of legal goods. One well-informed Kyrgyz expert argued that the main kryshas of
smuggling in legal goods are regional government administrations,809 such as a Tulip
Revolution activist subsequently appointed to a high-level position in the Osh regional
administration. Other well-known examples of white-collar involvement are an MP from the
South involved in smuggling cotton on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border,810 and a southern MP of
Uzbek origin who collaborates with a mayor to protect a crime group smuggling legal goods
to and from Uzbekistan.811 The family of a former high-ranking official and close ally of
803 Online journalist (2006).
804 Pr.kg (2007).
805 Author’s interview with K3 and K9, April-June 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
806 Author’s interviews with K1 and K4, April-June 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
807 According to gazeta.kg, burr walnut or woodknob (kap in Russian) is mainly available in Southern
Kyrgyzstan and is the most valuable material for making furniture, information available at
http://www.gazeta.kg/week/2006/06/29/wood/
808 Author’s interview with Mamat Tursugbaev, Deputy head of the Organized Crime fighting unit, regional
directorate of the MIA, Osh, May 2007.
809 Author’s interview with Rakhat Khasanov, Kyrgyz economist, March 29, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
810 Graubner (2005, p. 17); Corroborated in author’s interview with K1, May 2007.
811 Author’s interview with K1, May 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
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President Bakiev dubbed the “power broker” allegedly controls various contraband
operations from China.812
812 Author’s interviews with K9, K11 and K16, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
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Chapter 8. From criminals to politicians: Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
The involvement of uppeworld actors, the representatives of government insitutions and
legal businesses, in traditional organized criminal activities merits more attention by
researchers of organized crime. This section will provide empirical evidence from Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in an attempt to show that legal companies, the representatives of
political and economic elites and other legitimate actors have become primary actors in
organized crime. I consider this process inherent in state formation and development. The
stronger the ruling elites, the more legal actors become involved in illegal activities. While
during this process state institutions are strengthening, they are still vulnerable to external
influences and hijacking by private interests. In certain cases this process leads to a stronger
state, in other cases it does not.
This section is divided in three parts. The first part concentrates on the process of
privatisation (transition from a planned to a free market economy) in Ukraine from the early
1990s until today. It documents how shady takeovers by the representatives of the
Communist nomenklatura first undermined the privatisation process, earning it the nickname,
prikhvatizatsia. Insider dealings813 and misuse of the newly introduced voucher system were
the first methods of illicit division of formerly state-owned property. The methods of re-
division of resources have now changed to the more ostensibly “legal” privatisation method
of corporate raiding. The general process of legalization of organized crime also requires
legalization of illegal methods. Importantly, frequently the same groups carrying out
privatisation in the early 1990s are now practicing corporate raiding. Ukraine is still far from
the universal application of rule of law principles, although the legal system is much more
developed than it was at the breakup of the Soviet Union. This means that those striving for a
share of re-divided resources now use semi-legal means in addition to illicit ones. The second
part of this section focuses on the weakening influence of professional criminals in Georgia.
Nobody before 2004 would have imagined it possible to rein in the vory-v-zakone, but the
Saakashvili government managed to do so, partly due to the determination to fight organized
crime. However, the result of this fight was the establishment of a police state, with the
Ministry of Interior absorbing the functions of secret services, counterintelligence and police,
with all of this activity outside democratic civil control. Georgian organized criminal groups
813 Shelley (1998, p. 652).
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have suffered a major blow; however, the population has lived in fear of the state police
apparatus since 2004. Phone conversations among friends and family members were
frequently cut short by them with the phrase “will tell you more once we meet.” because they
assumed police monitored all telephone (mobile or landline) conversations. Hence vory-v-
zakone could no longer extort money from businesses in the post-revolutionary period, but
entrepreneurs reported being summoned to the prosecutor’s office to have fees illegally
extorted under the name of new and non-transparent “development funds.”814 The abuse of
property rights also increased.815
The third part of this section concentrates on Kyrgyzstan and drug smuggling. The period
of chaotic trading with no high level involvement in the early 1990s has been replaced by
organized trading by sophisticated criminal groups with political connections in the early
2000s. Already before the Tulip Revolution drug traffickers had managed to infiltrate the
government, with corrupt law enforcement and other officials getting their share of the
narcotics trade. Most worryingly, the protection chain reaches the highest echelons of Kyrgyz
bureaucracy. Furthermore, law enforcement representatives are now the main drug
traffickers.
1.Ukraine – Privatisation and re-privatisation: from shadowy takeovers to corporate raiding
1.1.General trends in underworld-upperworld relations
Ukraine offers vast opportunities to test the theories of underworld-upperworld
networks. Trends in the trajectory of Ukraine’s post-Soviet development and its readily-
available natural resources and developed industrial base delineated the nature of these
networks. Politicians on district, regional and central levels link up in different illicit
networks. For instance, local politicians in the Western Ukraine rural and agricultural district
of Chernivtsi, bordering Romania, are more likely to forge alliances with smuggling
networks while the politicians in industrially developed Dniepropetrovsk most likely will get
involved in the networks of financial and economic crime. By the same token, the extent and
intensity of corrupt and informal links of enterprises with law enforcement apparatus and
organized crime groups depend on the size and nature of the business.
814 See p. 230
815 See note 1087 in this chapter.
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Organized crime groups seek alliances with different government officials according
to the type and scale of their criminal activity. Crime groups engaged in human trafficking
will ally with the police, while money launderers will target the special services and tax
department. If fighting a particular criminal activity is split among law enforcement
structures, such as cigarette smuggling which is addressed by the customs, police and tax
departments, organized criminals’ strategy will be to seek contacts in each of these
institutions or a krysha influencing several of them. During the mid-1980s, nearly 33 percent
of criminal capital was spent on bribing public officials. This figure went up to 50 percent in
1999.816 In 2004, the cost of corruption to Ukraine was estimated to be about 1.5 billion USD
annually, which was about 13 percent of all budget revenues planned for the same year.817
The collusive relationship reaches its peak when former criminals become politicians
running licit and illicit businesses, although the investigation of this kind of case is rare. As a
study by the Ukrainian police academy concludes, “the majority of enterprises have found
themselves under control of organized crime groups with varying degrees of dependence,
using legal commercial structures but illicit incomes.”818 One of these legalized criminals
who survived the violent 1990s to reinvent himself as a politician and businessman was the
influential racketeer Vladimir Kisel, the late deputy on Goloseevskyi district council of Kyiv
and the chairman of the Ukrainian association of free wrestling before he died in car accident
in summer 2009.819
Initially Kisel was involved in prostitution rings, smuggling, racketeering and
extortion, robberies and illegal gambling. He also had interests in the Troieshchyna market on
the outskirts of Kyiv. Kisel even had the head of Kyiv’s anti-organized crime division on his
payroll and allegedly was involved in the murder of journalist Gongadze in 2000,820 the
assassination allegedly featuring the involvement of high ranking state officials including
President Kuchma.821
Furthermore, Kisel was linked with Grigoryi Surkis of SPDU; Igor Bakai, former
head of state oil and gas company Naftogaz; and Oleksandr Volkov, former Kuchma
associate and power broker who defected to the Yushchenko camp during the Orange
Revolution,822 forging ties with Timoshenko.823 Recently Volkov changed allegiance again to
816 Kalman (2004, p. 92).
817 International Centre for Policy Studies (2004, p. 6).
818 Organizovanna zlochinosts v Ukraini ta krainakh evropi (2006, p. 53).
819 See for instance Eltsov, Igor Bakai-chelovek i oligarch.
820 Wilson (2005, p. 34).
821 Constitutional watch, East European Constitutional Review (2001).
822 Author’s interview with Stas Rechynskyi, former official of the SBU, November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
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form the new political party “Kuchma.”824 Kisel and his son owned stakes in real estate,
restaurants and pizzerias in Kyiv, and according to unconfirmed allegations they maintained
an armed group under cover of a private security company.
Another criminal turned politician is Aleksandr Melnik, a deputy of the supreme
council of Crimea who was elected on the Party of Regions ticket, and in the mid-1990s was
leader of the criminal group Seilem. He is widely considered the protector of Rinat
Akhmetov’s interests in Crimea.825 Melnik was arrested on allegations of involvement in
assassinations in the 1990s, but freed in 2006. Melnik stated the arrest was political
persecution by Minister of the Interior Lutsenko from the Orange camp.826
Igor Fadeev, alias Moskva, a former member of Cherep criminal group in Kyiv, was
elected to the city council of Zhytomyr in Western Ukraine after he attempted to legalize in
2000 and joined the Timoshenko party.827 After leaks in the media in 2006 he was expelled
from the party but refused to leave the local legislature.828 Another member of Cherep,
Valeryi Grishenko, alias Kaban, became a deputy in the city council of Borispil in 2006 from
Yushchenko’s party bloc Our Ukraine.829 Some former criminals went into business and
stayed away from politics, such as Iskander Kerimov, alias Tatarin, a racketeering and illegal
trade crime leader in the 1990s, now turned successful businessman.830 Tatarin co-owns a
restaurant with a Rada deputy, in addition to a nightclub, elite restaurants, and shopping malls
like Kyiv’s “Mandarin Plaza.”831
Some criminals run licit and illicit businesses simultaneously, such as vory-v-zakone
Valery Kukhilava, alias Antimos, who is Abkhaz by origin and one of the few remaining
powerful professional criminals in Ukraine. He fled the country in 2007, but maintains
criminal influence in Ukraine’s underworld. Antimos began his criminal career in Abkhazia,
then continued in Kyiv in the early 1990s, eventually expanding throughout Odessa and
Lvov. Antimos runs licit restaurants in Kyiv and construction firms in Lvov, but also controls
Georgian robbery and burglary gangs in Kyiv and Odessa. According to a Rada deputy on the
anti-organized crime committee, Vadim Makhnitskyi, “Kukhilava was appointed criminal
warden (smatriashyi in criminal slang) of the drug trade in Odessa and Nikolaev by a
823 Wilson (2005, p. 161).
824 RUnews (2007).
825 Obozrevatel (October 2, 2006).
826 Obozrevatel (October 13, 2006).
827 Zhitomir (2006).
828 Ukraynskaya Pravda (2006).
829 Ord.com.ua (2007).
830 Author’s interview with Stas Rechynskyi, November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
831 Author’s interviews with U6 and U7 Kyiv, October-December 2007.
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gathering of vory in Moscow, and represents the interests of Russian crime groups in regional
businesses.”832 Antimos has business ties with a number of high-ranking individuals
including a former Rada deputy who is now running the sea shipping business in Odessa; the
former head of the economic crime division in Lvov regional directorate of the Ministry of
the Interior, now a Rada deputy; and Vakhtang Ubiria, also originally from Abkhazia, who
served as deputy head of Ukrainian railways under Kuchma, and is now the deputy Mayor of
Odessa and allegedly is linked with Semion Mogilevich.833
Oligarchs also frequently have criminal pasts. Besides the alleged involvement of
Rinat Akhmetov in criminal activities in Donetsk in the early 1990s, there are other examples
as well:
- Yevhen Chervonenko, a key Yushchenko ally and owner of a drinks company and
major freight operator allegedly started by smuggling red caviar and then by selling
Ukrainian beer in Polish bottles.834
- Viktor Medvedchuk and Hryhorii Surkis started their business life with protection
rackets in Kyiv’s markets.835 Later, the political party SDPU controlled by them was
funding itself through extortion under cover of a charity in Transcarpathia.836
- Dmytro Firtash, billionaire, key stakeholder of infamous RosUkrEnergo and alleged
ally of Semion Mogilevich, reportedly started in the 1990s with an illegal vodka
business and cooperates with the Korolevich criminal group in Chernovetsky region,
South-western Ukraine.837
The majority of this list went formally legal now, though the vague legislative basis, high
taxes and pervasive rent-seeking of high-ranking officials frequently create incentives for the
entrepreneurs to violate the law.
The question arises about what effect was produced by the Orange Revolution, which
was frequently portrayed as “the revolt of the millionaires against the billionaires”838 while
commentators also emphasized the crucial role of the middle class. However, the richest of
Ukraine maintained their influence, and state-oligarch relationships did not change greatly.
How did the oligarchs manage to keep control? Did the revolution have any impact on the
832 Makhnitskyi statement in NTN (2007).
833 Author’s interview with U1, U2, U12, U15, October-December 2007. See also Obiektivnaya gazeta (2005);
Kupchinskyi (2005).
834 Wilson (2005).
835 Wilson (2005, p. 41).
836 Kuzio (2005e, p. 4).
837 Author’s interviews with U12, U14, U15, November 2007. Also see Tema.in.ua (2006).
838 This phrase has been used widely and it is difficult to trace its origin.
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nature of state capture? The next section describes prikhvatizatsia, or the grabbing of state
resources during the first years of independent Ukraine, and overviews the development of
oligarchic groups, focusing on the Donbas region. It then examines state capture and the
impact of the Orange Revolution on state-big business relationships.
1.2. Prikhvatizatsia and the emergence of oligarchy
According to Louise Shelley, illicit privatization in Ukraine mainly occurred in mineral-
rich regions and in cities with valuable real estate. The sectors most affected were gas and
metallurgy.839 Tarkowsky speaks about two major forms of transfer of property in the
immediate aftermath of Soviet breakup: management buyouts of state-owned companies, and
the establishment of so-called “directors” companies. These methods may take many forms:
leasing of state-industries by private persons who were usually nomenklatura representatives;
transformation of state enterprises into a share company directly or indirectly owned by
Communist party representatives; or establishing subsidiary companies that subsequently
“sponge” mother firms.840 According to the Centre for Sociological Research, 82 percent of
1000 rich Ukrainians declared that the main sources of their initial capital were theft,
racketeering, currency operations and bribes related to public office.841
Ukraine has what Georgia and Kyrgyzstan lack: abundant resources and a well-developed
industrial base. Some scholars argue that the abundance of natural resources increased
bribery and rent-seeking.842 Indeed, Ukrainian oligarchs made most of their money in
commodity trading, especially in the gas trade that also involved elements of fraud and rent
seeking such as consolidating regional monopolies; passing their bills to the state; profiting
from subsidized loans; or extracting discounts in barter deals.843 50 percent of the capital in
Ukraine is believed to have been obtained illegally,844 which has produced a strictly negative
attitude toward oligarchs among Ukrainian society. Polls show that 67 percent of Ukrainians
perceive privatization as unjust,845 and 71.3 percent supported the re-privatization of large
enterprises.846 One Ukraine analyst aptly stated that Ukrainian capitalism emerged out of
839 Shelley (2004, p. 216); L. Shelley (1995, pp. 244-56).
840 Tarkowski (1990, pp. 94-97).
841 Zerkalo Nedeli (1996).
842 See for instance Leite, and Weidmann (1999).
843 Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 10).
844 Dolzhenkov (2000) quoted in Klyuchnikov, Smelik and Smelik (2004, p. 10).
845 Ukrayinska Pravda (July 5, 2005).
846 Ukrayinska Pravda (May 14, 2005).
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gangsterism.847 Organized crime and economy in Ukraine were more closely linked than in
Georgia or Kyrgyzstan. More resources in economic sector meant more opportunities for
organized crime that became embedded in legal economy what was different from
Kyrgyzstan where criminals preyed on businesses and from Georgia where organized crime
maintained some autonomy and acted as parasite for the “upperworld” (politics and licit
business).
A perfect case of rent-seeking is the coal industry in Eastern Ukraine. In 1997,
roughly half (41.47%) of all expenses anticipated in the State Budget of Ukraine were
directed toward state support for the coal industry. Financing has declined in subsequent
years, but remained high compared to, for instance, hospitals, which in 2001 got 0.14 percent
of state budget resources while coal got 2.72 percent.848 In addition to significant state
funding, all debts of the coal industry were cancelled in 1999.849 The Donetsk region also
became one of the most subsidized in Ukraine under the 1999 law on special economic zones
and investment regimes. These subsidies and tax exemptions undermined the willingness of
the enterprises to modernize,850 and were in fact well-lobbied extortion from the state. The
regional network controlling coal was also deceptively getting subsidies on the coal mined in
Russia’s Kuzbass.851
The representatives of the old nomenklatura who re-branded themselves the powerful
bureaucrats of independent Ukraine used the post-communist chaos to grab state resources,
awarding their associates from the shadow economy with licenses and shares in enterprises.
This led several analysts to assert the importance of the political-criminal nexus in
privatization.852 There were even cases when criminal groups were seizing entire factories,
for instance the metallurgical combines in Luhansk oblast and foodstuffs company in
Donetsk region.853
Kuzio and Wilson quote the Parliamentary commission on nationalizing the property
of the old Communist Party of Ukraine and its youth branch (Komsomol) by stating that
roughly 20 million rubles were deposited by the central committee into 37 private
businesses.854 Much of the money and assets owned by the Communist party has been
847 Swain (2006).
848 Ryabchenko (2003, pp. 215-216).
849 Ibid., p. 218.
850 Kravchuk (2005, p. 51).
851 Interviews with U3 and U4, October-November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
852 Shelley (1998, p. 653).
853 Williams and Picarelli (2002, p. 24).
854 Kuzio and Wilson (1994, pp. 176-178).
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laundered. Over the last decade roughly 20-50 billion USD left Ukraine,855 but the
government estimates that deposits in foreign banks do not exceed 1 billion USD.856
Gorodysky describes the concealment of funds earned from foreign trade and criminal
activity, documenting that capital flight from Ukraine has been an increasing problem
through the 1990s.857 Capital flight can also be regarded as a sort of defensive measure of
oligarchs. Once the oligarchs have accumulated enough funds abroad they could be a more
effective threat to Kuchma, who could destroy their domestic businesses, but not their
overseas funds.858
Ukraine continuously ranks at the bottom of the Global Competitiveness Report
Indicator “Pervasiveness of money laundering though banks.” In 2003, Ukraine ranked last
among 130 countries with a score of 2.6859 and in 2005 it ranked third last, the last four being
Russia, Ukraine, Dominican Republic and Guyana.860 The banking sector was most
penetrated by organized crime. Representatives of former secret police networks as well as
criminals frequently appear on the boards of leading banks.861 Also, a significant part of
funds are circulating outside of the banking system, which contributed to the emergence of
criminally-controlled currency exchange centers.
Criminal organizations show increasing interest in underground currency exchange
centres, which are a relatively new phenomenon of the late 1990s and have since become the
main activity of major organized crime. According to Yarmysh, these are legally registered
organizations used only for shadowy financial transactions, like illegal conversion of hryvnia
into hard currency.862 Williams and Picarelli observed that these centres facilitate money
laundering by moving funds between the formal and informal economies, and transferring
them into offshore accounts. In 1999, 3000 companies, including large businesses, banks and
state-owned establishments were using these centres.863 However, one centre in Donetsk was
found in 2006 to be serving 2000 enterprises.864 Thus this illicit business is expanding
quickly, and the centres move millions of USD annually. It is estimated that as of the
855 Baranovskyy and Sydenko (2004, p. 8). For a comparison, since the collapse of the Soviet state USD 50-150
billion left Russia according to Shelley (1997, p. 483).
856 Kravchuk (2005, p. 52).
857 Gorodysky (2001).
858 Way (2005, p. 138).
859 Money laundering through the formal banking system in the range of 1=pervasive to 7=extremely rare.
860 World Economic Forum (2004, 2005).
861 Shelley (1998).
862 Yarmysh (2004).
863 Williams and Picarelli (2002).
864 Magnolia TV (2007).
138
beginning of 2004, over UAH 33 billion, or 34.8 percent of the total monetary stock,865
circulated outside of banks.866 Thus the profit to criminal groups running these centres would
amount to roughly 2.5 billion hryvnias (500 million USD) in 2004, assuming that the fee is
ranging between 5-10 percent of the total amount.
The organizers of these centres are frequently otherwise “legal” entrepreneurs running
other licit businesses while having corrupt links with banks, law enforcement structures and
city or regional authorities. Sometimes criminal figures are also involved. For instance, 10
million USD was stolen from a car in Luhansk, allegedly the profit from an underground
currency exchange centre belonging to Vladimer Polubatko, alias Futbolist, the criminal
authority in Luhansk who owns the local football club “Zoria,” and other businesses. He is
also linked with the ruling cadre of the Party of Regions.867 Hence certain part of organized
crime that initially emerged in sports,868 maintains its stake there and uses it either as front for
criminal activities (money laundering) or for legitimizing itself (funding the popular sports
like football increases public endorsement for the criminals).
The situation remains unchanged after the Orange Revolution. An estimated 13
billion USD left the country between 2004 and 2006 as capital flight.869 The discovery of a
large scale VAT money laundering scheme, organized by large enterprises in Donetsk and
Dnepropetrovsk in 2006-07, and responsible for laundering more than 1 billion USD,
indicates the vested control of central and regional elites of these illicit money transfers
abroad.870 This indicates the weakness or unwillingness of law enforcement and tax
authorities to tackle the problem. Certainly political instability still remains to be the
significant incentive for capital flight.
Many former Communist officials and Red Directors became the owners of former
state enterprises, with the result that overall the old nomenklatura has survived in the new
political context, and brought with it the legacy of Communist corruption.871 This process of
“oligarchization” of red directors was completed under Kuchma.872 The influence of the
oligarchs created adverse conditions for smaller businesses that lacked political power and
operated in an environment largely shaped by big businesses. Smaller entrepreneurs
865 For comparison, in developed countries, cash in circulation totals 5-10 percent.
866 Baranovskyy and Sydenko (2004, p. 8).
867 Author’s interview U4, Kyiv, Ukraine, 1 November 2007. See Ord.com.ua (2007), Ord.com.ua (2009).
868 See pp. 56-58.
869 “Money laundering in Ukraine,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, April 3, 2007.
870 Ibid.
871 Shelley (1998, p. 651).
872 Balmaceda (2008, pp. 47-48).
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consequently resort to illicit means in order to survive.873 The Donetsk case discussed below
depicts well the initial turf-sharing between old and new businessmen.
Importantly, it was under the premiership of Viktor Yushchenko in 2000-1 when the
rent-seeking oligarchic system was damaged. Yushchenko turned a budget deficit to a surplus
in 2000 and reduced the state’s foreign debt. Consequently in 2000, for the first time, not
only had independent Ukraine recorded economic growth, but of no less than 5.8 percent. As
a result of Yushchenko’s reforms, several energy traders vanished and the owners of steel
mills became the richest and most powerful oligarchs. Thus oligarchs were transformed from
rent-seekers to producers,874 and a trend of part of the oligarchs to gentrify as capitalist
entrepreneurs (Dnepropetrovsk clan) rather than corrupt oligarchs (Kyiv clan) can be
discerned.875
Not all Ukrainian oligarchs have become law-abiding citizens: under Yushchenko
they also became immune from state prosecution since they themselves represent the state.
Oligarchs use former and acting law enforcement officials, lawyers and accountants and
“dummy” individuals and companies to thwart criminal inquiries by the government. Due to
their powerful system of defence that relies on these former law enforcers, the oligarchs’
economic crimes are rarely successfully investigated.876 Therefore, as Kalman found, anti-
organized crime efforts mainly concentrate on minor groups who pose no great economic
threat.877
The use of informal networks, corruption and political influence, or kickbacks and
offshore financing creates a semi-legal and semi-formal relationship between the state and
businesses, where no stakeholder has an interest in losing all the benefits by legalizing the
relationship. In the status quo, corrupt state officials can extract rents, while businesses
project their influence through corruption or intimidation. We now turn to the discussion of
regional economy in Donetsk that best illustrates political-criminal-business nexus.
1.3. The development of corrupt economy in Donetsk region
In Donetsk under President Kuchma, business entities’ standing depended on the
President’s favour, as he balanced them against each other to reinforce his own power, while
873 Puglisi (2003, pp. 106-107).
874Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 14).
875 Kuzio (2005, p. 178).
876 Kalman (2004, p. 98).
877 Ibid.
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preventing the emergence of any monopolies. The relationship between Kuchma and the
oligarchs could therefore be described as “convenient symbiosis”, as in Aslund and McFaul’s
description.878
Balmaceda shows that President Kuchma arbitrated between financial clans,
preventing their unification to challenge his power. Yet oligarchs were interested in
maintaining presidential power since this would guarantee their influence on each other.879
Because Kuchma’s political power was grounded in his ability to balance big businesses, the
oligarchs were unofficially limiting presidential power. So, both sides needed each other: the
political regime required money to sustain it, and the oligarchs wanted protection of property
rights and immunity from prosecution, for which they eagerly contributed financially.880 It
was estimated that the three major oligarchic clans881 controlled 150 out of 230 MPs in the
presidential majority after the 2002 Rada elections.882
Hence, since independence Ukrainian politics were dominated by several political-
economic groups (PEGs), based on a regional division between east and west Ukraine. The
power base of the opposing camps in the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko and Yanukovich,
was also based on east/west regionalism.883 These regional groups are further divided into
clans, such as the East’s Donetsk, Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk clans.884 As for political
parties, since independence they have been ideologically amorphous and merely kryshas for
regional and business interests.885 Funding of almost all political parties by big business leads
to dependence and corruption. A 2003 poll of party leaders found that political party funding
is mostly covert and includes: payment for lobbying, the sale of seats in party lists, and shares
in corporate profits.886
Kuchma’s balance of political and business groups sometimes failed, erupting in
violence. The assassination of Evgeni Shcherban in 1996, an entrepreneur from Donetsk
working with the regional governor to project influence of the Donetsk clan, was seen as a
result of rivalry between the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans.887
878 Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 17).
879 Balmaceda (2008, pp. 38-40).
880 Way (2005).
881 By ‘clans’ in Ukrainian case I mean regionally based groups uniting powerful politicians and businessmen.
882 Kuzio (2005a, p. 6).
883 Kuzio (2005c, p. 3).
884 Varfolomeyev (1998), Khanin (2004, p. 57), Moshes (2004).
885 Kuzio (2005b, p. 118).
886 Canadian International Development Agency (2004, pp. 27-8).
887 Novosti Dnepropetrovska (2009).
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Increasingly Kuchma’s regime became authoritarian. The so-called “phone justice”888
and governance based on quasi-legitimate Presidential decrees and rubber-stamped
Parliamentary laws, as opposed to the constitutional rule of law, dominated.889 Some scholars
counted that Kuchma violated the constitution no less than 200 times.890 Kuchma encouraged
corruption, as Keith Darden argued, for potential use as kompromat and a tool of control.891
Donbas in general, and its industrial city of Donetsk in particular, provides an
interesting account of the establishment of Industrial-Financial groupings and clan
dominance of heavy industry. The industrial development of the region generates more
opportunities for large scale corruption than the more rural and agricultural Western regions.
Donetsk is now the powerbase of one of the biggest political groupings in Ukraine, the Party
of Regions, as well as the richest man in Ukraine – Rinat Akhmetov. Furthermore,
criminologists believe that there is a criminal micro-culture in Donbas region. According to
Professor Kostenko, during Soviet times criminals from all over the Soviet Union were sent
to Donbas to work in coal mines. As a result, the residents of Donbas region believe “if a
man has never gone to prison he is not a man.”892 Indeed, a past prison sentence is not an
embarrassment in Donbas but is rather considered an enrichment of experience.893 This might
also explain the local popular support for Viktor Yanukovich or Rinat Akhmetov, both
reportedly having a criminal past. Additionally, the following features characterize the
culture of Donbas: individualism, tough behavior, respect for force, legal nihilism and a
certain degree of arrogance in regard to the rest of Ukraine, which, in their view, is just
countryside.894 All this has contributed to the general illegality and birth of organized crime.
Many people did not understand why Yushchenko’s supporters complained about electoral
fraud.895 Donbas is not the only part of Ukraine where citizens are accustomed to the
intersection of politics and crime. A study by the Gorshenin Institute shows that one third of
Ukrainians would vote for a political party having in its list a person accused of crime. 40
percent of respondents do not object to a person with convictions becoming President of the
888 Aslund and McFaul (2006, pp. 15-16).
889 van Zon (2005, p. 14).
890 Lindner (1998) quoted in Beichelt (2004, p. 124).
891 Darden (2001).
892 Author’s interview with Alexander Kostenko, Professor, Head of Criminology department, Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine, November 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
893 Osipian (2006).
894 Ibid.
895 van Zon (2005, p. 9).
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country.896 Roughly 10 percent of the population (4.5 million) have served prison sentences,
being influenced by criminal ideology to some extent.897
Returning to Donbas, this region had ties with Russia due to coal industry before
1991. These ties proved important in the political battles in independent Ukraine by
guaranteeing a certain degree of independence from the centre as central rulers attempted to
tighten power over the regions. In 1999, Kuchma was obliged to grant the region de facto
autonomy in exchange for its support in the Presidential elections.898 Regional organized
crime also gains influence through links with Russia. Williams and Picarelli attest that
Donbas’ organized crime has evolved to a level beyond that of Ukraine’s other regions, with
its massive-scale rent seeking and theft of state resources through Donbas’ political-business-
criminal nexus.899
Another particular feature of regional economic activity is its history of extensive
violence. Unlike other parts of Ukraine where the redistribution of spoils was relatively
peaceful,900 in Donetsk 80 percent of property changed hands after shootouts, explosions, and
organized criminal activities.901 The new Interior Ministry leadership has recorded 167
instances of the use of machine guns and explosives during the 1990s.902 Until today, 55
contract assassinations have not been investigated. Importantly the individuals targeted were
mainly entrepreneurs and their assets ended up under the control of Rinat Akhmetov.903
Vladimer Malishev, the head of the regional branch of the Ministry of the Interior whose
direct responsibility was to investigate these cases became Akhmetov’s head of security and
subsequently was elected to Parliament on the Party of Regions’ ticket. Another important
member of the Donetsk clan, Boris Kolesnikov, was first installed as the director of Donetsk
central market in the mid-1990s by Akhat Bragin.904Afterwards he became the head of
Donetsk regional council and was alleged to be involved in pressuring legal businesses to
give up their shares. In Donbas it was widely accepted that Akhmetov looked after business,
896 Kyiv Gorshenin Institute of Management Issues (2007).
897 Author’s interview with Viktor Driomin, Professor, Head of Criminology Department in Odessa National
Law Academy, December 2007, Odessa, Ukraine.
898 van Zon (2005, p. 15).
899Williams and Picarelli (2004, p. 166).
900 Leshchenko and Revenko (1999), Aslund and McFaul (2006).
901 Statement by General Moskal (2005).
902 Kuzio (2005d, p. 356).
903 See for instance Kuzin (2006).
904 Ibid., p. 90.
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Yanukovych looked after politics and Kolesnykov took care of the “other stuff,” implying
that he was a racketeer.905
Allegedly, Akhmetov headed the “enforcement squad” of the organized crime group
of Akhat Bragin (aka Alik Grek) in the early 1990s.906 He tries to cover all the traces: a
number of newspapers (Neue Zuricher Zeitung, Korrespondent, Kyiv Post), were obliged to
apologize publicly for linking Akhmetov to organized crime. Journalistic investigation has
quoted the alleged interrogation files of Rinat Akhmetov for some robberies and
assassinations in the 1980s.907 Akhmetov’s name appears with hundreds of others in a
September 1999 report by the chief department on fighting organized crime of Ministry of
Interior titled,“Overview of the Most Dangerous Organized Crime Structures in Ukraine.”
However the document uses different spelling of his name: Renat instead of Rinat. The
document says that “Renat’s group… dealt with money laundering, financial fraud, and
controlled a large number of both real and fictitious companies”.908
Now Akhmetov owns the largest business empire in Ukraine mainly through System
Capital Management (he owns 90 percent of shares). According to the audit conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the assets of SCM amounted to 7.2 billion USD in 2005. In 2008
the journal Correspondent said that Akhmetov’s assets amount to 31.1 billion USD and that
he is the richest man in Europe.909
Akhmetov is now very influential in the political party “Party of Regions” and is its
main financier. He is an informal leader of the “Donetsk clan” together with Viktor
Yanukovich. Yanukovich became head of Donetsk regional administration in 1997 and
provided the cover for Akhmetov’s rise to power and his takeover of all local rackets.
Akhmetov increased the size of his capital holdings by two to three times during
Yanukovych’s governorship of Donetsk.910 Importantly, many of the property transfers
happened after the assassinations of politicians and businessmen, and the property formerly
owned by them appeared on the books of the companies controlled by Akhmetov. For
instance the beer producing company now called Sarmat fell under Akhmetov’s control after
905 Wilson, (2005, p. 168).
906 Reportedly they were from the same village, Oktyabrskyi, in Donbas region, which reinforces the importance
of zemliachestvo in criminal networks.
907 Kuzin (2006, pp. 25-26).
908 OCCRP (2008). The police record is available at
http://reportingproject.net/new/REPORTS/Document%20about%20Donetsk%20crime%20group.pdf, retrieved
8 May 2009.
909 RIA Oreanda (2008).
910 Kuzio (2005d, p. 355).
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its owner, Yuryi Pavlenko was assassinated in 1998.911 The assassinations of A. Shvedchenko
founder of Inter-Ukraina; A. Momot, owner of company Danko; S. Roman, owner of Yug
and Kiev-Konti; S. Gutsul, owner of Bittekhnikal and others; resulted in similar property
transfers.912 The question “who benefits” from the assassinations is legitimate to ask in this
situation913 and is an accepted method of investigation.
The chart below based on police data shows that Donetsk oblast hosts the highest
number of organized crime groups.
Chart 10. Ukraine’s regional variation of organized crime groups (Ministry of Interior of
Ukraine)914
What follows is a brief account of historical background of sophisticated organized
crime in Donetsk. The first major criminal entrepreneur of the new generation was Akhat
Bragin, who took over Oktyabrsk market in 1988, then founded Liuks Trading Company
before assuming control of Shaktar Donetsk football club in 1995. He formed the crime
group Liuksovskie and according to police it profited from instigating rivalry and conflict
between thieves-in-law and sportsmen groups.915 Bragin gradually developed links with
authorities and eliminated all rival criminals including Viacheslav Frolov, Eduard
911 Novosti Donetska (2006).
912 See Kuzin (2006).
913 See for instance Serio (2008, p. 61).
914 Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine (2007).
915 Kuzin (2006, p. 88).
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Brahinskyi, the Dolidze brothers,916 Akop Akopian and others until he was himself
assassinated in 1995 and all his entreprises fell into Akhmetov’s hands.917 By that time his
influence was uncontested in Donbas region and he was expanding out to the rest of
Ukraine.918
Akhmetov legalized his businesses in the late 1990s and early 2000s, though he
allegedly maintained links with organized crime. Several of these allegations merit discussion
since they are corroborated by numerous sources,919 though they cannot be fully quantified
for apparent reasons.
First, Akhmetov allegedly employed Givi Nemsadze, who was reportedly involved in
the assassinations of 60 entrepreneurs and members of competing organized crime groups
with the purpose of expanding business and criminal influence in Donetsk region. Allegedly,
Nemsadze’s group controlled over 200 enterprises in different parts of the city and its
structure was split: first, planning and implementing criminal activity and, second, organizing
economic activity.920 Police officials alleged that the group enjoyed the protection of and
collusion with high officials and law enforcement officers.921 Second, Akhmetov allegedly
works with Mikhail Liashko, aka Mishania, who controls the two most popular Donetsk
casinos, Tallin and Golden Lion, and has allegedly closed his competitors down. Mishania’s
krysha was the high ranking police official General Belozub and this relationship helped the
former to survive the 1990s. He also co-owned White Swan trading centre together with
Boris Kolesnikov, arrested on extortion charges in 2005922 and Igor Akhmetov (a close
relative of Rinat Akhmetov) and other members of Akhmetov’s inner circle.923
1.4. The effect of the Orange Revolution
The anti-criminal element gained particular salience during the Ukrainian revolution,
unlike the Georgian and Kyrgyz ones, since the Orange camp widely used allegations against
Viktor Yanukovich’s involvement in organized crime and having a criminal past, such as
since the 1980s maintaining connections to organized crime groups by lobbying local and
916 A former officer (U5) alleged that Bragin used law enforcement structures to eliminate Dolidze’s group.
917 Wilson (2005).
918 Author’s personal communication with U12 and U14, November-December 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
919 Author’s interviews with U7, U12, U13, U14, November-December 2007.
920 Kuzin (2006, pp. 208-221).
921 Police official quoted in Ostrov (2005).
922 Kolesnikov was arrested in 2005 on allegations of getting theses shares through extortion.
923 Ord.com.ua (2006).
146
national governments for them.924 Kuchma famously stated to Vladimir Putin that he
(Yanukovich) was “just a Donetsk bandit.”925 Certainly, Yushchenko used this compromat
repeatedly to remind election crowds that bandits wanted to impose their rule and “teach us to
live in accordance with the rules of criminals, to learn prison slang and wear prison
uniforms.”926 Yushchenko also stated that people were no longer prepared to live according
to panyatya927 (the rules and code of underworld in criminal slang). Undoubtedly,
Yanukovich skilfully covered his prison past, though it ultimately became known.928
Corruption allegations played a crucial role in the standoff between Yushchenko and
Yanukovich and gave the former the upper hand929 before forming a key component of his
2004 election campaign, when Yushchenko convinced the majority of corruption-weary
Ukrainians that he was different.930
The Orange Revolution clearly resulted in increased political competition. The
centralized system with a single arbiter, Leonid Kuchma, is no longer in place and power is
partitioned among different political factions. Oligarchs therefore face more competition in
influencing the state, though both their strategy of capturing state institutions and the
penetrability of political structures by big business have remained unchanged. Despite the
promises of Yushchenko and Timoshenko to separate business from politics, the symbiosis
between the two remains intact, because no steps were made toward institutional delimitation
between state and private business. After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko appointed
businessmen like Petro Poroshenko and David Jvania to high government positions,931
generating speculation on replacing “Kuchma-era oligarchs” with “new ones.”932
Relationships between economic and political power that are particular to oligarchic systems
have formed in Ukraine, according to Lucan Way. Unlike other countries where political
leaders rely on the support of business interests, in oligarchic systems business owners
themselves hold legislative seats and other posts.933 Hence, in countries with weak
institutions and an underdeveloped legislative basis it becomes difficult to distinguish
924 Kuzio (2005b, p. 124).
925 Wilson (2005, p. 136).
926 Kuzio (2005b, p. 124).
927 Krushelnycky (2006, p. 270).
928 Wilson (2005, p. 136).
929 Copsey (2005, p. 101).
930 Aslund (2005b, p. 338); Kuzio (2005e, p. 2).
931 Wilson (2005, p. 164).
932 Copsey (2005, p. 102).
933 Way (2005, p. 136).
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between public and private office, which creates opportunities for the abuse of power and the
manipulation of government institutions by private interests.
Contrary to their popular anti-oligarch rhetoric during the Orange Revolution, the
Yushchenko administration proved to be unwilling or unable to curtail oligarch influence.
Shortly after the revolution, the oligarchs previously described as detrimental to national
economy became the benign national bourgeoisie.934 This new view of oligarchs as benign
was not shared by Yulia Tymoshhenko, the main supporter of re-privatisation after the
Orange Revolution. She advocated investigating 3,000 privatizations undertaken since 1992,
while Yushchenko supplied a list of only 29 companies.935 Yushchenko’s two main points of
focus were Ukraine’s biggest steel mill, Kryvorizhstal, and Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant.936 The
latter was co-owned by Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, son-in-law of Kuchma.937 Only
Kryvorizhstal was re-privatized and initially bought for 800,000 USD by Ukrainian oligarchs,
then sold for 4.8 billion USD to Mittal Steel.938 Shady privatisation deals still survived, such
as the privatisation of Dniproenergo in summer of 2007 that yielded over 500 million USD
stake in Akhmetov’s company. Bankruptcy was used as a mechanism to get hold of the
company, a strategy sponsored by Prime Minister Yanukovych. Akhmetov had made it clear
that he would cooperate with any regime939 and allegedly also contributed to Yushchenko’s
presidential campaign in 2004.940
Apart from government initiatives of re-privatization, the main re-division of
resources since the Orange Revolution has been implemented through raiding, relevant to this
study for its elements of capture of the judiciary and executive systems. Kuzio argued that “it
would be unreasonable to expect re-privatization to be more corrupt than initial
privatization.” The main problem was and remains corruptibility and unfairness in the
courts.941 No consensus emerged in the government on re-privatization procedures or on the
criteria for what to re-privatise.942
Raiding is a form of re-distribution of spoils in which a property object is seized.
Experts differentiate between “white,” “grey” and “black” raiding. In the “white” variety,
raiders usually use legal forms of merger and acquisition. The “black” one is an almost
934 Kuzio quoted in.Burwell, Aslund, Kuzio, Pifer (2006, p. 4).
935 Kuzio (2005, p. 6).
936 Kyiv Post (2006a).
937 Viktor Pinchuk is married to Kuchma’s daughter.
938 Forbes (2005).
939 Pukish-Yunko (2005).
940 Way (2005).
941 Kuzio (2006).
942 Aslund (2005b, pp. 341-342).
148
completely illegal takeover of a business943 and involves counterfeiting of documents,
registration of companies under dummy names, bribing law enforcement, and “buying” court
decisions. “Grey” raiding is usually somewhere in between, where outright criminal
activities, such as bribery, are used only to a limited extent. Usually raiders purchase a small
share of stock, then file a lawsuit in a lower-level court in a remote town, bribe the court for a
favorable decision and then take possession of the property, usually through using the
threatening force of private security companies or state law enforcement structures. Pervasive
rent-seeking in the criminal justice system creates incentives for raiding. Ukraine’s courts are
rated as among the top five most corrupt national institutions, together with state auto
inspection, police and healthcare services according to a 2007 USAID study. Yuryi Vasilev,
former judge and now an independent lawyer estimated that 95 percent of the judges are
corrupt: “Those who are not corrupt, are obliged to leave… those who act alone, without
sharing in the upper echelons get fired, or even prosecuted on corruption charges…Over the
past 9 months, only 3 out of 20 cases I was working on ended without the payment of a
bribe.”944 In general, raiding and corruption in courts are mutually reinforcing in post-Orange
Revolution Ukraine. Strangely enough, only 6 individuals from the court system were
convicted in 2007.945
Strong correlation exists between raiding activity and regime transition. The centres
of power have multiplied and instead of the strictly centralized governance system under
Kuchma, now several opposing factions of political-business elites are vying for power, none
being in full control. 60 percent of the respondents interviewed by the Corporate Relations
Research Center (CRRC) think that raiding has increased in Ukraine since 2005. Around
2500 enterprises have been raided in the last 2-3 years. CRRC data shows that the biggest
raiders are usually oligarchs, I. Kolomoyskyi (Privat), Konstantin Jevago (Finansi i kredit)
and Rinat Akhmetov (System Capital Management).946
Raiders are frequently assisted by private security companies and organized crime
groups in forceful takeovers of enterprises. For instance, a raider used the Kyiv crime group
to take over a steel factory in 2006,947 and another entrepreneur-cum-politician in Kharkiv,
Eastern Ukraine used Arthur Marabian’s (aka Sviatoi or Papa) crime group under cover of a
943 Zerkalov (2007, pp. 6-9).
944 Author’s interview with Yuryi Vasilev, November 15, 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
945 Osipov (2008).
946 Corporativ.info, 2006.
947Author’s interview with Andrey Semidedko, head of anti-raiding association, November 11, 2007, Kyiv,
Ukraine.
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sporting organization to raid a meat processing plant in Dergachevo.948 Most frequently
special purpose units of the Ministry of the Interior, such as Berkut, are used.949 These cases
involve large payoffs to law enforcement officials by major financial groups with ties to
political elites.950 Oligarchs have strengthened their control over law enforcement since the
last years of Kuchma’s reign.951 The situation changed little after the revolution. The process
of spoils redistribution through raiding clearly shows that the oligarchs still have an economic
interest in maintaining a weak state with an inefficient criminal justice system that is
vulnerable to manipulation.
2. Georgia – Extortion: from Professional criminals to the ‘Revolutionary Government’
In Georgia, infamous for its major contribution to the world of professional criminals,
vory v zakone took the lead, while in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, sportsmen crime groups
became predominant. Hence the vory were already established and their influence was
significant in Georgia’s underworld, even as they worked to infiltrate the “upperworld” of
politics since the break-up of the USSR. Jaba Ioseliani, for instance, a professional criminal
and leader of the paramilitary group Mkhedrioni, became President Shevardnadze’s deputy in
the early 1990s. Ioseliani is one of the most interesting figures in the recent Georgian history.
He was a criminal who served several years in Soviet prisons and attained the honorary
underworld title of vory v zakone. Later he was awarded an advanced academic degree
(Doktor Nauk) from Theatrical Institute in art criticism, became a professor, and entered
politics, eventually ending up as the most influential individual in post-Soviet Georgia after
the ouster of first post-independence president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Patterns of state capture
in Georgia thus diverge from those of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In the latter two, criminals
initially relied on physical intimidation before gradually developing more sophisticated
political connections.
2.1. Mkhedrioni
948 See for instance Ukraina Kriminalnaya (2007) and Komitet pradivadeistvyi organizovannoi prestupnosty i
korupcii (2007).
949Berkut is a successor OMON/ZMOP riot police created in 1988 by Gorbachev to counter potential civil
unrest. These were always former soldiers from elite units, such as airborne. The service within the ranks of the
Berkut is regarded as prestigious because of higher-than- average pay and high-quality technology, and numbers
roughly 5000. Its main function is riot control and anti-mafiya and anti-terrorist operations. Source: “Security
and foreign forces” in Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment (2007); Kuzio (1998).
950 Author’s interviews with U4, U5 and U6 October-December 2007.
951 Aslund and McFaul (2006, p. 23).
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In Georgia’s post-Soviet conditions of increasing insecurity, opposition groups
created Mkhedrioni as well as a National Guard that were a combination of criminal
groupings and urban teenage gangs952 and both were predecessors of the current Georgian
army.953 Besides Mkhedrioni and the National Guard, other regional and district gangs
proliferated, their members sometimes assuming state positions. The Gamgebeli (local
administrator) of Zestafoni district was a member of “Sviri criminal brotherhood.”954
Mkhredrioni was created as a paramilitary detachment whose goal was to carry out
the political aims of its criminal founder, Jaba Ioseliani.955 Ioseliani debuted in politics in
1989 by helping Akaki Bakradze become elected as a USSR people’s deputy, and Bakradze
subsequently helped Ioseliani.956
Mkhredrioni was registered in July 1989. Many, not all, of its members had criminal
records,957 and many came from affluent Tbilisi families.958 As time passed, the group
became increasingly involved in crime. Mkhredrioni presented itself as the heir to historic
Georgian guerrilla groups who fought Persian, Ottoman and Russian occupiers. Overall,
Mkhedrioni numbered roughly 4000 in Georgia; Tbilisi was the largest branch with 800-1000
members.959 Slider estimated that Mkhedrioni numbered from 3000 to 5000.960 Members
would take an oath to defend Georgia’s people, the Georgian Orthodox Church, and Georgian
territory. The group became more active as the country moved towards independence, and as
relations between Georgian nationalists and the country’s national minorities deteriorated
with the rise of the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia. At this time Mkhredrioni acted as a
counterbalance to other paramilitary organisations set up by rival nationalists. Jaba Ioseliani
himself stated that Mkhedrioni was “a patriotic organization, but based on the thieves’
tradition.”961 When asked why he recruited Temur Khachishvili into the organisation (later
952 Baev (2003, p. 131).
953 Demetriou (2002, p. 7).
954 Wheatley (2005, pp. 80, 87).
955 Ioseliani’s professional criminal background is as follows: 1948 – imprisoned for staging a bank robbery in
Leningrad, served 17 years in a Soviet prison (released 1965); 1970s – served a sentence for manslaughter, upon
release returned to Georgia where he graduated from the Institute of Theatre Arts, became a professor and wrote
several popular plays; 1991 – imprisoned by Gamsakhurdia;
1998 – detained on allegations that he was involved in an assassination attempt on Shevardnadze, held for 3
years pending trial and then sentenced to 11 years for banditry, terrorism and conspiracy to kill the President.
Ioseliani was released from a Georgian prison in 2000, and died in 2003.
956 Mikadze, Shevelev (1993).
957 Weatheley (2005, p. 46).
958 Shelley (2007, p. 53).
959 Weatheley (2005, p. 55).
960 Slider (1997, p. 165).
961Rezonansi (1998).
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Khachishvili served as Minister of Internal Affairs, 1992-3) Ioseliani replied it was because
of Khachishvili’s prison record and his lack of a Komsomol background.962 Despite his
official position in the Shevardnadze government, Ioseliani maintained underworld contacts.
His links with the powerful Georgian thieves-in-law community in Russia are especially
important. He threatened Russia in the mid-1990s, saying that Georgia might start guerrilla
warfare on Russian territory if the latter did not negotiate on Abkhazia.963
Although Ioseliani and Gamsakhurdia shared a similar nationalist outlook, the two
men fell out after Gamsakhurdia came to power in 1990. Ioseliani and his supporters were
imprisoned in 1991, and Mkhredrioni was banned.964 After escaping from prison, Ioseliani
supported a coup d’etat against the Gamsakhurdia government, and Eduard Shevardnadze
came to power.
Koehler writes that Gamsakhurdia was ousted through an “urban alliance of
underworld authorities, scientists, intelligentsia and former Soviet patrons.”965 Gamsakhurdia
himself maintained that the rebellion had been plotted by “the Georgian mafia and erstwhile
communists who have lost their sinecures,”966 as well as the “mafia, the mob and the
Transcaucasian military district” of the former Soviet Union.967 To some extent this rhetoric
is well-founded, as the actors involved in the coup d’etat included cooperating factions from
the under and upper worlds.
Mkhedrioni were linked with Communist party structures as well. Slider notes that a
possible link between the two was Guram Mgeladze, formerly chairman of the Georgian
Agricultural Ministry’s Gosagroprom, and widely viewed in Georgia as one of the leaders of
the informal “party-economic mafia.”968 In other sources, Guram Mgeladze is referred to as
“my old friend” by Shevardnadze969 and two journalists report that Mgeladze also was an
“old pal” of Ioseliani.970 This link is interesting since it shows how corrupt Soviet elites
bridged the under and upperworlds during the post-Soviet transition. While First Secretary of
the Communist party of Abasha (Western Georgia), Mgeladze was a pioneer of
entrepreneurial initiative, as early as 1973. He instituted a system of agricultural management
modelled after Hungarian reforms. This initiative streamlined management of state and
962 Ibid. This is commensurate with ‘thieves code’.
963 Podlesskikh (1994, p. 28).
964 Slider (1997, p. 166).
965 Koehler, (1999, pp. 2, 39).
966 Gamsakhurdia quoted in Rojo (1992).
967 Reuters (1992).
968 Slider (1997, p. 165).
969 Shevardnadze (1991).
970 Mikadze, Shevelev (1993).
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collective farms under horizontal leadership, replacing centralized Ministry control and
consequently increasing local initiative, resulting in higher productivity and incomes for
farmers. In 1981 Mikhail Gorbachev, as the Central Committee secretary in charge of
agriculture, credited the Mgeladze-Shevardnadze experiment as “worthy of approval.”971
Mgeladze was promoted to Chairman of the Committee for Agricultural Production for the
whole Georgian SSR.972 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Mgeladze left for Moscow
and controlled a share of Moscow’s gambling business, according to Russian media.973
Russian gambling was penetrated by shady capital and professional criminals from the onset,
and part of gambling in Russia was controlled by Georgians until 2006.974
Shevardnadze remained dependent on the Mkhredrioni, using them as parliamentary
security guards. Mkhredrioni also provided constant security to Jaba Ioseliani after he
became a Member of Parliament. There were also other paramilitary groups operating in
Georgia.975 The most influential, after Mkhredrioni, was the National Guard, led by Tengiz
Kitovani. Kitovani boasted good contacts with the Russian military and criminal community,
and he was a schoolmate of Gamsakhurdia. The National Guard was staffed by local citizens
serving under criminal bosses, and numbered 8000.976 It funded itself through extortion
rackets.977
Together with Mkhredrioni, the National Guard instigated a coup d’etat against the
legitimately elected Gamsakhurdia. Afterwards, the newly formed military council of three
main players of the coup d’etat, Kitovani, Ioseliani and Tengiz Sigua, brought Shevardnadze
from Moscow and installed him as president. One of the first documents signed by Ioseliani
and Kitovani immediately after the coup d’etat was an amnesty that freed many criminals,
including some vory, from prison.978 One of the aims of this amnesty was in fact to get vory
free.
Over time, members of Mkhredrioni gained a reputation as “heavily armed thugs”
engaged in violent criminal activity including extortion of businesses, using roadblocks to rob
motorists, and narcotics smuggling. In their early years, Mkhredrioni were repeatedly sent by
971 Suny (1983, p. 383).
972 Suny (1989, p. 312).
973 See for instance Novyi region (2009); Glonti and Lobzhanidze (2004, p. 54).
974 Kupatadze (2007a).
975 For a comprehensive survey of paramilitary groupings, see Demetriou (2002).
976 Aprasidze (2004, p. 46); Demetriou (2002, p. 24).
977 Baev (2003, p. 131).
978 Ushangi Mgeladze (2008).
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Ioseliani to fight President Gamsakhurdia’s supporters in Western Georgia, and while doing
so they frequently also looted the local population.979
Mkhredrioni were also repeatedly sent to fight the separatists in Abkhazia during the
ethnic conflict that took place in the autonomous region between 1991 and 1993. While in
Abkhazia, the Mkhredrioni also terrorized the population. Due to his relationship with
Shevardnadze, Ioseliani was given a formal government position in September 1993 to help
the government enforce a national state of emergency. This gave him powers to detain
people, under which he established a repressive regime criticized by foreign governments and
human rights organizations for its extrajudicial killings, especially of “Zviadists” or men
loyal to Gamsakhurdia.
In 1994, Mkhedrioni sponsored a new political movement with Ioseliani as honorary
chairman.980 Mkhedrioni operated mafia activities under cover of the Rescue Corps, the
political society “Elections,” and various TV channels and shops. They assassinated
opposition political leaders who resisted them, such as Gia Chanturia who was gunned down
in 1994.981 The leaders of Mkhedrioni (Ioseliani, Temur Khachishvili, and Giga Gelashvili)
planned and implemented assassinations, according to the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia,
including the murder of Soliko Khabeishvili, the vice-president of Eduard Shevardnadze’s
foundation “Revival and Democracy;” of police general Gia Gulua, and an attempt on former
defence Minister Giorgi Karkarashvili.982 A former police official thinks that Gulua was
assassinated because he was obstructing Mkhedrionis’ access to transport and communication
facilities.983 In a survey conducted by the Institute of Demography and Sociological Studies
on major societal problems in 1994, rising crime levels come second in the list after price
rises and above the war in Abkhazia (!).984
After several acts of political violence blamed on Mkhredrioni, the group was
outlawed and Ioseliani imprisoned. The Ministry of Internal Affairs emerged as a vital actor,
eventually disarming the Mkhedrioni and other warlords.985 War was a critical independent
variable that both weakened and strengthened organized crime groups. Military defeat in
979 Prosecutor’s office of Georgia, briefing on a Mkhedrioni court sentence; Ushangi Mgeladze (2008).
980 Aves (1996, p. 10).
981 Ushangi Mgeladze (2008).
982 Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, briefing on Mkhedrioni court sentence, available online at www.pov.gov.ge
983 Account of Ushangi Mgeladze (2008).
984 Gachechiladze (1995, pp. 111-113). Gachechiladze argues that crime was a problem during the Soviet Union
as well, but in no region did crime levels reach a higher rank in terms of public concern than number 15 before.
During the late 1980s, the public ranked the major problems as poor supply and quality of consumer goods,
sanitary conditions of settlements, and inadequate housing.
985 Aves (1996, p. 21); Nodia (2002, p. 431).
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Abkhazia weakened both the Mkhedrioni and National Guard and eased the task of the
Ministry of the Interior in confronting both.986 After the demise of the Mkhedrioni, some of
its powerful elite emerged as successful “legitimate” businessmen. Ioseliani himself was
released in 2000, after 5 years of prison, and died in 2003. The Georgian patriarch buried him
in Sion cathedral where important or honoured Georgian historical and social figures are
customarily buried, and high-ranking government officials, including President Shevardnadze
attended his funeral.987 Even now, the term “Mkhedrioni times” (Mkhedrionis Dro in
Georgian) is frequently used to denote the most chaotic and criminalized period of Georgia’s
recent history.
Within Georgia, most individuals with experience in the country during the 1990s can
recall the Mkhedrioni’s setting up of road blocks to demand fuel, money or other valuables
from motorists or even confiscate their automobiles. Gachechiladze reports that well-armed
highway gangs instituted almost complete control over the major roads, making traffic unsafe
and blocking economic relations between provinces.988 Mkhedrioni and the National Guard
also perpetrated abductions for ransom.989 Aves writes that “under the guise of raising funds
for the war effort they were able to develop a network of extortion rackets.”990 The war in
Abkhazia and the Zviadist insurgency in Samegrelo created many organized crime
opportunities for the Mkhedrioni. In the early 1990s, Mkhedrioni infiltrated a local branch of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and conducted a systematic campaign of extortion against
local traders.991 Mkhedrioni elite also made sure that they would profit from privatization.
Thus important stakes were acquired by Ioseliani and his key associates in the Georgian
economy through insider relationships with government officials.992
Much of the violence in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution
can be explained by attempts by paramilitary criminal groups to get access to resources. In
fact the groups did not engage in violence if no booty or resources could be acquired. In
1991, the National Guard refused to fight in South Ossetia because the province had no
“lootable resources.”993 By contrast Kitovani was eager to fight in Abkhazia because its
lucrative shadow economy could offer many illicit revenues.994 As Koehler summarizes, “a
986 Nodia (2002, p. 429).
987 Shelley (2007a, p. 54).
988 Gachechiladze (1995, p. 138).
989 See for instance the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, briefing on Mkhedrioni court sentence.
990 Aves (1996, p. 10).
991 Ibid., p. 47.
992 Shelley (2007a, p. 53).
993 Baev (2003, p. 136).
994 Wheatley (2005, p. 73).
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market of violence developed in which economic effectiveness devoid of moral embedding
turned out to be the most important control for the use of violence.”995
Shevardnadze tried to bring paramilitary groups under state control by making the
National Guard the “official army,” appointing Kitovani the Defence Minister and giving
Mkhedrioni official status as the “Georgian Rescue Force.” Shevardnadze also appointed
Temur Khachishvili, close ally of Ioseliani, as Deputy Interior Minister (1992-1993).996
Spheres of control of illicit profits were divided by giving the Mkhedrioni a monopoly over
the distribution of fuel and making the National Guard the exclusive arms trader.997 Some
observers said it was the “moral equivalent of appointing John Gotti and Carlo Gambino998 as
head of the FBI and DEA [in the United States].”999 Shevardnadze dismissed Khachishvhili
in 1993, although he was reinstated as a deputy months later by Shevardnadze’s new Minister
of State Security, Igor Giorgadze.1000 Giorgadze allegedly masterminded the assassination
attempt against Shevardnadze in 1995. During his tenure, Khachishvili undermined law
enforcement efforts against organized crime groups, including his peers from Mkhedrioni.
Some of its members were appointed to law enforcement replacing professional policemen.
In 1992, Vato Kipiani, a thief-in-law and member of Mkhedrioni, had his uncle Jimi Kipiani
appointed as Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Jimi Kipiani, in turn, helped to
end investigations and prosecutions into Vato Kipiani’s group.1001
Another influential leader of Mkhedrioni, Gia Vashakdize, became Deputy Minister
of Defence. Vashakidze was a graduate of Moscow military academy and was married to the
daughter of General Potapov, the commander of peacekeeping forces stationed in Abkhazia
in the mid -1990s. After the Rose Revolution, on December 5, 2003, Gia Vashakidze and
other former members of Mkhedrioni kidnapped a director of United Georgian Bank,
demanding 3 million USD in ransom. They were arrested in January 2004.1002
After Shevardnadze granted amnesty to Jaba Ioseliani, the Mkhedrioni leader tried to
re-enter politics by attempting to register Mkhedrioni as a political group with the Ministry of
995 Koehler (1999, pp. 45-46).
996 Importantly, Khachishvili had a criminal record of robbery that should have automatically disqualified him
from entering high office in law enforcement structures.
997 Baev (2003, p. 133).
998 Both men were prominent bosses of the Italian mafia in the United States.
999 Goltz (2006, p. 6).
1000 Aves (1996, pp. 19-20).
1001 Ibid.
1002 Ministry of the Interior of Georgia (2004).
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Justice. The then-Minister of Justice, Mikheil Saakashvili, refused on the grounds that
criminal organizations could not be registered as political groups in Georgia.1003
During Mkhedrioni the underworld dominated the state domain; the dynamics is
changing in favour of political elites after outlawing Mkhedrioni what is discussed in the next
section.
2.2. The changing dynamics of dominance between underworld and upperworld actors
The influence of the thieves remained even after Ioseliani was imprisoned in 1995.
Shevardnadze, unlike Gamsakhurdia, had capitalized on his old nomenklatura networks to
rebuild his power base,1004 allowing professional criminals to revive Soviet-era links.1005 In
2000, police discovered two professional criminals in a car belonging to Rudik Tsaava, the
deputy chairman of the ministerial council of the Abkhaz government-in-exile. Tsaava
confirmed he knew these individuals but denied knowledge of their criminal status.1006 Vakho
Chachanidze, a professional criminal from Tbilisi, had connections to former deputy general
prosecutor, then Member of Parliament.1007 Another professional criminal from Moscow,
Jemal Mikeladze, was arrested along with a former official of the Adjarian Interior Ministry
in 2000, 1008 indicating the extensive relations between political elites and criminals.
As the previous discussion on the Mkhedrioni demonstrates, the Georgian state in the
early 1990s was dominated by the underworld. In addition to other factors that Georgia has in
common with Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, such as weak state institutions, a poorly developed
legislative system, and rampant corruption, an additional variable has been the breakdown of
the state monopoly of violence due to the three wars. These are the Civil War, dubbed the
“Tbilisi War;” the Abkhaz war, and the war in South Ossetia. The newly-born weak state
with its weak institutions was not capable of dealing with the conflicts, and therefore various
criminal brotherhoods and paramilitary gangs filled the void. The situation began to change
in 1994, when the influence of Mkhedrioni and the National Guard was neutralized and the
1003 Civil Georgia (August 1, 2001).
1004 Aves (1996, p. 11).
1005 Shelley (2007, pp. 58-9).
1006 Rezonansi (August 22, 2000).
1007 Ibid.
1008 Rezonansi (April 25, 2000).
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police consolidated power.1009 Shevardnadze was in charge of institutions of state power, and
reduced criminality so that it no longer threatened political order.1010
Beginning about 1995, centres of power moved from purely underworld ones to
overlapping networks of under and upperworld. However, the state simultaneously became
increasingly tied to corruption and organized crime, some experts even arguing that they
were “the main source.”1011 For instance, the Ministry of the Interior controlled the cigarette
and oil businesses, both in retail and wholesale markets.1012 Targamadze also tried to control
every bribe-generating activity emanating from the official functions of the Ministry of the
Interior, and opposed the transfer of pre-trial detention centres to the Ministry of Justice
because he would lose bribe opportunities from the centres.1013 Many branches of criminal
justice system became engulfed in bribery. The majority of the law students at Tbilisi State
University were aiming to work in public procuracy, because of the lucrative possibility from
illicit revenues, according to a survey conducted by a Georgian corruption research centre in
1998.1014
Hence, the political elites started to dominate over organized crime in the late 1990s,
although they never consolidated power fully. The situation returned to a symbiotic balance
in the early 2000s, especially due to Kakha Targamadze’s ouster in 2001.
Professional criminals remained important power-wielders in the country, through
rampant racketeering, extortion, kidnapping, and protection schemes. Thieves-in-law
participated illegally in the legal economy by levying fees from the profit of businesses
(racketeering, extortion), acquiring legal stakes/shares in various businesses through illegal
means such as violence or intimidation (so-called tsilshi chajdoma translated as acquiring a
share), or establishing their own legal companies for cover of illicit activities.
This high level of collusion allowed criminals to influence government decisions. The
mayor of Georgia’s second largest city, Kutaisi, recalled that in 1993 he offered professional
criminals positions as managers of major factories as a quid pro quo for giving up illegal
activities, but his proposal was rejected.1015
Georgia’s other links between criminals and officials include those of vory Tariel
Oniani with Shevardnadze’s bureaucrats; Members of Parliament; and high-ranking Interior
1009 Gachechiladze (1995, p. 152); Darchiashvili (2003,p. 10); Wheatley (2005, p. 87).
1010 Nodia (2002, p. 419).
1011 Darchiashvili (2003, p. 8).
1012 Ibid., p. 12.
1013 Stefes (2006, p. 109).
1014 Ibid., p. 154.
1015 24 Saati (2003).
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Ministry officials, in addition to Aslan Abashidze, the warlord ruler of Adjaria. Tariel
Oniani’s influence permeated all levels and branches of government; in 2005, Saakashvili
claimed that Koba Narchemashvili, the Former Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, would
meet with Oniani at Tbilisi airport whenever he visited Georgia and even provide Oniani with
a police escort.1016
Oniani was possibly the most influential Georgian vory. His shares in Airzena
Airlines1017 were made more valuable by the fact that President Shevardnadze was giving
Airzena preferential treatment because his close relative also owned stakes in it.1018 In
November 2002, Kakhi Asatiani, one of the directors and shareholders of “Airzena”, was
assassinated in an apparent contract killing in downtown Tbilisi.1019 It was claimed by the
political opposition leaders as well as by the family members of Asatiani that the
assassination was masterminded by the authorities in collusion with big businessmen related
to Airzena, including Shevardnadze’s relative.1020
Oniani has helped the Georgian government in solving various issues, at the cost of
increasing official dependency on the criminal world. For instance, according to police
sources Oniani helped get UN observers released after they were taken hostage in Kodori
Gorge in 2003.1021 President Shevardnadze affirmed the hostages were freed as a result of
intervention by criminal authorities. Tevdoradze claims that Spanish and Arab businessmen
were similarly released in 2001.1022 Human kidnapping emerged as the major illicit activity in
Georgia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The cases were frequently situated in uncontrolled
areas such as the Pankisi or Kodori Gorges with crime groups in these lawless areas under
complex webs of protection provided by the top officials of the Interior Ministry. One police
official said “none of the abduction cases, especially those involving foreigners, have been
solved without ransom and Tariel Oniani was involved in all major cases”.1023 Hence,
resolving kidnappings increased collusion between professional criminals and the police,
building the influence of the vory and further criminalizing the political system.
The criminal scheme of returning stolen cars for ransom was organized in a similar
way. Groups under control of the thieves–in-law stole cars and then returned them to their
1016 Address by President Saakashvili (2005).
1017 See for instance Prime News (April 6, 2003).
1018 Author’s interviews with G7 and G8, June 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1019 Blagov (2003); Darchiashvili (2005, p.15).
1020 For a statement by Asatiani’s widow see Qronika (2003); for the statement by Mikheil Saakashvili see
Prime-News (December 1, 2002).
1021 For more information on the case see Devdariani (2003).
1022 Prime-News (June 15, 2003).
1023 Author’s interviews with G3 and G4, August 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia.
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owners for money. This illicit profit from this process, called vazvrat in criminal slang,
flowed to the vory, who put part of the money in obshiaks and retained the rest. Some
criminals other than the vory, such as drug dealers, also participated in this type of crime. The
role of Kakha Targamadze is important here. During his tenure of office as Interior Minister,
(1995-2001) the collusion between police officials and thieves-in-law was especially evident
and kidnapping and other crimes grew under his protection. Targamadze previously headed
the Interior Ministry’s department on organized crime and economic sabotage.1024 While
there, Targamadze controlled major stakes in illegal business activities and fed off the
presidential family.1025 These activities included providing krysha for a large tobacco
company and illicit fuel business1026 as well as alliances with underworld leaders in extortion
activities and human abductions. Allegedly Targamadze was linked to the kidnapping
business in Georgia by acting as a protector for Shota (Mevlud) Chichiashvili, the leader of
an organized crime group based in the Pankisi gorge.1027 Chichiashvili was arrested and
extradited by Russian authorities in summer 2003 on charges of kidnapping Spanish and
Georgian citizens and holding them in the Pankisi Gorge.1028 Later the indicted kidnapper
said that the former authorities used him to conceal their own crimes. In his interview,
Chichiashvili never mentioned the name of Targamadze, but said that the Tbilisi police chief
asked him in 2000 for help to secure release of Red Cross representative hostages.1029
Returning to Oniani, he frequently acted as a mediator between large businesses in
Georgia. For instance, according to Rezonansi newspaper reports from August 2000, he
helped resolve a dispute between two major beer-producing companies. Such mediation was
common in the late 1990s because businesses and citizens were reluctant to turn to the
inefficient and corrupt courts and instead sought justice from vory. Professional criminals
became widely popular, even standing as role models for youth. In 1995 more than 25
percent of school children surveyed in Georgia said they aspired to be vory v zakone.1030 A
public opinion poll carried out by a group of authors researching the Rose Revolution1031
1024 BBC Monitoring Service (December 13, 1995).
1025 Christophe (2004, p. 16).
1026 Iprinda News (November 14, 1997); Reportedly Targamadze was also colluding with insurance companies
in corruption schemes such as setting up a monopoly for a particular company, according to my
communications with a former police officer, January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1027 Author’s interview with G6 and G8, June 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia. See also Loria and Gegeshidze (2006);
Scott (2007, p. 23).
1028 Black Sea Press (December 9, 2004).
1029 Chichiashvili (2005).
1030 Serio and Razinkin (1995, p. 76).
1031 For more details see Khutsishvili (2008, pp. 223-245).
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confirms that trust in the criminal authorities by the general public1032 decreased significantly
in the post-revolutionary period:
Table 5. Trust in Georgian institutions (ICCN)
Would apply More Yes than
No.
More No, than
Yes
Wouldn’t
apply
1. Ombudsman 29,6 32,2 12,4 25,8
2. Court of Law 16,4 29 15.7 38,9
3. Parliamentary Committee
for Human
13,9 24,3 19,3 42,5
4. Human rights watch NGOs 16,7 30,1 19,2 34,1
5. Mass media 18,4 29,2 18,7 33,7
6. Oppositional parties 5,6 13,8 18,6 62,1
7. Criminal authorities 5,7 7,8 11 75,5
8. Friends/relatives 66,4 24,7 3,3 5,5
9. Party in power 12,2 19,3 17,1 47,4
Police data indicate that the vory sought to extort money from or penetrate every
profitable business. Their business interests ranged from restaurants and bars to the microbus
services (marshrutkas). Their involvement also varied from direct ownership to protection,
although sometimes the two forms of involvement were overlapping. The case of Bondo
Shalikiani, MP-elect during Shevardnadze’s time,1033 shows how much wealth the criminal
leaders managed to amass in the 10 years following independence from the Soviet Union.
Shalikiani was arrested in March 2004, and his assets included shares in electric-mechanical
and transport factories, a meat factory, the TV channel Kutaisi, sanatoriums, and about 20 gas
stations. All these assets were confiscated and Shalikiani paid 140,000 USD in fines.1034
Later he claimed to have transferred 500,000 USD to President Saakashvili´s bank
accounts.1035
2.3. The fight against organized crime after the Rose Revolution
Before the Rose Revolution, thieves-in-law offered protection to private businesses
and controlled a significant part of the informal and formal economy of the country. New
legislation adopted in 2005 and modelled after the American RICO (Racketeer Influenced
1032 This public opinion poll was conducted throughout Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia);
overall 1.000 respondents were interviewed - 488 male and 512 female.
1033 He was a member of short-lived parliament that was announced illegitimate after the Rose Revolution.
1034 Khorbaladze (2004).
1035 OligarchWatch (2008).
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and Corrupt Organizations Act) and Italian Anti-mafia legislation criminalized the fact of
being a thief–in-law, and prescribed sanctions including the confiscation of property. This
legislation allows for the seizure and sale of property acquired through corruption and
organized crime; criminalizes affiliation with known organized crime groups; and creates
protections for witnesses testifying in corruption and criminal cases.1036 A crucial part of this
legislation is a plea bargaining system designed to incentivize the accused to cooperate with
authorities.1037 This piece of legislation is expressly designed as a tool to subvert the
“omerta”-type ban on cooperation with authorities advocated by the “thieves' code.” Just
before the revolution, some police officials complained that “a large section of society does
not even consider the possibility of cooperating with the police.”1038 In 1999, the Interior
Minister claimed that if police lacked the right to investigate in prisons, solved crimes would
diminish by 30-40 percent.1039
As a result of the new campaign against organized crime, Tbilisi police alone detained
9 thieves-in-law and 37 criminal authorities in 2005. Allegedly there are more than 30
thieves-in-law held in Georgian prisons at present, and large scale confiscation of their
property has begun. In 2004-2006 some of the luxurious houses and apartments previously
owned by thieves-in-law have become the offices of regional and district police stations, for
instance in the western Georgian towns of Kutaisi and Tsalenjikha. According to the
Georgian police, the assets of 16 thieves-in-law have already been seized or are awaiting
seizure. These efforts have damaged the financial bases of criminals as well as the links and
connections they previously enjoyed within the Georgian government. Furthermore, new law
enforcement and legal authorities within the Georgian government have become more
cooperative with a number of European law enforcement structures, which, for example,
greatly facilitated the investigation of organized crime groups in Spain and Belgium.1040
Simultaneously, police reform has been implemented, significantly increasing public
trust in police, and making the Interior Ministry more efficient.1041 The police service
reliability indicator1042 as measured by the World Economic Forum in its annual Global
Competitiveness Report has increased from 2.6 points in 2004 (one of the lowest among over
1036 Government of Georgia (2006).
1037 Transparency International, Property rights in Post-revolutionary Georgia.
1038 Statement of Koba Narchemashvili (2002).
1039 Statement by K. Targamadze (1999).
1040 Author’s personal communication with G3, G4, G7 and G8, June-August, 2006.
1041 For more information on police reform see Kupatadze (2007b).
1042 Police services (1= cannot be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals, 7=can be relied upon to
protect businesses from criminals).
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130 countries) to 4.6 points in 2007, on par with Slovenia and Turkey and the second highest
among former Soviet Union countries, after Estonia. All these efforts that resulted in a
strengthened state have curbed the influence of professional criminals. All of them have been
transferred to a single prison, No. 7, and are thus isolated from other criminals and the
outside world. Therefore they lost the capability to exert influence in prisons and to
coordinate criminal activities outside prison walls. Human Rights Watch found that prison
No. 7 features the harshest conditions of Georgian prisons, with inmates being continuously
mistreated.1043 Before, vory were placed in cells No. 49, where the cell doors were not
locked, the cells were well-furnished, and inmates enjoyed even alcohol and prostitutes.
Thieves-in-law had free access to communications, which allowed them to organize external
criminal activities.
The side effect of strengthening police, however, were the numerous alleged
violations of human rights in the post-revolutionary period, including mistreatment of
detainees and the use of excessive force.1044 The underworld responded through a number of
prison riots and demonstrations, which were in fact a reaction to the larger policy of anti-
crime crackdowns. For instance 200 supporters of Zaza Ambroladze, thief–in-law from
Terjola district in Western Georgia, blocked the road.1045 In 2006 riots followed the attempt
by penitentiary officials to transport several thieves–in-law from prison No. 5 to prison No. 7.
The detainees were allegedly beaten during the transfer, triggering riots of more than 400
inmates.1046
In summer 2005 three Georgian sportsmen, Aleko Davitashvili, President of the
Georgian Wrestling Federation, his brother Davit, and the judo champion Giorgi
Revazishvili, were arrested and convicted on charges of extortion of 8,000 USD from a
Greek businessman in Tbilisi.1047 Following court’s decision to imprison the perpetrators,
their friends, mainly wrestlers and relatives, destroyed the court hall and blocked the central
Rustaveli Avenue of Tbilisi. Riot police was deployed to the streets for the first time since the
Rose Revolution and soon police dispersed the demonstration.1048 The arrest of the wrestlers
resulted in protests by other sportsmen. Some of them even refused to take part in preparatory
training for the World Championship in wrestling. Later the former Olympic Judo champion,
1043 Human Rights Watch (2006, pp. 86-88).
1044 See for instance US State Department (2006) and Amnesty International (2007).
1045 Human Rights Watch (2004).
1046 Human Rights Watch (2006, pp. 58-82).
1047 Civil Georgia (June 30, 2005).
1048 Civil Georgia, (July 1, 2005).
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president of the Judo Federation and former Minister of the Interior Dilar Khabuliani
apologized to President Saakashvili for the riots.1049
The wrestlers arrested form part of an organized crime group with international
connections. The group is headed by influential thieves-in-law, including Tariel Oniani, and
is tied to former policemen, such as Davit Kachkachishvili, former head of the Anti-
corruption Unit of the Ministry of the Interior1050 dismissed after the Rose Revolution.1051
According to Georgian press and government officials, the riots were managed from prison
by Davit Karseladze, alias Kalatoza, relative of Tariel Oniani’s wife, former wrestler and
wrestling trainer, and operational leader of the crime group.1052 Kalatoza does not hold the
status of thief-in-law, although he has great authority in the criminal world. The group was
also engaged in kidnapping, robberies and selling illegally trafficked cars from Europe in
Georgia. For instance, Kalatoza used sportsmen to extort money from the drivers of
marshrutkas (micro-buses) and to force entrepreneurs to transfer all their shares in companies
to him. One entrepreneur running a factory producing construction materials was paying 15
percent of his income to Kalatoza’s group.1053 The same group was involved in an attack on
Post Bank in Tbilisi in 2004, stealing 80,000 lari (roughly 40,000 USD).1054
The thieves’ community also tried to use other means to counteract increasing
government pressure. For instance, the son of Bondo Jiqia, governor of Samegrelo region,
was kidnapped and held in custody for 6 days in March 2004. Some of the media attributed
this abduction to the arrest of over 20 professional criminals in the Samegrelo region in the
first half of 2004.1055
In general, the Saakashvili administration concentrated on state-building rather than
democratizing.1056 The incoming elites seemingly decided to capitalize on the popular
mandate to implement some painful reforms that would not necessarily be popular, such as
the dismissal of 30,000 state employees,1057 but also to empower the executive branch for
rapid implementation of reforms without the time-consuming due process of planning and
approval by the legislative branch or participation of civic society stakeholders. Post-2003
constitutional changes strengthened presidential authority, increasing his capacity while
1049 Akhali Taoba ( 2005).
1050 He also served as head of the chief administration of the Interior Ministry Traffic Police in 2003.
1051 Ministry of the Interior of Georgia (2005).
1052 Rezonansi (2005).
1053 Author’s interview with G24, 23 July 2006, Gamarjveba, Georgia.
1054 Georgian police (2005).
1055 Akhali Versia ( 2004).
1056 Mitchell (2006, pp. 674-5).
1057 Wertsch (2006).
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diminishing his share of accountability, which resulted in the parliament playing a “rubber
stamp function for the government of Saakashvili.”1058 This approach has far reaching
consequences for the Georgian state in general and fighting organized crime and corruption
in particular. Stronger presidential powers allowed Saakashvili’s government to overcome the
budgetary crisis, increase revenues and restore financial order.1059 However anti-crime and
anti-corruption policies were largely unsupervised by public or non-governmental bodies. As
a result, steps undertaken were sometimes quasi-legal with little respect for the rule of law.
Some critics called this process a transformation from “democracy without democrats” to
“democrats without democracy.”1060 State-building based on rule of law was undermined
without a “commitment of those in power to legal constraints.”1061
Moran argued that when the state’s law enforcement capacity is monitored and
constrained by social and political freedoms, corruption and crime have room to develop,
suggesting a trade-off between building a strong state and fostering democracy.1062 Arguably
this is also the logic that the Saakashvili administration has followed. There was a wide
awareness of the need for political elites to re-legitimize the state, which as Nelken and Levi
anticipated, involved major intrusions into civil liberties.1063
The new government took a zero tolerance policy to crime. In 2004, then-Prosecutor
General Irakli Okruashvili said “we will take appropriate measures against everyone who has
committed crimes. We don’t differentiate.”1064 In March 2006, Saakashvili recapped:
We have announced a policy of zero tolerance and we should continue this policy, we
should put everyone in jail in accordance with the law and we should amend the
criminal procedure code so that no one can be released through conditional
sentences.1065
While this principled position was aimed at crime bosses, it also had longer term
consequences detrimental to democratic processes. Some dangerous practices in the name of
anti-crime and anti-corruption were apparent from the beginning, as initially police
frequently made arrests while wearing military fatigues with their faces covered by masks.1066
Saakashvili repeatedly encouraged police to meet any resistance by force. He provided
1058 Transparency International (2006).
1059 Papava (2007).
1060 Broers (2005, p. 347).
1061 Pistor (1999).
1062 Moran (2001, p. 389).
1063 Nelken and Levi (1996, p. 9).
1064 Okruashvili quoted in Katz (2006, p. 256).
1065Civil Georgia (March 27, 2006).
1066 Katz (2006, p. 240).
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permission for the use of deadly force without any constraints: a Presidential order to the
Minster of Internal Affairs in early 2004 permitted law enforcement officers to shoot, on the
spot, any suspect who refused to obey their orders.1067 Also many allegations of criminal
procedural violations were reported, such as arrests without warrants, in the fight against
corruption. In response, the Tbilisi procurator once told reporters that because suspects would
often attempt to flee or feign illness to avoid arrest, law enforcement was sometimes forced
to detain them in such a manner.1068 In the aforementioned case of Shalikiani, law enforcers
were either unwilling or unable to go through the legal procedure of gathering incriminating
evidence and instead took the “simple and fast” way of planting arms in his residence.
Several observers reported that the prosecutions of criminal cases of former officials after
confiscation of property and funds were frequently “sheer nonsense from a strictly procedural
viewpoint.”1069
Disregarding the rule of law led to dire criticism from human rights watchdogs and
other NGOs, who have reported that the police are involved in extrajudicial killings, torture
and other law violations. Weathley comments: “a government led by lawyers, which was
supposedly trying to create a state based on the rule of law, was using means that were far
from the spirit of the law to achieve its goal.”1070 An analogy with Thailand is relevant here.
Drug abuse in Thailand was and remains a major problem, so much as to be considered a
threat to national security. The “war on drugs” announced by Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime
Minister of Thailand in 2003 was widely supported by the public. The policy led to the
extreme measures by the authorities. The police published blacklists of suspected drug
producers and traffickers. These lists were frequently inaccurate according to national
watchdogs. The police “shoot-to-kill policy” led to extrajudicial killings.1071 In Georgia, from
2005-2006, 25 people were killed during 73 special operations conducted by the Georgian
Ministry of the Interior.1072 These two country cases show the serious consequences of
reassertion and extension of state power when targeting organized crime in the name of
national security.1073
The climax of alleged official disregard of law was the assassination of Sandro
Girgvliani, a banker kidnapped and assassinated, allegedly by high-ranking police officials,
1067 Katz (2006, p. 244).
1068 The Messenger (2004).
1069 RFE/RL (2004).
1070 Wheatley (2005, p. 204).
1071 Collins (2007, pp. 120-121).
1072 Transparency International (2007).
1073 Loader and Sparks (2007, p. 91).
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in 2006. The case led to a major uproar in Georgian society and greatly damaged the public
standing of the police.
Some police officers may have conducted extrajudicial killings for their own purposes,
unrelated to fighting crime. First, because of the formerly close collaborative links between
police officers and organized criminals, officers might try to eliminate criminals to erase any
compromat the latter may possess. Several such cases were referenced in my personal
communications with Georgian police officers.1074 Second, in the extreme, law enforcement
officers may use their unchecked power to bully, intimidate or even eliminate individuals
totally unrelated to crime. In February 2006, Gia Telia, a former anti-drug policeman who
had retired in 2003, was killed in a clash with the Special Operative Department of the
Ministry of the Interior. According to the Ministry, Telia, who was a suspected drug dealer,
was killed by police after he opened fire.1075 A few months before, in November 2005, the
newspaper Rezonansi published an interview with Telia who alleged that he was under
constant threat of assassination due to the information he possessed about the involvement of
police officials in drug smuggling.1076
Many of the constitutional changes, including ones that strengthened the presidency at
the expense of the legislative branch, were labelled as “undemocratic” by critics of the
government. Saakashvili dismissed these criticisms in an apparent effort to use the anti-crime
campaign as an excuse for legitimizing undemocratic moves. He stated that his
administration was “struggling with organized crime and those who want to join are
welcome.”1077 In a comment on Ukraine’s Orange Revolution relevant also to Georgia,
Aslund observes: “revolutionaries are convinced that they are right, and are not prone to seek
advice, so that radicalization typically proceeds further than the population is prepared to
tolerate.”1078
Occasional comparisons between Saakashvili and Putin are made in press. Charles
Kupchan speaks about the “Putinization of Georgia”1079 and Thomas de Waal calls
Saakashvili “Putin’s copycat.”1080 This criticism is based mainly on the increasingly
authoritarian tendencies in Georgia, and Saakashvili’s policy toward political opposition and
1074 Author’s personal communication with G7 and G8, January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1075 It was not clear whether he was the first to open the fire. Nevertheless this was used to justify the police
action.
1076 Civil Georgia (March 6, 2006).
1077 Katz (2006, p. 252).
1078 Aslund (2005b, p. 349).
1079 Kupchan (2006).
1080 de Waal (2007).
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the media. In fact Georgia’s super-presidential system is similar to that of the Russian
Federation and Central Asian states.1081 Similar to Putin, Saakashvili was also in favour of re-
establishing state control over major assets in the country and reclaimed much state property
after the Rose Revolution.
The process of “de-privatisation”, as Papava calls it, also shows signs of redistribution
of property for the benefit of Georgia’s new elite. Frequently property has been reclaimed
forcibly by law enforcement.1082 The right of the president to direct sale of state-owned
facilities and enterprises through his single-handed decisions1083 further complicates and
corrupts the redistribution of spoils.
Allegations of mishandling of private property rights by the government were
frequently articulated by political opposition figures and businessmen. In December 2006, a
group of opposition lawmakers accused the Financial Police and General Prosecutor’s Office
of abusing the property rights of entrepreneurs, “a number of businessmen have had to
‘voluntarily’ hand over their property, mainly office space in downtown Tbilisi, to the state
following pressure from the authorities.”1084 In the same period Jacob Shamatava, an
entrepreneur from Tbilisi, said that prosecutors were intimidating him to hand over to the
state his plot of land in a Tbilisi suburb near the U.S. Embassy, even threatening to arrest
him.1085 The problem is wider: journalistic investigation by Maestro TV documents how
representatives of tax authorities and city administration have been forcing entrepreneurs to
give up real estate in favour of state or state-favoured private businessmen under the threat of
“creating problems for their families” or initiating criminal prosecution related with tax fraud,
drug trade or other crimes.1086 Many sources corroborate these allegations, for example 2006
GRECO report observed that it was unclear to whom this property has been transferred or
sold and whether anyone apart from the state benefited from it.1087
In December 2006, the newspaper Alia published a list of 16 enterprises whose
owners gave up their shares to the state. One of the first “volunteers” was Nugzar
Shevardnadze, a nephew of Shevardnadze who gave to the state a 14-story building located in
Ortachala district. The list also includes machine manufacturing factories such as JSC
1081 Transparency International (2006).
1082 Papava (2007).
1083 Transparency International (2009).
1084 Civil Georgia (December 18, 2006).
1085 Civil Georgia (December 21, 2006).
1086 The recording is available at Maestro TV website at http://maestro.ge/jg.php?lang=geo&&page=2
1087 Council of Europe (2006, p. 9). See also Transparency Internaitonal, Property rights in post-revolutionary
Georgia; GYLA (2007); Corso (2007).
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Elmavalmshenebeli (39 percent of shares “donated” to the state); JSC
Eleqterovagonshemketebeli (42 percent) and other plants in tea production, machine
building, oil refineries, and sanatoria. The nine shareholders of the company Zhiner leasing
the hydroelectric plant in Zhinvali were forced to give up their shares, amounting overall to
61 percent of the stock, in January 2005. 1088 Later, Okruashvili said that the transfer of
property was legalized by registering shares in the names of trusted individuals, such as close
friends of top officials (first Dito Kitoshvili, former Chairman National Communications
Regulatory Commission and then Irakli Okruashvili and Davit Kezerashvili, former Defence
Ministers) or they were “bought” by businessmen close to the authorities and then transferred
to the state or the National Movement. For instance Qibar Khalvashi bought an office from a
businessman and then gave the office as a gift to the National Movement.1089 The dummy
names behind the property transfers change according to who is in favour with the ruling
regime and its most loyal allies, according to Okurashvili. For instance, after Irakli
Okruashvili left, the stakes in major TV companies were reshuffled in favour of the
Bezhuashvili family. Georgian Industrial Group (GIG), owned by David Bezhuashvili,
became a major media stakeholder owning Mze, Rustavi 2 and Pirveli Stereo.1090
Alia gives interesting statistics from notaries. The data shows that the number of gift
agreements leading to the transfer of property has almost doubled in Georgia in 2004,
compared to 2003. The following chart shows the trend of property transfers in Tbilisi and
the regions:1091
Chart 11. Property transfers in Tbilisi and regions in 2002-2004 (newspaper Alia)
1088 Alia (2006).
1089 Okruashvili (2008).
1090 Civil Georgia (November 20, 2006).
1091 Alia (2006).
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These practices extended to the extralegal process of demolishing privately owned
houses built before the revolution, with the argument of improving the city’s image.1092
Another wave of property confiscations forced restaurant owners in Tbilisi and a nearby town
to “voluntarily” hand over their property to the state or face criminal charges.1093 The owners
were reminded that they had received their licenses/permissions for business through corrupt
deals with Shevardnadze-era officials and were pressured to hand the property over to the
state, if not they were threatened with criminal proceedings including ones based on drugs
planted on a person by official order.1094
High post-revolution expectations pressured the new government to deliver tangible
results quickly, as manifested in a need for revenues.1095 The shortest way to generate
revenues was collecting them from entrepreneurs. Almost all businessmen the author
interviewed in Georgia report the same practice: they were summoned to the Prosecutor’s
office and pressured to pay for their “past wrongdoings.” The payment could be made in cash
or property. In case of disobedience, businessmen reported the threat of criminal
investigation. Some entrepreneurs mentioned that paid much more than was claimed in
official documents. Allegedly, the money went to various quasi-legal foundations or
Nationalist Party coffers.1096 Similar to the renovation of Konstantinovsky palace in St.
Petersburg in 2003 which was financed through “voluntary” donations by oligarchs,1097 some
of the projects in the new Georgia were “voluntarily” funded by private businessmen, for
instance the modern Signagi city project in Kakheti region.
1092 Papava (2007).
1093 Human Rights Watch (2008).
1094 Transparency International (2007, p. 2).
1095 Christiansen (2006).
1096 Author’s field research in Georgia, June-August 2006. See appendix 2 (pp. 218-219).
1097 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005, p. 147).
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The pressure was not confined to national businesses, but several foreign investors
also reported what they termed state blackmailing of businesses that obstructed the inflow of
investment.1098 It was also reported that the state enforcement institutions were used as tools
to silence owners of companies who were not supporters of the ruling party and to reward
friendly businesses. Hence the anti-corruption policy has been instrumentalized by the ruling
regime to pressure its political opponents and their sources of financial support. The actions
of law enforcement agencies cannot be viewed as nonpartisan, as shown in the crackdown on
Salford capital, the business group owned by Badri Patarkatsishvili, and the Arti group
owned by a close associate of Irakli Okruashvili.1099
After several cases resolved in favor of private companies, the government announced
abolishment of the practice of discussing tax disputes in arbitrage.1100 In general, the new
authorities failed to create a well-functioning court system and numerous sources report that
courts are less independent now than before the revolution. A Transparency International
report shows that while corruption is no longer a problem in the court system after the Rose
Revolution, freedom of judges is questionable. The judges are continuously pressured by the
authorities to rule in their interest. This unlawful intrusion has increased since 2003, the
report says.1101 A report on judicial reform by the American Bar Association also posits that
the major problem in the Georgian judiciary is “improper influence from the executive
branch and the procuracy” that is said to have increased since the Rose Revolution.1102 This
practice is informed by the Soviet legacy when the prosecutor controlled the outcome of
cases when political interests were involved and Communist Party leaders instructed judges
how to decide a case. Nowadays judges are pressured through the use of compromat, the
threat of removal, etc.1103
Some lawyers refer to the Supreme Court as a “department of the General
Prosecutor’s office” pointing out the dependency of court rulings on the Prosecutor.1104
Lawyers also commonly state that “judges have become like notaries: they write what they
are told to.”1105 In late 2005, three judges, described by the Georgian media as “rebel judges,”
resigned with the public statement that “every time the Supreme Court considers cases in
1098 Rezonansi (November 13, 2005).
1099 Kupatadze (2009).
1100 Prime-News (April 21, 2005).
1101 Transparency International (2008).
1102 ABA/CEELI (2005, p. 1).
1103 Ibid., pp. 6, 38-39.
1104 Author’s personal communication with G2, G16, G26, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1105 Ibid.
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which the authorities have an interest, the judges are instructed on how to rule under pressure
from the Prosecutor General.”1106
The result of all these efforts was the establishment of a repressive state structure with
strong extra-legal police powers. This is very close to the definition of a police state, “an
apolitical unit (as a nation) characterized by repressive governmental control of political,
economic and social life, usually by arbitrary exercise of power by the police in place of
regular judicial and administrative organs and legal processes.”1107 In Georgia, all these
elements are present. Along with undermining the independent functioning of the court
system, the police have acquired unlimited power. In fact the post-Rose Revolution “human
resources optimization” in the Ministry of Internal Affairs bypassed the secret police in
favour of eliminating police from administrative branches (ecology police, traffic police,
etc).1108 Moreover the Soviet system of ODR (Acting Reserve Officer)1109 was strengthened
in the post-revolutionary period. ODR officers worked as deputy ministers in roughly two
dozen Ministries, as Shevardnadze’s secret “eyes and ears.” Post-revolution, these officers
have been placed in almost every government structure, and a special division coordinating
their activities was established. This amounts to very close control of public life by the
police. The police became increasingly political, especially after Saakashvili’s power was
challenged in November 2007, and the main function of the police was reported to be
undermining the political opposition. Former officers of the Ministry of State Security were
instructed by high ranking police official to leave their jobs in political opposition.1110 More
examples of the political use of police follow.
2.3.1. “One’s own criminals” v. “Bad criminals”
While the anti-crime campaign targeted most of the professional criminals and corrupt
officials, some companies with vague ownership structures and former criminal owners have
gotten stronger since the revolution. A company founded by two members of the Mkhedrioni
in the early 1990’s, who were the part of elitist Veris Sadzmo “Borotebi” (“Evils”),
Mkhedrioni sub-group1111 has grown into a venture of considerable regional importance,
1106 Civil Georgia (December 8, 2005).
1107 Definition from Webster’s Third International Dictionary, as quoted in Chapman (1968, p. 431).
1108 For more information on police reform see A. Kupatadze et al. (2007).
1109 Ofitser deistvuisheva rezerva in Russian, translated as “acting reserve officer.”
1110 Author’s interview with G32, 23 June 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1111 Vera brotherhood. Vera is a central Tbilisi district mainly populated by urban Tbilisi intelligentsia.
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diversifying away from its original focus on logistics and oil trading and transhipment. The
Group’s interests now extend into Central Asia, the United States and Switzerland.
According to due diligence conducted by the author on behalf of a Western company,
this business group has extensive links with the political elite of Georgia. Their main
associate and protector was an influential Member of Parliament before 2008, when he
became a cabinet minister. This individual’s brother was also a member of the Borotebi
criminal brotherhood and his brother committed at least one murder.1112 This MP has very
close relations with the President’s inner cycle, including Saakashvili himself.
The company operated by these individuals currently conducts legal business, but
empirical evidence shows it operates on the brink of legality. Two major findings are relevant
here: first, the group demonstrates the capacity to use violence or the threat of violence
against adversaries or critics. An influential and well-informed source, familiar with business
in Georgia, said of the company, “one can expect anything from them… they do anything to
achieve their goals.”1113
Second, the company uses corruption and political pressure to attain their goals,
including political pressure to win public tenders. Previously a representative of the company
was “caught” announcing that they had won a government tender before the tender
commission released the results.1114 In another case, the political opposition criticised the
government’s decision to lease an historical building to this company.1115 Despite opposition
in parliament, the company still won the bid.1116 Another case indicates that the company
used its contacts in the government to damage the property of a competitor,1117 pointing to
trends of state capture. Despite these concerns, research shows that this company is intent on
ensuring that their business interests remain legal, and that direct criminal activity in their
operations remains low.
Additionally some research shows that in certain regions local power networks
remained intact despite formal reshuffles of bureaucracies. Mkhedrioni are integral parts of
these local networks, and crucial players in redistribution of assets.1118 In at least one Western
Georgian city the head of the Sakrebulo (local council) is a former Mkhedrioni member, and
now a local National Movement activist.
1112 Some sources have alleged that he was also a member of the same group.
1113 Author’s personal communication with G7, 12 January 2009.
1114 Statement in the newspaper Saqartvelos Respublika ( 2005).
1115 Khvalindeli dge (2005).
111624 saati (2005).
1117 Transparency International (2007, p. 10).
1118 Dadalauri (2006).
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In general, no government policy bars the creation of monopolies by companies with
political links.1119 These links are frequently used against legitimate competition, so the
Georgian state has remained captured, and state institutions used for private purposes. In
November 2006, the Financial Police was manipulated by Samtrest, a Georgian Agriculture
Ministry wine company, against an Italian company: 100 tonnes of Italian wine were
disposed of on allegations it was counterfeit.1120 Later, the allegations were proven
groundless.
In 2006 the Austrian meat producer Schirnhofer had problems with the Georgian
authorities in launching a business, rumoured to be because the Head of one law enforcement
agency, had interests in the meat business.1121 The issue was raised by Wolfgang Schussel,
Austrian Chancellor, during his meeting with Zurab Nogaideli, Georgian Prime Minister. The
issue was resolved in favour of the Austrian company and Saakashvili gave the order to
eradicate “artificial obstacles” for businesses in Georgia, stating that “even the smallest
business should not feel that there are officials – governors, deputy governors, police chiefs
who create obstacles for their business.”1122 After he was removed from government, this
official’s interest in the meat producing company emerged; he is often seen at Mitana’s
premises,1123 and multiple business sources corroborate that he is at least partial owner.1124
2.4. The re-emerging political-criminal nexus?
Mass street protests in late 2007, the first time since the Rose Revolution were
partially motivated by increased perceptions of corruption, wrongdoings and abuse of power
by the government. The legitimacy of the regime was significantly damaged then, and as a
consequence political elites have reportedly re-established links with criminals. The
Saakashvili government has lost much of its initial legitimacy to unpopular reforms, an
adverse socio-economic situation and high unemployment rates. The government moved
more slowly on reform in the social welfare sector than it did in other sectors.1125 According
to a survey conducted by ICCN, 68.5 percent of the respondents said that they participated in
1119 Transparency International (2007, p. 10).
1120 Civil Georgia (November 15, 2006).
1121Author’s interview with a G14, 10 July 2007, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1122 Civil Georgia (May 10, 2006).
1123 Author’s personal communication with the residents of Nakhalovka district, January 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1124 Author’s interview with G14, G15, G18, G27, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1125 Transparency International (December 2006).
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2007 demonstrations due to economic hardship.1126 Regardless of the inspitation for the
protests, the authorities used excessive force against these peaceful November 2007 anti-
government demonstrations, as well as raiding and vandalizing a critical TV company.1127
Consequently, Saakashvili called for snap presidential elections and the authorities made a
number of concessions, for instance ceasing probes into disputed properties.1128
The consequent weakening of the regime allowed the political-criminal nexus to re-
emerge. Since late 2007, the use of criminals by ruling regime for political purposes was
reported by some local observers. Before the parliamentary election of 2008, a number of
criminals were released from prison in exchange for their assistance in the election campaign
of the ruling party. The criminals were reported to act as “enforcers” pressuring the
population to vote for the candidate of the ruling National Movement party.1129 Later, Irakli
Okruashvili, the opposition politician exiled in France, also alleged that the authorities freed
and used criminals during the elections.1130 According to these reports, weakened elites were
obliged to re-establish relationships with criminals, though to a lesser extent compared to the
pre-revolutionary period.
Table 6 summarizes the above discussion and draws some parallels between the
practices of professional criminals and political elites that came to power after the revolution.
In fact much of the illicit practices survived.
Table 6. Parallels between the practices of professional criminals and political elites
Pre-revolutionary practices of professional
criminals
Post-revolutionary practices of
‘revolutionary elites’
Extorting businesses through violence or
intimidation
Levying fees from businesses for past
wrongdoings through pressure (applied
through tax enforcement structures) or
blackmail (threat of criminal prosecution)
Tsilshi chajdoma (acquiring a share) through
violence or intimidation
Property transfers from businessmen to
individuals linked to new elites or to the state
through pressure or blackmail
1126 ICCN (2008).
1127 Human Rights Watch (2008).
1128 Ibid.
1129 Mtivlishvili (2008).
1130 Okruashvili (2008).
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Using state institutions for private purposes
through collusion and corruption
Using state institutions for private purposes
through political pressure (threat of dismissal,
manipulating public finances, etc)
As this section shows, organized crime, or illicit activity practiced by groups,
continues in Georgia, though the perpetrators have changed. This has to do with the general
cultural environment in the country. Indeed, illegality in Georgia developed its own raison
d’être. My own conversations with political elites suggest that in the logic of the rulers, illicit
profiteering is a side effect and should be tolerated in the name of “re-building” or “saving”
Georgia.
This kind of illegality cannot be fought only by massive campaigns against thieves-in-
law. It requires the transformation of political culture and changing the way the people think
about certain issues such as friendship, understood as a link to be potentially exploited for
illicit benefits if the friend succeeds in a professional career; rules understood as a regime
imposed from above with no ultimate purpose other than intimidation, and manhood proven
by a supposed display of courage through rule-breaking. The institutional context of
corruption has been dealt with to some extent, although little has been done to address
cultural facilitators of corruption, arguably the most important component.1131 In this regard
no “revolution” took place. State-building in the post-revolutionary setting was processed in
the same political culture that watered down the overarching efforts to fight criminality and
corruption. As Lawson points out, “a revolution is only successful if the principal institutions
and organizations in a society are systemically transformed.”1132 Certainly this kind of
transformation is a very long term perspective.
A key variable explaining the persistence of corruption is the survival of informal
institutions, or “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”1133 that may also constrain the
enforcement of formal rules.1134 These institutions may include illicit institutions such as
various forms of clientelism and patrimonialism. These informal institutions also may
knowingly or unknowingly serve the purposes of organized crime, for instance by reinforcing
corrupt networks based on blat. Most important here is the capacity of these institutions to
survive regime transition and changes in formal structures. As North puts it, “while formal
1131 Tupman (2005, p. 262).
1132 Lawson (2005, p. 73).
1133 Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 727).
1134 Raiser (1997, p. 18).
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rules can be changed overnight, the informal norms change gradually… revolutionary change
is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and performance will be different than
anticipated.”1135 The persistence of these informal institutions accounts for the survival of
organized crime per se defined as “a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to
profit from illicit activities, that is maintained through the use of force, threats and/or the
corruption of public officials.”1136
Additionally, despite significant efforts to reform the police, it remains a political tool
used by the ruling elite to safeguard itself. To transform policing culture requires the
introduction of European values in policing such as respect for human rights and serving the
larger community instead of the regime. Again this requires political will and is a long-term
perspective. Currently, a European legal-rational bureaucracy is difficult to establish in an
environment which lacks distinction between private and public and where rules are applied
with partiality.
3. Kyrgyzstan’s Drug Trafficking: from Sportsmeny and Ugalovniki1137 to Police and Elites
3.1. Drugs trade in Kyrgyzstan
In Soviet times Kyrgyzstan was known as a krasnaia respublika (red republic)1138
implying low crime rates, rigid control by the Soviet police (militia) and weak influence of
professional criminals, or “thieves-in-law” (vory v zakone).1139 Organized crime was always
under the control of Soviet police, according to a Kyrgyz police official. Officially the
Kyrgyz were not represented in the thieves’ community, but there were ethnic Russian
professional criminals in Kyrgyzstan.1140
Proximity to Afghanistan is a key variable in why organized crime emerged so
powerfully in Kyrgyzstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan’s development
as one of the key transit countries for Afghan heroin to the markets west of Afghanistan has
become a major factor corrupting the Kyrgyz political system. Drug money has derailed law
1135 North (2006, pp. 8-9)
1136 Albanese (2004, p. 19).
1137 Sportsmeny denotes crime groups composed of sportsmen and Ugalovniki refers to mere criminals.
1138 Author’s interview with Melis Turganbaev, Colonel of Police, Head of Organized Crime Unit, Interior
Ministry, June 2007.
1139 There are only two vory in Kyrgyzstan: the Chechen criminal leader Aziz Batukaev (although his title of vor
is contested and arguably he is self-named) and Kamchy Kolbaev (reportedly he was nominated as a “thief-in-
law” in Moscow in 2006, demonstrating the influence of Russian organized crime on Kyrgyzstan).
1140 Parmankulov (2008).
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enforcement efforts, corrupted courts, and influenced local council and parliamentary
elections,1141 hijacking the country’s political institutions. It also created “sources of income”
for the peasants involved in limited local cultivation, and for drug transporters from
Afghanistan to Russia.
Central Asian drug trafficking is more disorganized than organized. Currently, drug
traffickers are becoming more streamlined and specializing only in narcotics. However, these
groups remain largely nationally-based as opposed to transnational.
In Soviet times, about 98 collective farms (kolkhoz) in the Issyk-Kul region of
Kyrgyzstan provided 80 percent of the Soviet Union’s legal supply of opium, and 16 percent
of the world’s legal supply, from roughly 1916 to 1973.1142 Opium poppies were widely
cultivated in the South and the city of Osh was previously known as the “Bogota of the
East.”1143 In order to use drug production to the country’s advantage, the Kyrgyz elite
actually considered legalizing the cultivation of opium poppies in early 1993, but were forced
to retract under international pressure.1144 Now Kyrgyzstan is not considered a major drug
producer. Local production is limited to cannabis, marijuana and opium.
Drugs production involves numbers of impoverished people. For instance, in Osh entire
families go to plantations to pick opium poppies. The parents make hashish and marijuana
and children sell it.1145 Recently, police officials admitted that there are heroin-producing
laboratories in Kyrgyzstan.1146 Already in 1996 there were some streets in Osh where one
could buy opium from every house.1147 Extreme poverty and unemployment explain why
large parts of the population were drawn into the illicit business. Drug prices were nearly
double in Bishkek compared to Osh, making illicit trade very profitable.1148 The price goes
up to 10,000 USD on the Kazakh-Russian border, 25,000 USD when packaged for retail sale
in Moscow, 30,000 USD as a bulk wholesale item in Western Europe or between 130,000
USD and 150,000 USD when sold on the streets of Europe.1149 Significant profits guarantee
that the funds available to corrupt law enforcement officials are unlimited. By comparison,
1141 On drug money involved in elections see for instance Interfax Central Asia News (2004).
1142 Silk Road Studies program (2004).
1143 Redo (2004, p. 98).
1144 Galeotti (1994).
1145 Karakg.net. (2007).
1146 BBC Monitoring Central Asia (2008).
1147 Reuters News (October 2, 1996).
1148 Agence France Presse (March 27, 2005).
1149 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment (2008).
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the average licit monthly wage is 30-40 USD in the capital and in rural areas it is much
lower, with unemployment at 17 percent.1150
Kyrgyzstan became the conduit for illicit drugs1151 due to its geopolitical location,
insecure borders and corruption in law enforcement. Twenty percent of the opium and heroin
produced in Afghanistan is likely to transit through the “Northern route,” or ancient “Silk
road” through the former Soviet Central Asia, with the rest passing through Iran and
Pakistan. According to estimates 60,000 kilograms of heroin are trafficked through
Kyrgyzstan annually;1152 however, seizures are small. In 2005, only 202 kilograms, and in
2006 only 260 kilograms of heroin were seized.1153 That means that only 0.34 percent in 2005
and 0.43 percent in 2006 of the overall heroin traffic was detected. In 2005 Bakiev admitted
that only 2-3 percent from all drug turnover is confiscated, and the “drug mafia” does not
bear big losses.1154 According to a knowledgeable journalist from Osh, “only small portions
of drugs are seized; the big ones pass freely.”1155 The big seizures take place when competing
groups inform law enforcement about their rivals’ shipments.1156
The drugs mainly pass through the Osh region, the so-called “Osh knot,” along the Osh-
Bishkek highway or the Talas region to Kazakhstan and Russia. In Russia the narcotics
business is estimated to be worth 15 billion USD a year and the largest part of it finds its way
to Russia through the Central Asian or “Northern” route.1157 Drug traffickers from
Afghanistan and Pakistan earn 1 billion USD a year selling and moving drugs in
Kyrgyzstan,1158 and volumes had been rising continually.1159
Drugs transiting Kyrgyzstan are mainly distributed in the Russian market, especially to
Siberia and the Ural region1160 although trafficking to China is already a problem and is
expected to grow in the coming years, considering opiate and heroin trafficking has become
more professional and the drug market in China is growing. Small part of the drugs remains
in Kyrgyzstan. According to the National report on drug policy of Kyrgyzstan there are
1150 Ibid.
1151 US Department of State (2006).
1152 Mardi (2004, p. 262).
1153 Agency for Drug Control of the Kyrgyz Republic (2006).
1154 Akipress (June 7, 2005).
1155 Author’s personal communication with K1, Osh, May 30, 2007.
1156 Mardi (2004, p. 262).
1157 Reuters News (February 16, 2006).
1158 Dow Jones International News (October 19, 2000).
1159 Toursunof (2002).
1160 Author’s interview with A. Kniazev, Professor of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, April 2007.
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26,000 drug users in the country;1161 however, unofficial estimates range from 70,000 up to
250,000.
Marat argues that drug smuggling thrived in Kyrgyzstan due to the government’s more
liberal approach to trade generally. For similar reasons, Kyrgyzstan became a regional central
point for the shuttle trade of Chinese goods, both legally and illegally imported.1162 The drug
trafficking routes on the territory of Kyrgyzstan coincide with the trade routes for goods
arriving from China including contraband,1163 but drug trafficking is more organized than the
smuggling of Chinese goods. It is difficult to give exact estimates of what percentage of
smuggling in illegal or legal goods is organized.
Local drug production as well as transit has risen since the breakup of the Soviet Union,
and in 1993 officials noted the first “sharp upsurge in underground plantations of opium
poppies.”1164 The newly independent Kyrgyz state lacked the resources as well as willingness
to fight the expanding drug trade. At the same time, groups involved in the drug trade were
becoming increasingly professional. Already in 1992 they were well-armed1165 while in 1994
the drug traders began “capturing small district towns and regional centres while law
enforcement officials and state employees joined in selling and distributing narcotics.”1166 In
1998 Akaev said that “the drug mafia has even made its way into law enforcement bodies,
and we must fight it decisively.”1167
In 1996 the “drug mafia” had developed transnational linkages, and Kyrgyz officials were
complaining about its growing sophistication and ties with Kazakhs and Russians.1168 The
technical capacity of the groups was also improving, their refined communication methods
making it more difficult for law enforcement to locate them.1169 At the same time “links
between government officials and criminal groups are exposed increasingly often,” according
to Askar Akaev.1170 In 2001 it was reported that every drug trader had his own roof, and that
in the rare instances where drug cases reach court the dealers received absurdly short prison
1161 The Times of Central Asia (March 2009).
1162 Marat (2006b, p. 33).
1163 See for instance Townsend (2006, p. 8).
1164 BBC Monitoring Service (1993).
1165 Doughty (1992).
1166 BBC Monitoring Service (1994).
1167 Akaev quoted in Daily News Bulletin (May 15, 1999).
1168 Reuters News (October 1, 1996).
1169 Collett-White (1998).
1170 Daily News Bulletin (July 30, 1999).
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terms.1171 Already in 2000, Kyrgyzstan was exporting more drugs than either Myanmar or
Thailand.1172
The elites of Kyrgyzstan have always been profiteering from drug smuggling, since other
opportunities were limited, due to a lack of either natural resources or a developed industrial
base. During the 1990s, Akaev’s rule was challenged by Bekmamat Osmanov, head of
Jalalabad region. Osmanov remained an important figure in South, being elected to
Parliament in 1995 and allegedly playing an important role in the regional drug trade.1173 The
elite-drug smuggling nexus was especially problematic in the South, because it was a conduit
for Afghan heroin. The Khorog-Osh highway linking Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan was also a
major supply route for drugs. The political elite and law enforcement officers were involved
in the early and mid-1990s, as well. As Anderson observes, the Osh militia was also involved
in the drug trade, and 1997 witnessed several arrests of regional militia officials on
allegations of complicity.1174 In June 2001, Marat Kurbanov, the head of the personnel
department of the National Security Service, was jailed for 10 years and his property
confiscated, for drug dealing.1175 In 2002, the former deputy head of a district interior
department and his associate and bodyguard, a boxer holding the title of master sportsman,
were arrested for drug dealing.1176 One of the members of an organized drug trafficking
group arrested in September 2004 was a colonel of the regional traffic police in South
Kyrgyzstan.1177
Nowadays, mainly groups comprised of a blend of upperworld and underworld operate in
the drug trade, for instance groups of policemen and criminals. Islamic militants are also
involved in drugs. In the late 1990s, they controlled significant drug flows in Southern
Kyrgyzstan;1178 more recently, Hizb Ut Tahrir has been active in drug trafficking through the
Southern regions of the country.1179
Frequently the lines are totally blurred among groups complicit in the drug trade.
Empirical evidence also suggests that after the assassination of the main drug baron,
Bayaman Erkinbaev, shortly after the Tulip Revolution, representatives from the police and
1171 Kyrgyz-Press International News Agency (2001).
1172Jane’s Intelligence Review (2000).
1173 Anderson (1999, p. 40).
1174 Ibid., pp. 93-4.
1175 Vecherniy Bishkek (June 12, 2001).
1176 Vecherniy Bishkek (July 10, 2002).
1177 KyrgyzInfo News ( September 22, 2004).
1178 Mameyev (1999).
1179 Author’s interview with Sanjarbek Tadjimatov, Senior Lecturer, Osh State University, Analyst of FTI
(Foundation for Tolerance International), May 31, 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
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special services became more involved in the smuggling chains. Interestingly, the drug trade
temporarily stalled in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, when criminal groups were
unsure how to proceed.1180 This hesitation was short lived. Nazaraliev estimated “the drug
barons will immediately buy the new functionaries.”1181 A drug trader in Osh told a journalist
“initially the political changes will hurt my family, but we will find common ground with the
new authorities.”1182 Hence the illicit business was resumed, albeit with the representatives of
the upperworld now playing a more important role.
Corruption and rent-seeking hampers the country's fight against drug smuggling, due to
the low salaries of law enforcement staff and their broad, poorly-defined responsibilities.
Single bribes paid to border guards or customs officers may equal their official monthly
salaries. The law enforcement officials formally responsible for fighting drug smuggling
usually live lavishly. Due to this apparent disparity, there is a good deal of public speculation
about the involvement of government officials in narcotics trafficking. Allegedly at least
three mid-level officers of the Drug Control Agency of Kyrgyzstan are involved in drug
trafficking.1183 In the South the majority of law enforcement personnel are complicit in the
illegal drug trade.1184 According to one observer in Osh “now primarily it’s the police and
local authorities that are engaged in drug trafficking.”1185 In 2004 Bakhtiyar Mambetov,
Kyrgyz coordinator for a UN anti-drug programme and officer from the Kyrgyz State Drug
Control Agency, told the press that “Kyrgyz power-wielding structures are involved in drug
trafficking, particularly in the country's south.”1186
The involvement of law enforcement officials varies from simple bribes to direct
participation. Some observers argue that law enforcement agencies are totally engulfed in the
drug trade. In 2008 Russian drug expert Alexander Knyazev stated that senior officials are
involved in drug smuggling.1187 Evidence suggests that major drug flows are controlled by
police, and rivalry for market shares can lead to inter- and intra-agency struggles. For
instance, in early 2007 several police officers were arrested on charges of drug smuggling in
Osh. It became clear later that the policemen were victims of internal strife over drug trade
1180 Isakov (2005).
1181 Komsomolskaya Pravda (March 31, 2005).
1182 Agence France Presse (March 27, 2005).
1183A statement made by a former officer of the Kyrgyz law enforcement structures, at a roundtable dedicated to
corruption issues, May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1184 Interview with K3, Bishkek, 10 April 2007.
1185 Interview with K12, May 31 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
1186 KyrgzInfo News (April 12, 2004).
1187 Knyazev quoted in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Kyrgyzstane (2008).
182
profits.1188 In August 2008, Police Colonel Anvar Aliyev, the deputy head of Kyrgyzstan's
anti-drug police, was shot dead in the centre of the capital, Bishkek.1189 Later, a Kyrgyz MP
commented that some of Kyrgyzstan’s assassinations concerned the redistribution of illicit
drug market shares between law-enforcement agencies, and that “drug fighters are merging
with drug barons.”1190
Kyrgyzstan’s senior officials are rarely arrested or convicted. One government executive
alleged in 2003 that civil servants commit one in four economic crimes in Kyrgyzstan, yet
not one high-ranking official has been apprehended.1191 In the drug trade and other crimes,
investigations usually do not go beyond the couriers and “foot soldiers.” Several police
officers are worth mentioning, however, because they might have been prosecuted for “their
independent initiative to traffic drugs while not paying the drug barons’ networks”.1192
· In September 2007, one hundred and nine kilograms of opium was found in a car
driven by a high-ranking police officer.1193
· In November 2008, a colonel from the Interior Ministry's internal troops was detained
near a military base in possession of about 8 kg of Afghan heroin.1194
· In December 2007, a senior investigation officer from the Osh anti-narcotic
department was arrested for drug trafficking. The police search uncovered seven kg of
heroin and 25 kg of Afghan opium in his house.1195
· Police officers were implicated in selling of 2 kg of heroin in February 20061196 and in
transporting 18 kg of Afghan opiates from Osh to Bishkek in September 2006.1197
· In September 2005, three officers from the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency (DCA)
funded by the US government were convicted for narco-trafficking operations.
Neither the head of the agency nor the Kyrgyz President, whose direct authority the
1188 Personal communication with K13, 30 May 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
1189 Agence France Presse (August 5, 2008).
1190 AKI Press, Bishkek, online, September 19, 2008.
1191 Dzhanuzakov (2003).
1192 Author’s interview with Sheradil Baktygulov, political scientist, June 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1193 24.kg (September 27, 2007).
1194 RIA Novosti (November 26, 2008).
1195 Vecherniy Bishkek (December 18, 2007).
1196 Akipress (February 6, 2006).
1197 24.kg (September 4, 2006).
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DCA is under, made any comments. The three corrupt DCA officers were fired only
after a protest letter from the US embassy.1198
Former police and security service officers are also involved in the drug trade. Former
policemen know law enforcement tactics and how to evade them. Over their careers, they
also gained experience of the best drug smugging routes and the mechanisms of drugs traffic.
In March 2007 a former officer of the National Security Service directorate in the [southern
Kyrgyz] town of Osh was arrested because after he retired as a lieutenant colonel in 2004, he
had set up a major drug trafficking operation and provided intelligence to dealers.1199
Policemen are involved not only in trafficking but in distribution as well.1200 Re-sale of
seized drugs by policemen is also common. Some drug traders buy drugs from policemen.1201
Hence, the chaotic trading period of the 1990s was by the 2000s replaced by organized
drug smuggling by sophisticated criminal groups with political connections. Before the Tulip
Revolution, drug traffickers had managed to infiltrate the government, and corrupt law
enforcement officials also got their share of the trade. On April 13, 2004, Askar Akaev
charged that “criminals have penetrated the state structures, terrorizing the nation.”1202 Hence
drug trafficking was increasingly perceived as a threat during the 1990s and early 200s. In
2004, Askar Akayev told the Security Council that terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, organized crime and drugs were threatening the nation’s security.1203
Here it is worth concentrating on an important figure in Central Asian drug
trafficking, Bayman Erkinbaev. Erkinbaev was a wrestler1204 and started his criminal career
as a racketeer, and he soon managed to get control over both the drug trade and some legal
businesses. In 2005, the Minister of the Interior estimated that his business assets and
property were worth 20-25 million USD.1205 Erkinbaev controlled several markets/bazaars
including the Karasuu market in Ferghana Valley, one of the largest in Central Asia. Bayman
became a Member of Parliament in 2005, despite nearly 40 criminal cases1206 raised against
him since 1991. None of these cases were concluded. Furthermore, Bayman received the
1198 Author’s communication with K23, 24 March 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1199 Kabar (March 14, 2007).
1200 Slovo Kyrgyzstana (March 13, 2007).
1201 Vecherniy Bishkek (April 6, 2001).
1202 Akaev quoted in Ibraev (2004).
1203 Toktogulov (2004).
1204 On sports-crime nexus see pp. pp. 54-56.
1205 Associated Press (November 29, 2005).
1206 Ferghana ru (2005).
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highest number of votes (95.45 %) in Kyrgyzstan.1207 Certainly, major election fraud would
greatly contribute to this return, although Bayman’s popularity was genuinely high.
In his early career, Bayman extorted from the most profitable cafes and restaurants in
Osh, according to a local resident. Reportedly he was promoted by the political elites in order
to balance the Uzbek criminals in the South, similar to the role of Rysbek Akmatbayev
against the Chechens in the North. According to local observers, Uzbek organized crime has
almost no stake in drug smuggling in Osh, thanks to Bayman’s involvement and his state
support.1208
The main pillars of Bayman’s power were successful sportsmen in Alysh, the national
wrestling. Bayman was the President of the International Federation of Alysh Wrestling,1209
headquartered in Osh. It was estimated that Bayman could gather more than 2000 wrestlers in
case of need and he always had 400 on stand-by.1210 After his assassination, the members of
the club decreased to 500 in Osh and 300 in Bishkek.1211
Erkinbaev played a major role in the public uprising in the South that resulted in the
Tulip Revolution. He provided logistics and financial support for the demonstrations
estimated at several million USD.1212 Reportedly, Bayman was trying to defend and expand
his business in this way.1213 Interestingly, unlike in Bishkek, no looting occurred in Osh after
the revolution, due to Bayman’s control, according to local residents.1214
Bayman’s popularity reached its peak during the March 2005 events, and he became
informal governor of the region before his assassination in September 2005. In this period
slogans like “Bayman is our batir (hero)” and “Bayman is the hero of Kyrgyz nation” were
common in Osh and Batken,1215 his home district. He controlled the personnel policy of
regional and city administrations as well as law enforcement structures after the revolution.
Reportedly Bayman’s main source of income was drug trafficking and he had
extensive linkages with Tajik and Uzbek transnational drug traffickers.1216 It is believed that
Bayman and his associates laundered drug money through the Alysh wrestling federation.
1207 KCHR (2005).
1208 Author’s field research in Osh, May 2007.
1209 After his death, his wife took over the presidentship. For more information on the federation see
http://www.wrestling-belts.org/index2.php
1210 Vestnik evrazii (2005).
1211 Agim (March 7, 2007).
1212 Author’s interview with Sanjarbek Tadjimatov, Senior Lecturer, Osh State University, Analyst of FTI, May
31, 2007.
1213 Graubner (2005, p. 18).
1214 Author’s field research in Osh, May 2007.
1215 Author’s interviews with K1, K12, Osh, May 2007.
1216 Author’s interview with A. Kniazev, Professor of Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, April 2007.
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One laundering method was Bayman’s organization of the 2002 World Alysh Championship
in Osh, for which he brought mainly students from Bishkek who had nothing to do with
wrestling.1217 Drug money was also invested in Bayman’s regional markets, and factories
such as the Liquor Spirits plant in Osh (Likiora Vodochnyi Zavod).1218
Bayman was assassinated in September 2005. The official investigation concluded
that the assassination was ordered by Sabyr Batyrov, Erkinbayev's close friend, in revenge
for failing to fulfill an agreement to supply 20 kg of heroin to a prison for crime boss Bolot
Tynychbekov. Batyrov together with another criminal were found guilty in July 2008.1219
After his death Bayman’s wife Cholpon Sultanbekova and his 4 sisters inherited his
businesses, including shares in several regional markets.1220 According to a journalist in Osh,
after Bayman’s assassination many members of his group were jailed and others found refuge
in neighbouring countries. Others went into the service of Bayman’s wife, who assumed the
presidency of the Alysh Federation.1221 Still other illegal and legal businesses were taken
over by Bayman’s rival Sanjar Kadiraliev, a Member of Parliament.1222 Arabpai Tolonov,
another MP, a key ally of Erkinbaev, emerged as a new mediator between Uzbek and Kyrgyz
crime groups in the South.1223
Kadiraliev, Bayman’s rival, was a racketeer and criminal from the South1224 who was
linked through tribal kinship networks1225 with one of the leading political figures in the
Kyrgyz state.1226 He had a background in boxing and before being elected to the Jogorku
Kenesh, he ran a crime group, “Sanjar and Kanjar,” from the cover of a sports complex called
“Turbaza.”1227 When he was elected, his crime group was removed from the police watch
list.1228 He took over part of the drug business after Bayman Erkinbaev was killed, and was
1217 Author’s interview with K1, Osh, May 30, 2007.
1218 Author’s interview with K11, April 3, 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1219 Akipress (July 16, 2008).
1220 Author’s interviews with K1 and K12, May 2007, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
1221Interview with K1, Osh 30 May 2007. See the website of Alysh Federation. Available
from: http://www.wrestling-belts.org/index2.php. On Cholpon Sultanbekova’s participation in Erkinaev’s
business see Weekly Bulletin of the Foundation for Tolerance International, Issue 40, Review of 3 – 9 May
2006, Published on 10 May 2006; On her participation in an election campaign as a candidate for Parliament see
Weekly Bulletins No.7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 38, 39.
1222 Marat (2009).
1223 Author’s field research in Osh, May 2007.
1224 Interestingly, his brother worked for the State Customs Committee. For more information on this individual
and his crime group, see Weekly Bulletins of Foundation for Tolerance International (2007).
1225 They are from the same village in South Kyrgyzstan.
1226 Interviews with K11, K14, K16 and K23, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. This has been corroborated by a police
officer from organized crime fighting unit of Ministry of Interior on the conditions of anonymity.
1227 FTI Weekly Bulletin, Issue 15, October 12, 2005.
1228 Interview with Mamat Tursugbaev, Deputy head of OC fighting unit, regional administration of Ministry of
Interior, Osh, 11 May, 2007
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assassinated himself in early 2009. This and other plausible allegations suggest the drug trade
involves the highest levels of government in Kyrgyzstan.
3.2. State Capture by political elites: ruling families in Kyrgyzstan
More than decade-long rule of Akaev resulted in rampant corruption in every sector of
the political and economic life of the country, as Akaev’s family played a major role in rent-
seeking and corruption schemes. Many lucrative business activities in Kyrgyzstan had to
have endorsement from Akaev’s son, Aidar, and son-in-law, Adil Toigonbaev.1229 Aslund
indicates that the ruling family held monopolies on medium and large enterprises1230 and
Collins reports that Akaev’s relatives had controlling interests in sugar, cooking oil, bars and
minibuses.1231 Other observers noted that Askar Akaev indirectly controlled the Kumtor gold
mine and Krakeche coal mine as well.1232 The family also controlled many media sources.
For instance, Adil Toigonbaev’s holdings allegedly included the daily Vecherniy Bishkek, the
television station KOORT, the weekly Avtoradio, and the Kyrgyzinfo website.1233 Aidar
owned Bitel, the country's largest mobile phone operator1234 and together with Adil
controlled jet fuel supplies to the American military base in Kyrgyzstan and Manas
international airport.1235 The company received 200 million USD in fuel contracts from the
US government. Aidar also controlled a group of young representatives from the National
Security Service and Ministry of Finance. Additionally, the President’s daughter Bermet and
her husband were both actively involved in “Alga, Kyrgyzstan” one of the most influential
political parties.1236
The ruling family directly owned shares in many enterprises, and sold protection to
others, illegally extorting shares from them. If the businesses refused protection, they would
be threatened with tax inspections and other pseudo-law enforcement measures.1237 Kyrgyz
prosecutors later raised five criminal cases against Aidar Akaev for embezzling USD 4,5
million,1238 though observers allege this was the tip of the iceberg.
1229 Author’s interviews with K11, K12, K14 and K16, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1230 Aslund (2005a).
1231 Collins (2006, p. 234).
1232 Graubner (2005, p. 18).
1233 Ibraev (2004).
1234 Sydykov (2007).
1235 See for instance, International Oil Daily (2005), and Energy Intelligence Group (2003).
1236 Graubner (2005, p. 11).
1237 Aslund (2005a).
1238 Akipress (September 30, 2008).
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Mairam Akaeva, the president’s wife, who informally oversaw staffing in state
organizations, used to distribute government positions in exchange for bribes.1239 Good
connections with her were vital for advancing one’s career.1240 Reportedly foreign companies
planning to do business in Kyrgyzstan, for instance in the gold mining sector, paid Akaeva
for a favourable government decision.1241 The fund “Meerim,” run by Akaev’s wife, was
repeatedly accused of diverting budgetary funds and money laundering.1242 Various state
institutions, like the President’s administration and the Bishkek mayor’s office, continuously
transferred money to “Meerim” and it eventually held 6 buildings in Bishkek alone, and more
property in the regions.1243 Perhaps most sickeningly, the fund was a legal cover for human
trafficking to the United States.1244 In a study conducted by Kyrgyz group Sotsinformburo,
Akaeva was ranked as the most influential figure in Kyrgyzstan by an expert opinion survey
in 2003.1245
As a result of these activities, Akaev’s family amassed vast wealth and property which
Anders Aslund estimates to be at least several hundred million US dollars.1246 Allegedly,
some criminal leaders were also related to and supported by ruling family representatives
who wanted leverage over organized crime. However, over time these criminals wrested free
of their patrons, even contributing to their ouster.1247
Informal channels of illegal payments were institutionalized in Kyrgyzstan. In the
chaos immediately after the Tulip Revolution, these channels were temporarily disrupted and
businessmen were confused as to whom, how much and when they should pay the regular
illegal amounts.1248 Engvall writes there was “no actor in a position to define the rules of the
game.”1249 With Akaev’s family and its operatives removed from informal control of crime
and bribery, the centre of power became vague. Since then, the corruption pyramids have
been restored in Kyrgyzstan and, as some analysts have put it, “one family has been
1239 Author’s interview with Elena Avdeeva, Chief editor, Newspaper Belyi Parakhod, March 28, 2007,
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1240 Graubner (2005, p. 11).
1241 See for instance the account of the former government official Isaev (2006, p. 41).
1242 Marat (2006b, p. 83).
1243 Delo No (May 4, 2005).
1244 RFE/RL (2009).
1245 AKIpress (May 21, 2004).
1246 Aslund (2005a).
1247 Author’s field research in Kyrgyzstan, March-May 2007.
1248 Author’s interview with Nur Amorov, a lecturer in political science, Kyrgyz-Slavic University, April 18,
2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
1249 Engvall (2007, p. 37).
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substituted for another.”1250 Azimbek Beknazarov, the Prosecutor General, acknowledged in
2005 that most of Akaev’s property and companies had been transferred to the new
powerbrokers.1251 Beknazarov was shortly dismissed from his position. Later he argued that
the family members of Bakiev applied pressure to the President and played a key role in his
dismissal.1252 According to unconfirmed but widely corroborated allegations, Maksim
Bakiev, the president’s son dubbed “The Prince”1253 and Janish Bakiev, the president’s
brother, are now the main kryshas of all legal and illegal businesses.
Bakiev gradually consolidated power. He removed his former allies in the
revolution1254 firing among them Azimbek Beknazarov, a fervent fighter against Akaev-era
corruption. Simultaneously Bakiev is demonstrating increasing willingness to halt
constitutional reform and increase his powers.1255 The process of re-asserting Presidential
power limited the influence of organized crime but also has contributed to strengthening of
illicit control of informal elite groupings over the licit and illicit economy.
The process of redistribution itself was violent in Kyrgyzstan, resulting in contract
killings after the Tulip Revolution. The process remained outside the control of legitimate
public institutions. Political elites acting in their own private interest, in addition to criminal
groups all seized assets during property redistribution. Reportedly, political elites used non-
state actors such as criminals, or even used the state, to obtain spoils. The infamous list of
Daniar Usenov is a good example of representatives from the political elite using government
structures to advance their interests. Usenov, as deputy prime minister after the Tulip
Revolution and head of the newly created commission for investigating the assets of the
Akaev family, was allegedly linked to the new president’s son Maksim Bakiev. Some of the
companies that appeared on Usenov’s investigation list were unconnected to Akaev’s family,
although they came under the scrutiny of the incoming elites. One expert alleged that
Usenov’s list was an “organized racket” with businesses paying bribes to be removed from
the list, and the others falling into the hands of the new ruling family.1256
The career success of other members of the Bakiev family also raised eyebrows.
Other Bakiev’s brothers also did well after the Tulip Revolution. Adil Bakiev was appointed
1250 Author’s interviews with K11 and K23, March-May 2007, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. See also Ababakirov
(2007).
1251 Sydykov (2007).
1252 Beknazarov (2009).
1253 RFE/RL (July 10, 2008).
1254 IWPR (January 23, 2006).
1255 IWPR (December 23, 2005).
1256 Kupatadze (2008, p. 289).
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as the ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to China, and also heads the federation of Karate-
Dou.1257 Another brother, Marat, is ambassador to Germany. Kanybek heads a village
administration, while Akhmat is a successful businessman in Jalalabat, the Bakievs’ home
town.1258 And yet another of Bakiev's brothers - Jusupbek Bakiev, was briefly the deputy
director of Kyrgyzstan's Agency for Community Development and Investment before his
death in early 2006.1259 President Bakiev claimed no connection to the career success of his
brothers.1260
State institutions are frequently used in private interests for political infighting. In
September 2006, Omurbek Tekebaev, a political opponent of the government, a former
speaker of parliament, was jailed in Poland when airport border guards discovered heroin in
his luggage; he was soon cleared by a Warsaw court, and an airport official claimed he was
instructed by Janysh Bakiev, a brother of President Kurmanbek Bakiev and deputy head of
the national security services, to plant the drugs.1261 President Bakiev was obliged to dismiss
his brother, and a parliamentary commission established that the incident was organized by
Janysh Bakiev, although the latter appealed the decision and had it reversed.1262 In June 2008
he was re-appointed to a senior position as Chief of the State Guard Service.1263 Many of the
officials in government institutions, especially in the criminal justice system, are related to
and lobbied by various members of the Bakiev family, especially Janysh and Maksim. For
instance, Bolotbek Nogoybayev, former Interior Minister, was Janysh’s protégé.1264 The
subsequent Interior Minister, Moldomusa Kongantiev, worked with Janysh in the Jalalabad
police in the mid-1990s. There is some evidence that Janysh and his associates are involved
in drugs smuggling through the country.1265 Akhmat, another brother of President, is also
believed to control organized crime and drug trafficking in southern Kyrgyzstan.1266
Hence it can be safely argued that the state in Kyrgyzstan has been captured by a
small clique of powerful individuals related through blood kinship.1267 This discussion leads
to the question whether the agents of underworld are penetrating the legal system trying to
1257 Delo No (May 21, 2008).
1258 Sydykov (2007).
1259 Sydykov 2007.
1260 Delo No (May 4, 2005).
1261 The Economist (2006).
1262 AKIpress (September 18, 2007).
1263 AKIpress (June 3, 2008).
1264 24.kg (February 6, 2007).
1265 Marat and Isa (2010).
1266 Marat (2008, p. 234).
1267 See for instance International Crisis Group (2008).
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use it for their own benefit or the agents of upperworld are increasingly engaged in organized
criminal activity pursuing illicit profits. The following section addresses this issue.
4.Criminals hijacking the law enforcement system or law enforcers monopolizing organized
criminal activity?
Collusion between underworld and upperworld began in the earliest Soviet period, but
was under-reported. An extortion racket group was first reported in Odessa as late as
1972.1268 However, the vector of dominance was changing in Ukraine similar to the other two
cases.
All three countries experienced similar trajectory. In the conditions of limited state
capacity, inefficient law enforcement and a corrupt court system, business disputes were
often solved outside of legal institutions in the early 1990s. Businesspeople started to develop
contacts with the criminal world, using their services for collecting debts and enforcing
contracts. Even earlier, in the late 1980s, government officials had resorted to working with
the criminal world. In many instances, major criminal leaders were created and promoted by
the political elites through the security apparatus of the state. A former secret service officer
from South Ukraine indicated that the KGB, renamed SBU (Special Service of Ukraine) after
independence, used criminal groups to rob foreigners in Odessa.1269 Soviet KGB had
infiltrated professional criminal groups by placing KGB recruits in the prison systems and
creating conditions for their advancement among professional criminals. Thus, the KGB
acquired some organizational control over crime.1270
Afterwards, some crime groups got so strong and wealthy that they escaped the
informal control of the authorities. Simultaneously, the secret services of independent
Ukraine were much less powerful than their Soviet predecessors. As a result, dependence
reversed and by the early 1990s former or acting KGB/SBU officers were on the payroll of
organized crime.1271 According to Ukrainian police data, in 1995, crime rates had increased
by 500 percent compared to those of 1973. In early 1990s, organized crime groups directly or
indirectly used law enforcement structures against rival crime groups, by, for instance,
informing law enforcement on the plans and activities of competing groups. When police
1268 Faitelberg and Blank (2003, p. 320).
1269 Author’s interview with Oleksandr Evgolenko, former officer of SBU, December 2007, Odessa, Ukraine.
1270 Albini and Anderson (1998, p. 31).
1271 Author’s interview with Oleksandr Evgolenko, former SBU officer, December 2007, Odessa Ukraine.
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arrested those criminals, they knowingly or unknowingly eliminated the informant group’s
rivals. However, in many instances, crime groups were directly buying police assistance.1272
The situation began to change in 1997-8 as the state cracked down on organized
crime. By this time most of the post-Soviet states have accumulated significant resources to
fight criminality and meet increasing popular demands for public safety and order. Political
elites were monopolizing control over the means of coercion and taking the states out of post-
independence chaos. Certainly this process was manipulated for private ends by some agents
of upperworld.
Crackdowns indirectly led to the legalization of some criminals, because the process
of post-Soviet violent redistribution had nearly been completed, and the criminals that
survived were the strongest in terms of criminal standing and potential for penetrating the
upperworld. They controlled thousands of fighters and had lasting influence. The head of the
SBU claimed in 1996 that criminal structures controlled 60 percent of the overall capital in
the country.1273 In the 1998 elections, many individuals with direct or indirect connections to
criminal activities were elected. Thus, Zhdanov quotes Crimean Interior Ministry data stating
that nine active members of organized criminal groups were deputies on the Kerch city
council.1274 One of the powerful Crimean organized crime groups has even established a
political party, “the Christian-Liberal party of Crimea” uniting wealthy entrepreneurs, former
officials, sportsmen and religious authorities.1275
Police, special services and the prosecutor’s office are also putting forward their
interests in legal and illegal business. In the continuing fight between law enforcement
structures and bandits, law enforcement started to get rid of competing organized crime
groups informally. One Ukrainian law enforcement officer reported that authorities planned
to eliminate an organized crime leader in Eastern Ukraine by staging a prison “escape
attempt.”1276 Special services sometimes provoked conflicts between various crime groups,
fulfilling two major goals: first, weakening these groups, and second creating legal ground to
send them to prison.1277 This is similar to the practices of the Spanish government in the
1810-1820s, when they employed one group of maritime predators to catch others in an
attempt to protect Spain’s extensive coastline from smugglers.1278 This kind of practice leads
1272 Author’s interview with U5, 10 December 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
1273 Beliaev (1996).
1274 Zhdanov (2002).
1275 Kommersant Ukraina (2006); Pervaya Krimskaya (2003).
1276 Officer quoted in Kuzin (2006, p. 69).
1277 Author’s interview with Oleksandr Evgolenko, former officer of SBU, December 2007, Odessa Ukraine.
1278 Gallant (1999, p. 50).
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to the incorporation of organized crime groups into the state elites, and collusion between
upperworld and underworld.
Following organized crime groups’ change of tactics to less violent means, private
security companies proliferated in the late 1990s to serve as covers for “formerly criminal”
gangs. The trend has continued since and currently organized crime is mainly involved in
small-scale racketeering and debt enforcement, as well as raiding under the cover of private
security companies. The traditional protection racket and arms smuggling by organized crime
groups has almost disappeared. Now there is a racket by police and prosecutors who extort
money from wealthy businessmen without political connections.1279 Joint research by
Canadian and Ukrainian researchers shows that money is extorted regularly on the basis of
fabricated criminal cases. Well-organized networks of policemen, prosecutors and judges
make the entrepreneurs pay money under the threat of prosecution, and if they pay the case is
recorded as “solved.” Thus the investigation statistics get better even while rents are
extorted.1280
In 2001, Tulyakov found that most business extortion was conducted by government
regulatory inspectors to supplement their official salaries. He determined that business
victimization had “changed from mass criminal extortion to mass legalized extortion by
government abuse of power.”1281
In 2003, 40 percent of surveyed Ukrainian law enforcement officers indicated
collusion between law enforcement and organized crime. The same figure for Russia was as
high as 64 percent.1282 Police officers explained to a journalist their support for Yushchenko
as an attempt to prevent “things getting worse” under Yanukovich. They said that the police
had become an adjunct to organized crime under Kuchma and expressed their extreme dislike
of someone with criminal convictions taking power.1283
Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition resulted in strong linkages between police generals
and criminals. These criminals frequently relocate together with their protectors. For
instance, if the policemen are promoted to central offices from regional ones, the criminals
move to Kyiv as well.
In Ukraine several high ranking law enforcement officials were accused of alliances
with organized crime groups. For instance, former SBU director Leonid Derkach (1998-
1279 Author’s interview with U6, 25 October, 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine.
1280 Canadian International Development Agency (2004, p. 18).
1281 Juravlyov, Tulyakov (2004, p. 6).
1282 Shandula (2003, p. 269).
1283 Krushelnysky (2006, p. 272).
193
2001) reportedly protected the infamous criminal Semyon Mogilevich. In one newspaper
interview, the former said “there is not a single episode on the territory of Ukraine where this
person (Mogilevich) or his accomplices have violated the law.”1284 In another example,
Andrey Derkach, the son of Leonid Derkach and MP, elected to the Rada on the Socialist
ticket in 2006, reportedly has business links with Aleksandr Angert, alias Angel, an infamous
criminal from Odessa.1285
Another example is Igor Belozub, first deputy Minister of the Interior and head of the
police anti-organized crime department (2006-2008) who formerly led the section fighting
organized crime in Donetsk (2000-2004). Reportedly he headed the investigation into the
assassination of Akhat Bragin,1286 and the case remains unresolved. According to the police
officers Belozub is a long-standing protector of Mishania,1287 a Donetsk criminal discussed
above. Belozub was also linked with the private security agency Axim. Axim is associated
with Vladimer Malishev, Akhmetov’s close associate, a former head of Donetsk police and
now an MP from the Party of Regions.
However, organized crime is normally ignored by law enforcement, while petty
criminality is targeted. Many of the organized crime groups keep low profiles and engage
mainly in predatory crimes. The most important illicit networks have been partially or fully
legalized.
Importantly, on average 51.7 percent of organized crime groups detected in 1994 -
2005 had only 2-3 members, while only 2.8 percent of all detected crime groups comprised
more than 10 members in the same period. Moreover, more than 70 percent of detected crime
groups had existed only over 1 year, and the rest up to 2 years. Hence, it can be safely
concluded that only small and less important groups are investigated, while organized crime
networks stay untouched. Solomon and Foglesong found that the groups reported as
“destroyed” by Ukrainian police could have just taken on new names and partners.1288 This
also means that the most efficient and ruthless groups face less competition.1289 Hence
organized crime becomes more effective overall, aided by state policies.
Organized crime groups have penetrated many important sectors of the economy. The
chart below reflects the main trends.
1284 Derkach (1999).
1285 Author’s field research in Odessa, Ukraine, November 2007.
1286 Ukraynskaya Pravda (September 13, 2006).
1287 Author’s interview with U14, 21 December, 2007, Kyiv, Ukraine. See also Ord.com.ua (2007).
1288 Solomon, Foglesong (2000, p. 5).
1289 Williams and Picarelli (2002, p. 64).
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Chart 12. The dynamics of sectoral engagement of organized crime groups (Ministry of
Interior of Ukraine)1290
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As the diagram shows, most organized crime groups are involved in general criminal
activities (burglaries, robberies), economic crime and financial crime. Only 5 percent of all
organized crime groups are reported to have corrupt links with government officials, as crime
groups’ collusion with the upperworld is rarely detected. This is further confirmed by the
survey of law enforcement officers, who believe 60 to 80 percent of the crime committed in
the financial-credit sector go unregistered.1291 Usually this type of crime is highly
sophisticated and involves corrupt officials. A National Police Academy study concluded that
only 15 percent of perpetrators of financial or credit crime are brought to justice.1292
Corruption in the police and secret services was tolerated for years in the post-Soviet
setting. Law enforcement’s loyalty was bought through rewarding them with the right to seek
bribes. Both Shevardnadze and Akaev chose the Ministry of Internal Affairs as their main
power base, while decreasing the powers of the KGB.1293 Arguably, both distrusted the KGB
as the apparatus formerly used by Moscow to repress the republics. In Ukraine, the SBU
(KGB successor) was thought to be “used by Russia to obstruct, disrupt, and undermine the
development of sustainable capitalism and democracy in Ukraine.”1294 The politics of ruling
by compromat was instituted by Kuchma, who made the SBU his main pillar of support
despite the way this undermined Ukrainian independence. SBU became especially important
under the leadership of Derkach, a personal friend of Kuchma.
1290 Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine (2007).
1291 Organizovanna zlochinosts v Ukraini ta krainakh evropi (2006, p.139).
1292 Ibid., p. 139.
1293 On Georgia see Kupatadze (2007b); on Kyrgyzstan see Collins (2006, p. 161).
1294 Anderson and Albini, (1999, p. 288).
195
Turning from Ukraine to Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze’s distrust of the MGB, the
successor of the KGB, emanated from his Soviet experience as Georgian Minister of the
Interior. A clear-cut, although not public, conflict existed between the two law enforcement
agencies. The conflict reached its peak under Yuryi Andropov as chairman of the KGB and
Nikolay Sholokov, as Chief Policeman of the USSR.1295 Some sources suggest that Sholokov
even attempted to arrest Andropov in 1982. Also in the same period the employees of the
Ministry of the Interior badly beat Andropov’s son in Tiraspol, Moldova. After these
incidents, the KGB initiated a wide scale information campaign against the Soviet
militsia.1296
The conflict continued in post-Soviet times. The functions of fighting various forms
of crime were duplicated in both Ministries, which frequently resulted in “turf wars” for the
control of illicit revenues. Although Shevardnadze catapulted senior policemen into high-
ranking positions at the Ministry of State Security, the process was viewed with suspicion by
the KGB veteran officers who called it the “policization of the KGB.”1297
As a rule, in all three countries under discussion in this study, the political authorities
turned a blind eye to bribery in law enforcement structures in exchange for loyalty. Bribery in
these symbiotic systems engulfed all levels. In Georgia, for instance, police cadets were
obliged to pay bribes for admission to the policy academy as well as for all examinations
during several years of study. Nearly all had paid teachers at least 3,000 USD for entry into
the police academy.1298 This corrupted the whole system. The cadets would look for ways to
get this money back through corruption. This bribery also created loopholes for criminals to
penetrate the law enforcement system. For instance, in 1993, three individuals whose studies
were funded by organized crime groups reportedly entered the police academy of
Kyrgyzstan.1299
Equally importantly, rent-seeking in the highest ranks was customary. Levan
Kenchadze, former head of the traffic police and former head of the anti-terrorist centre of
the Ministry of State Security, was arrested in 2004 on allegations of illicit arms trade with
Chechens and involvement in the abduction of Spanish businessmen. Afterwards, Kenchadze
was working as Deputy Director General of the Tbilisi office of the Gazprom-linked
1295 Reportedly, Shevardnadze was a close associate of Sholokov.
1296 Kuchynskyi (1997, pp. 372-375).
1297 Author’s personal communication with former KGB officers, June 2008, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1298 Jack (2004, p. 20).
1299 Akipress (March 6, 2007).
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company ITERA.1300 Kenchadze was sentenced to eight years in prison for “illegally writing
off and utilizing [service] firearms, which caused the loss of 18,000 lari to the state”1301 and it
was also corroborated that he was at least indirectly linked with the abduction case.1302 A
police search of the Kabadoni printing house, owned by Kenchadze, revealed fake Russian
excise labels, fake police IDs signed by former Georgian interior minister Koba
Narchemashvili, and fake ballots intended for use in the November 2003 elections.1303 This
indicates the vast criminal interests of law enforcement official. The authorities also
confiscated Kenchadze’s shares in a hotel in downtown Tbilisi, his Tbilisi residence, and his
summer house.1304
Hence rent-seeking by high-ranking officers has often developed into direct
involvement with organized crime. Criminals were also used to hide complicity. A criminal
of Ossetian origin operating in drug smuggling within South Ossetia was actually “created”
by top Interior Ministry officials in the mid 1990s. This “created” criminal was a key actor in
drug trafficking through South Ossetia that fed illicit money into networks of high ranking
police officers and government officials in Tbilisi and in Tskhinvali for many years.1305
To summarize, the illegality of the post-Soviet transition also engulfed the law
enforcement system. Police generals became the key actors in organized crime networks,
sometimes directly involved in criminal activities. The political-criminal nexus based on
alliances between criminals and law enforcement officials dominated the domain of
organized crime in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
1300 Prime News (April 29, 2004).
1301 Rustavi-2 (2005).
1302 Prime News (March 5, 2002) and (July 9, 2003).
1303 Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations (2004).
1304 Prime News (November 19, 2004).
1305 Kviris palitra (2004).
197
Conclusions
Organized crime has become a subject of interest within the disciplines of Political
Science and International Relations only recently.1306 From a political science perspective, it
is worthwhile to investigate how organized crime is embedded in a larger political context,
and how politics interconnects with criminality. Similarly, the correlation between a post-
revolutionary society’s political-environmental transformation and accompanying changes in
organized crime merits further attention. I therefore focused on the regime transitions or
“revolutions” in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine and their impact on organized
crime.
As I demonstrated in this dissertation, the three countries experienced different paths
of post-revolutionary development. The effects of the revolutions on organized crime and
corruption were also different. It can be safely argued that the Tulip revolution of Kyrgyzstan
and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution failed to curb crime and corruption, while in Georgia,
regime transition hindered organized crime. However even in Georgia there has been a
reverse of the many advances brought about by the Revolution. Nevertheless structure and
forms of corruption as well as the balance between upperworld and underworld actors has
changed substantially as documented in eighth chapter and appendix two.
Explaining different outcomes of similar events was a key puzzle, whose solution I
sought by engaging my extensive field research in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine. I
conducted roughly one hundred interviews with representatives of government and non-
government structures, including criminals and corrupt officials. Data from primary sources
were cross-checked with secondary research, and the findings were presented in the eight
chapters above. To conclude, I will briefly summarize the main findings and offer an
explanation for diverging patterns in the case studies. Following my final thoughts below on
the interaction between the state and organized crime, the discussion moves to an assessment
of the impact of the revolutions on crime and corruption, including an account of the key
explanatory variables, such as geography, natural resources, industry, and regional wars. All
of these factors shape the nature and form of organized crime differently in the three
countries.
Interaction between the State and Organized Crime
1306 See for instance Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, p. 6).
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Soviet rule and the path of post-Soviet development produced a type of organized
crime that is defined in this dissertation as the nexus between politicians, businessmen and
criminals. As the theoretical discussion in the second chapter demonstrates, competition
between these groups for dominance was a crucial aspect of post-Soviet state formation. The
eighth chapter proposes that control over the state domain shifted between organized
criminals and the political elite. In periods of abrupt change or of more gradual transition, the
dominance of one of these factions may be challenged as a new equilibrium emerges, since
revolutions are windows of opportunity for acquiring power. Depending on the wider socio-
political setting, new alliances and power sharing are able to emerge between organized
criminals and politicians.
In the fourth and eighth chapters, I discuss cooperation or conflict between various
actors in the illicit market or “underworld,” including “thieves-in-law” (vory-v-zakone) and
the “new criminal entrepreneurs.” I concluded these chapters by showing how the
competition became more peaceful over time as a result of the criminals’ legalization
process, which blurred boundaries between the licit and illicit milieux.
As chapter four’s discussion of the Ukrainian economy shows, the chaos and
instability associated with the transition to a market economy bred the political-criminal clans
that hijacked the process of privatisation. Due to the nature of the post-Soviet transition,
criminals won ownership of vast resources and became indispensable instruments of the new
“legitimate” authorities, who needed the criminals’ capital and social support, not to mention
occasional physical force, to entrench their political power. As a result, many members of
organized crime groups infiltrated the elites and legalized themselves politically by winning
elected office. The others were co-opted by the political elites in an attempt to increase their
own power. These processes spread throughout the whole political and economic system,
corrupting it.
Profiteering from illicit activities has been monopolized by the dominant group at the
time, criminals or politicians. The extent of the criminal monopoly depends on the nature of
the illegal activity monopolized, and the amount of government control of the territory in
which it takes place. In regions that are little-controlled due to geographic features
(mountainous, remote) or political reasons (stand-off between regional and central
government) the political-criminal nexus thrives. The most profitable illicit activities also
attract more attention and rivalry between political and criminal groups. Contrary to frequent
assumptions, the most sophisticated networks are involved in smuggling legal (tobacco, oil,
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timber) vice illegal (radioactive materials, arms) goods as demonstrated in the section on the
relevance of the network approach for the study of organized crime in post-Soviet Eurasia.
The nature of the goods involved shows the importance of high-ranking official complicity in
smuggling and trafficking. The more uncertain the market (such as that of radioactive
materials) and the higher the risk in trafficking particular items (such as weaponry) the less
participation by corrupt officials and criminal actors acting at the brink of legal and illegal
markets.
Collaboration between criminals and government officials has also been sustained and
reciprocally beneficial, and shows some trends. In the three countries politicians use
criminals for certain purposes, such as:
- Intimidation of political and commercial rivals (threat of violence, violence,
collecting compromat, blackmail, destruction of property, assassination)
- Ballot rigging (buying votes, intimidating voters, mobilizing their own supporters
behind a particular candidate, provoking conflicts in the camps of rival politicians)
- Money laundering (establishing front companies, laundering illicit incomes earned
through bribery through underground currency exchange centers, or through the
“legal businesses” under their control, such as casinos and restaurants)
- Assistance in forceful takeover of enterprises (raiding)
- Smuggling of licit and illicit goods
In return, criminals receive:
- Information (on rival criminals, on future possible raids by law enforcement)
- Support (lobbying in legislative and executive bodies, financial rewards)
- Protection (immunity from criminal prosecution, avoiding tax enforcement
inspections, protection against rival criminals)
Sometimes the interests of elites and organized crime converge: in times of crisis,
legal authorities may need the assistance of informal or criminal authorities to ensure social
order. Given the societal influence of organized criminals, the elites may use them to control
petty street crime. As discussed in the fourth chapter, organized crime was reportedly used by
authorities to control the prisons, a practice that continues in the post-Soviet period. When
legal authorities are strong, the influence of professional criminals is curbed in the prisons.
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However, when government structures weaken, professional criminals emerge as the main
power wielders and dictate their conditions to the prison authorities. Sometimes criminals and
government authorities share influence.
The conceptualization of the political-criminal nexus as an alliance between the state
and organized crime is sometimes not helpful, because in post-Soviet societies there is not
always a dichotomy between licit and illicit activity. Criminal networks straddle both the
under- and upperworlds, and both licit and illicit structures. As chapter eight demonstrated,
frequently policemen or secret service officers cooperate in or take over organized criminal
activities, such as drugs smuggling or human trafficking. This collusion derails the law
enforcement effort, showing that authorities are not always offering passive consent to crime,
but sometimes actively assisting in and benefiting from it. Hence I prefer the term “sub-state”
to “non-state” when referring to criminal networks in post-Soviet Eurasia, because it more
accurately describes the links between and embeddedness of criminal networks in licit state
structures.
In line with the argument developed by Serio,1307 rather than a triangle to
conceptualize the political-business-criminal nexus, it would be better represented by a line
that captures the frequent blurring of distinctions between the three. Similarly, an idea of
collaboration of distinctive actors is replaced by overarching, intermingling networks of
collusion.
A final point of consideration is that the term organized crime groups may be a type
of defamation used by rival factions of political elites to accuse and weaken each other.
Instead of singling out individuals or groups as criminal or legitimate, it is more helpful to
look at organized criminal activity and see who the perpetrators are. As various parts of this
dissertation show, mere low-level criminals are rarely directing organized criminal activities,
in the same way groups with both upper and underworld presence in business, crime and
politics do.
Explaining the diverging patterns
The first factor accounting for the diverging post-revolutionary patterns of the three
countries is the influence of “the West.” The West has been a factor of allure in the cases of
Georgia and Ukraine, where it was widely understood that the rule of law is a prerequisite for
1307 Serio (2008).
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conforming to Western and European social and legal standards. Becoming part of the
European Union is a clear-cut goal of Georgia and Ukraine, where it was a major “push” and
“pull” factor, while a desire for European acceptance was absent in Kyrgyzstan. Further,
Russia is a significant “pull” factor in Kyrgyzstan as a role model for the large part of
country’s political elites and general public.
Second, Westernisation and democratisation were widely used in the 1990s and 2000s
in Georgia to legitimize both public discourse and some elites, which “westernized”
themselves to a great extent.1308 In Ukraine, Westernisation also occurred, albeit to a lesser
extent due to the country’s huge size and regional differences. Mitchell observes that no
ideology competes with the Western democratic model in Georgia and there is little nostalgia
for the Soviet Union.1309 This is not necessarily the case with Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan, where
in each a significant part of the population aspires to join Russia, especially in the Ukrainian
East and Kyrgyz North.
As various researchers argue the anti-corruption measures in post-Soviet Eurasia was
largely delineated by external pressure from international organisations such as World Bank,
EU, Council of Europe (CoE) and others.1310 CoE is regularly monitoring the anti-corruption
progress in post-Soviet states through GRECO (Group of States against corruption) for
instance. The implementation of the recommendations are frequently portrayed as the issue of
international prestige.1311 Hence the ‘pro-Western’ leaders are largely concerned with their
image as anti-corruption crusaders and actually try to fight corruption on the ground.
The experience of statehood is another important factor. While Georgia and Ukraine
had at different historical points existed as independent entities, Kyrgyzstan had not until
being established as such under the Soviet system. Independence from the Soviet Union was
not desired by the general public nor was the dissident or anti-Soviet movement present. This
syndrome of “unexpected independence” still exists, according to the leading political
scientist in Kyrgyzstan.1312 This exacerbates the lack of trust toward the state, making family
and blood kinship-based networks the major source of legitimacy.
The different patterns of state capture are delineated according to the political
economy of a particular country. Ukraine, an industrially developed state with a large
1308 Broers (2005, 337).
1309 Mitchell (2006, p. 671).
1310 Grodeland (2010, pp. 239-240).
1311 Di Puppo (2010).
1312 Statement by Muratbek Imanaliev, founder of the Institute of Public Policy, at a roundtable at the American
University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, April 4, 2007.
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resource base, produced powerful and super-rich individuals who influence state policies.
Economically weaker Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have been shaped less by oligarchic capital,
with the state instead hijacked by other agents. Professional criminals in Georgia and ruling
families in Kyrgyzstan have had great impact on the state, by neutralizing state power or
directing state resources for the sake of their own interests. In the countries where blood
kinship networks hold power, such as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, rather than the money-based
functional cooperation as in Ukraine, the state is more likely to be captured by family groups,
such as relatives of the incumbent president. Explanations for diverging patterns in state
capture must therefore encompass both political-economic conditions and social-cultural
characteristics.
The historical context of the post-Soviet transition is also important. The ethnic
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s directly contributed to the
strengthening of the underworld through illicit revenue-generating opportunities based on the
war economy. These criminal networks successfully hijacked the weakened central authority
that lost control over more than twenty percent of the country’s territory.
Finally, geography strongly influences the nature of state capture. For instance, the
proximity to Afghanistan made Kyrgyzstan an ideal candidate for capture by organized crime
groups involved in drugs trafficking. In general, states with a role in the production or supply
of illegal commodities or in the storing and laundering of the proceeds of crime are more
likely to be captured by organized crime.1313
Impact of the revolution
As the fifth chapter shows, revolutions provide opportunity for elites or organized
crime groups. Political elites may use this opportunity to suppress organized crime that is
challenging the control of the elites, as in Georgia. Organized crime may benefit from the
uncertainty and chaos to limit the influence of elites and influence the state domain, as in
Kyrgyzstan. The balance between the underworld and upperworld may remain stable in the
case of a division between the political elites and the surviving power of the previous
government, as in the case of Ukraine.
The impact of the revolution can be situated in several variables:
1313 Levi (2007, p. 778).
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- political opposition to incumbent regimes
The greater the divisions between the elites and the political opposition, the more
opportunity exists for organized crime. Likewise, the more limited the financial, technical
and logistical resources of the political opposition, the more chance for organized crime’s
participation. The degree of the political opposition’s alignment with the West1314 directly
and negatively correlates with the extent of their cooperation with organized crime. In the
event of low alignment with the West and/or divisions between the elite and opposition, a
great deal of operating room for organized crime exists during transitional periods, but I
found that this is usually the case only if crime groups already possessed substantial
resources before the revolution. My research indicated that sub-state and crime groups with
resources before the revolution were ready for and interested in involvement in the
revolution, while sub-state groups without pre-existing resources would not have been
powerful enough to intervene.
- the strength of civil society and the role of organized crime groups in the
revolutionary process
The more grassroots the civil society organisations are, the greater their chance for active
participation in the revolution. Likewise, the stronger the role of civil society groups in the
revolutionary process, the less important is the role for organized crime. Finally, the closer
the links between organized crime and political elites, the more active the role of crime
groups in the revolution.
- personal morals of the leaders and their views on cooperation with organized
crime
The more integrated the leaders are in the ancien regime, the greater the likelihood of
their involvement with organized crime. In general, the leaders of this kind of movement
enjoy “clean reputations;” however, given the general political and economic context, the
incentives/temptations to engage in criminality and corruption remain high in the post-
revolutionary setting.
- the presence and nature of the “pact” between outgoing and incoming elites
1314 Exemplified by Western donors and non-governmental organisations.
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A negotiated departure of the outgoing elites limits the ability of incoming elites to “clean
the house.” Therefore, the more revolutionary elites negotiate with the incumbents, the more
powerful organized crime remains in the post-revolutionary setting.
Each of the aforementioned variables’ explanatory power operates in concert with the
others. The following table sums up the argument:
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
The strength of political
opposition to ruling
regimes during the
revolutions
Strong Strong Weak
The role of organized
crime groups in the
revolutions
None Limited Present
The role of civil society
in the revolutions
Significant Significant Limited
The influence of old
guard in the post-
revolutionary setting
Weak Strong Strong
Negotiated Pact Absent Present Present
The intermingling of
politics with business
High High High
Re-distribution of the
spoils
Non-violent Averagely violent Violent
Corruption Petty corruption
has decreased,
Corruption
pyramids have
been disrupted
Corruption
schemes
decentralized
Political and
administrative
corruption has
remained the
same, and even
increased in
some sectors
Strength of organized
crime
Organized crime is
keeping a low
profile and playing
a discreet role
Organized crime
groups are
continuously used
by political elites,
although largely
under control
Organized crime
is getting
stronger,
criminal leaders
have political
ambitions
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Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
Connecting nodes Based mainly on
personal
friendship, family
connections
Based mainly on
regionalism
Based on blood
kinship, family
connections and
friendship
Crime policies Tough anti-crime
measures
Weak anti-crime
measures
Weak anti-crime
measures
Considering the extent of institutional break with the past the Georgian case
resembles more the Portuguese one1315 rather than Polish or Spanish cases where the change
was more gradual and piecemeal.1316 The useful parallel can be drawn with Chile in the case
of Ukraine. In the former, the policy of accommodation between the Concertacion
government and the opposition in 1990 undermined the democratic government’s capacity to
reform.1317
The survival of illicit profiteering
Hence, diverging patterns are explained by a set of variables indicating a relationship
between political transitions or revolutions and criminal activity. One of the most crucial
variables, among others, that helps to explain the absence or limited success of anti-
corruption and anti-crime reforms is the survival of informal institutions, including various
forms of clientelism and patrimonialism.
Illegality has developed its own raison d’être in all three cases. State or sub-state
actors are embedded in this illegality and, depending on who dominates, profit from it. This
is exacerbated by societal acceptance. In Georgia, rule-breaking is frequently encouraged as a
display of “courage” or “manhood.” In Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, corruption is considered part
of the normal daily routine for a government officeholder. Cultural relativism produces
different perceptions of corruption. The practices labeled as corruption from a “Western”
perspective may be seen as a display of respect in Georgian, Kyrgyz and Ukrainian societies.
Hence, there is a significant discrepancy between the social legitimacy of the illicit activity
and its formal illegality.
1315 Maxwell (2009)
1316 Smolar (2009)
1317 Huneeus (2009)
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As demonstrated in the sixth chapter, various forms of clientelism and patrimonialism
survived, such as the nepotism that is still frequently practiced in government appointments.
The survival of these institutions waters down reforms and perpetuates illegality. European
legal-rational bureaucracy is difficult to establish in an environment where the rules are
applied with partiality, where “friendly” companies are awarded with preferential contracts,
and where financiers of political opponents are pressured through various state law
enforcement structures, as shown in the discussion of anti-corruption politics in Georgia.
Closely related to this is the pattern of diluted distinction between the public and the private
realms. Frequently, it is difficult to distinguish where the public office ends and private office
starts. Changes in informal institutions take time, and societal transformation cannot be an
immediate outcome of any type of revolution. This brings us back to the dissertation title:
‘transition’ continues after transition.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Quantitative measurements of changes in organized crime
In this section several quantitative datasets will be used to discuss both changes in
organized crime, and the measurement of organized crime itself. This process is complicated
by differing definitions, uneven standards of police and judicial reporting, and socio-political
factors.1318
Van Dijk constructs a composite organized crime index combining five interrelated
proxy indicators: perceived prevalence of organized crime, especially racketeering; unsolved
homicides; grand corruption; money-laundering; and the extent of the black economy.1319
Unsolved homicides are used to measure the extent of violence and the co-optation of law
enforcement. We can use the Global Competitiveness Reports cited by Van Dijk as the basis
for tracking changes in organized crime.
In this section, I first present general indices for measuring the rule of law and
organized crime; second, I introduce data on private property; third, I discuss changes in
police efficiency and public trust in the police; and fourth, I treat the independence and
incorruptibility of the courts. These four pillars allow inferences on the changes in organized
crime, according to my analysis and based on the research of Varese.1320
Firstly, as Van Dijk argues, there is a strong correlation between high performance on
rule of law scores and low rates of organized crime.1321 Several institutions measure the rule
of law, such as the World Bank. Their indicators measure “the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”1322
1318 See for instance Mesko, Dobovsek and Jesetovic (2009, pp. 58-62).
1319 Van Dijk (2007, p. 42).
1320 Varese (2001, p. 1).
1321 Van Dijk (2007, pp. 46-7).
1322 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007, p. 5).
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Chart 13. Rule of Law Indicator in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan (Wolrd Bank)1323
The rule of law indicator developed by Bertelsmann Stiftung as part of the 2008
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 1324 measures the separation of powers, the independence
of the judiciary, punishment in the case of abuse of office, and protection of civil rights.
Table 7 . BTI Rule of Law Index1325
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
2003 2 3 2
2006 5 7 4
2008 6 6.8 5.3
The table 7 does not depict annual changes well, although it shows general trends.
Both World Bank data and BTI data confirm the hypothesis that the rule of law has
strengthened in Georgia since the revolution, while there is mixed impact in Ukraine and only
slight improvement in Kyrgyzstan.
Now, turning to the organized crime index developed by the World Economic Forum
(WEF) in its annual Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR), 1326 it supports the hypothesis
1323 World Bank, Worldwide governance indicators 1996-2007.
1324BTI index, available online at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/27.0.html?&L=1
1325The scale is from 1 to 10, with a higher number corresponding to a better ranking.
1326 The raw data are from the Expert Opinion Survey conducted annually for the World Economic Forum’s
Global Competitiveness Report. The survey covers the CEOs and senior management of businesses in 130
countries. The response rate ranges from 75 in 2003 to over 100 in 2007, and the survey results are used by
academic institutions and governments worldwide, including USAID and Transparency International. The
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that organized crime decreased in Georgia, increased in Kyrgyzstan and remained stable in
Ukraine.
Chart 14. Organized Crime Index(World Economic Forum)1327
In 2007, Georgia was ranked 52nd in the world for organized crime, but with the third
best results in the former Soviet Union behind Estonia and Latvia. Kyrgyzstan showed rapid
deterioration in 2006 and improvement in 2007.
One of the indicators measured in the Failed State Index by Fund for Peace is the
criminalization and/or delegitimization of the State. The indicator is based on massive and
endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites; resistance of ruling elites to transparency,
accountability and political representation; widespread loss of popular confidence in state
institutions and processes (widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public
demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes); resistance
to military conscription; rise of armed insurgencies; and growth of crime linked to ruling
elites.1328
annual reports prove that the raw data are subject to a thorough quality control process. See in particular the
reports on the methodology of Global Competitiveness Reports 2003-2004, World Economic Forum; Global
Competitiveness Reports 2004-2005, World Economic Forum; Global Competitiveness Reports 2005-2006,
World Economic Forum; Global Competitiveness Reports 2006-2007, World Economic Forum; Global
Competitiveness Reports 2007-2008, World Economic Forum.
1327 Organized crime (eg mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) in your country (1=imposes significant costs on
businesses, 7=does not impose significant costs on businesses).
1328 For more details see the Fund’s website at
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366
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Table 8. Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the State (Fund for Peace).1329
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
2005 N/A 8.9 8.9
2006 7.7 7 8.3
2007 7.9 7.5 8.2
These data correlate well with other quantitative measurements and indicate
improvement in Georgia since 2004; a downward trend in Kyrgyzstan following its
revolution; and a 2006 downturn in Ukraine followed by improvement in 2007.
The second pillar of property rights is measured by data analyzed in the BTI and
GCR. Lack of clear definition of property rights is usually associated with high levels of
organized crime.1330 Ability to enforce property rights is one feature of a strong state.1331
Weakly defined property rights invite organized crime to play a role in securing private
property.
The BTI index tries to establish whether there is an adequate framework to support a
functional private sector and asks two questions: first, do government authorities ensure well-
defined rights of private property, and do they regulate the acquisition of property? Second,
the BTI index determines whether private companies are permitted and if state companies are
privatizing.
Table 9. BTI Private Property Index1332
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
2003 2 3 3
2006 4 6 6
2008 7.5 6 7
The data in the table indicate how much progress the countries made since 2003 in
terms of ensuring adequate regulatory framework. Presently, in all countries property rights
and the regulation of property acquisition are well defined in principle, but there are problems
1329 Measured on a 10 point scale, where the greater the number, the better the performance.
1330 Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003, p. 7).
1331 Volkov (2002, p. 83).
1332The scale is from 1 to 10, with a higher number corresponding to a better ranking.
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with implementation under the rule of law.1333 On paper all looks good; problems abound in
practice. Here, bringing in the data from Global Competitiveness Reports adds more insight:
Chart 15. Property rights indicator (World Economic Forum)1334
The deterioration of the Georgian indicator might be related to the erratic attitude of
the Saakashvili government towards property rights. The poor property index is more an
indicator of “state racketeering” than of rising organized crime. Kyrgyzstan’s 2006 score
shows the near-collapse of governance and state institutions there. Interestingly, Ukraine was
ranked 3rd from the bottom among 130 countries in 2003, and has since manifestly improved.
The third pillar concerns the efficiency of and extent of public trust in the police. As
mentioned, the general trust between citizens and government directly correlates with the
success of organized crime.1335 The greater the trust the less successful organized crime is.
The police service reliability indicator as measured in the Global Competitiveness Report
depicts the trends:1336
Chart 16. Police service reliability indicator (World Economic Forum)
1333 Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 (2008, p. 30).
1334 Property rights, including over financial assets range from 1 (poorly defined and not protected by law) to 7
(clearly defined and protected by law).
1335 Levi (2007, p. 786); Liddick (1999, p. 2).
1336 Police services are ranked in a range from 1 (cannot be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals) to
7 (can be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals).
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The indicator for Georgia has increased from 2.6 points in 2004 (one of the lowest
among over 130 countries) to 4.6 points in 2007, now on par with Slovenia and Turkey and
the second highest indicator behind Estonia among former Soviet countries. By contrast,
Kyrgyzstan in 2006 ranked fourth from the bottom of the table, with Chad and Bolivia.
Simultaneously, Georgian police did well in terms of public trust. The level of trust in
the Georgian police increased to 65 percent in 2005 from 32 percent in 2004, according to a
Caucasus Resource Centre survey. In 2005, 53.9 percent of the respondents thought that the
police were effective in securing personal safety and civic rights, as opposed to a 5.7 percent
level of trust in criminal leaders (in 2004 the figure was slightly greater, 7.3 percent).1337
Strikingly, in 1997, only 1.7 percent of the population expected fair treatment from the police
(!) and only 12.1 percent from the courts.1338 Additionally, while 80 percent of the population
considered in 2000 that the police would ask for a bribe, only 24.6 percent still thought so in
2006.1339
The police ranked fourth in a national survey of confidence in Georgian state
institutions, with a level of 65 percent in 2007. The creation of the patrol police is considered
one of the major achievements of the Saakashvili government. In Kyrgyzstan, law
enforcement structures come 7th in the achievement list with a confidence level of 58
percent.1340 In Ukraine only 11 percent of citizens trusted the police and prosecutors and 17.5
percent trusted the Security Service in the early 2000s.1341 More recently the trust in Yuri
Lutsenko, Minister of the Interior, was relatively high1342 before an incident in Frankfurt
airport in 2009 when Lutsenko made a drunken scene. However, more than 50 percent of the
respondents interviewed by the Razumkov centre had low or no trust in the police (34.4
1337 CRRC (2006).
1338 Poll carried out by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in cooperation with the
Arnold Bergstraesser Institute as quoted in Darchiashvili and Nodia (2003, 22).
1339 Bonvin (2006).
1340 For Kyrgyzstan, see IRI (2007b); for Georgia see IRI (2007a).
1341 Rakhmanin and Mostovaya (2001, p. 370).
1342 Ukrainian National News Agency (2006).
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percent rather mistrust and 22.1 percent fully mistrust police officers).1343 Levels of trust in
the police did not change greatly as a result of the revolution: according to another poll, in
1994, 57 percent mistrusted the police; in 2004, 58 percent; and in 2008, 56 percent.1344
The fourth pillar concerns judicial independence and bribery, measured through the
data of the Global Competitiveness Reports and BTI. The independence of the judiciary is the
single most important predictor of the extent of organized crime.1345 The BTI question asks
whether an independent judiciary exists.
Table 10. BTI judiciary independence index
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
2006 7 6 3
2008 5 7 4
Thus the judiciary is less independent in Georgia and more independent in Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan now, compared to 2006. The data of GCR1346 does not correlate with BTI
findings.
Table 11. Judiciary independence index (World Economic Forum)
Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
2004 2.4 2.2 N/A
2005 2.4 2.3 1.7
2006 2.1 2.5 2.0
2007 2.5 2.5 2.0
It confirms that the courts are more independent in Georgia and Ukraine than in
Kyrgyzstan, although it does not confirm that judiciary independence is decreasing in
1343 Razumkov Center (2009).
1344 White and McAllister (2009, p. 245).
1345 Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003). See also Van Dijk (2006, p. 10).
1346 Respondents were asked whether the judiciary in your country is independent from the political influence of
members of government, citizens, or firms, with 1 indicating “no, heavily influenced,” to 7 “yes, entirely
independent.”
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Georgia or Ukraine. Again in Georgia, it is more probable that the independence of the courts
decreased at the expense of more influence from the executive branch of power and not from
organized crime or other interested groups. The issue has been discussed above in light of
Georgian property rights.
Appendix 2. Georgia’s anti-corruption drive – an old tune
Immediately after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili made it clear that fighting
corruption and crime would be one of his top priorities.1347 The fight against corruption was
carried out fervently, although the process was flawed. Saakashvili’s government fought
corruption as a tool of legitimizing themselves as new authorities, demonstrating the stronger
state’s new capacities, and displaying to international observers the new administration’s
seriousness about rebuilding state institutions. In his annual parliamentary address in 2009
Saakashvili stated:
“We have defeated corruption and neither Bulgaria, Romania – which are now EU
members – or even Germany can say it; we can say it – we have defeated corruption
and we have defeated organized crime.”1348
Many reading this statement would think that the comparison with Germany is
misplaced if not ridiculous. However, many improvements can be observed in terms of
fighting corruption in the post-revolutionary period, and the major reform efforts of the
Saakashvili government laid a good basis for this. The executive branch has been reorganized
and streamlined and has introduced a cabinet style of government. The government has
greatly simplified the regulatory framework for the business sector, implemented major tax
reform, improved management of public finances through adoption of a medium-term
expenditure framework (MTEF) and a single treasury account for the central government,
and strengthened oversight institutions.1349 17 percent of the money turnover in the private
sector came out of the shadows in one year after the revolution.1350 However, the reform
agenda was pursued with little concern for democratic principles such as contestation and
citizen input. The absence of debate and discussion over the reforms engendered lower
awareness among the Georgian public about the reforms’ potential impact. Furthermore, the
1347 Saakashvili (2004).
1348 Saakashvili (2009).
1349 Anderson and Gray (2006, p. 19).
1350 Chamber of Control of Georgia (2006, pp. 24-25).
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Saakashvili government showed a tendency to “raise expectations and oversell its
accomplishments.”1351 As discussed earlier in the thesis, Saakashvili’s government failed to
manage exaggerated expectations.
The new administration’s anti-corruption policy was based on administrative
methods, such as cutting unnecessary bureaucracy, increasing salaries for state employees,
and cancelling unnecessary licenses, procedures and institutions. Immediately after the Rose
Revolution, extensive media coverage of the arrests of corrupt state officials broadcast the
new state policy of “intolerance toward bribery.” One report by Transparency International
complained about the absence of a research-based approach to addressing the root causes of
corruption.1352
Arrests of former Shevardnadze elites included: Akaki Chakhaidze, Head of Georgian
Railways; Merab Zhordania, Chairman of the Georgian Football Federation; Merab
Adeishvili, former Minister of Transport; and David Mirtskhulava, former Minister of Fuel
and Energy. Overall, about 80 officials and entrepreneurs were arrested.1353 In 2004 alone, 50
million USD was confiscated from the corrupt Shevardnadze representatives,1354 and property
worth EUR 40 million was reclaimed.1355
The anti-corruption campaign was an “old tune,” though. In fact, Saakashvili and his
inner cycle have earned dividends from the anti-corruption platform. For instance, Ivane
Merabishvili, close associate of Saakashvili, who emerged as the most powerful member of
government since the revolution as the Interior Minister, was the first to declare to foreign
media on the corruption of the Shevardnadze regime in the late 1990s.1356 Merabishvili
played an important role in the revolution. Although he was not a public figure, he was one of
“the engines and driving forces” in Zurab Zhvania’s words.1357
Saakashvili’s popularity owes much to his anti-bribery drive during Shevardnadze’s
tenure of office.1358 He was seen as an “island of honesty” in the heart of the corrupt system.
The Georgian public remembered very well Shevardnadze’s meeting with the government
when Saakashvili, then Minister of Justice, showed photographs of the impressive mansions
owned by corrupt officials (some of them present) and demanded immediate action against
1351 Mitchell (2007).
1352 Transparency International (2007a).
1353 Stefes (2006, p. 166).
1354 IWPR (August 4, 2004).
1355 Council of Europe (2006, p. 9).
1356See Merabishvili’s quote in Baker (2001)..
1357 Zhvania (2005, p. 35).
1358 Freizer (2004, p. 4).
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them. Certainly this rhetoric did not go unnoticed. His resignation from the Minister’s
position was seen as “a hopeless single-handed effort” of a brave “corruption-crusader”
against the whole machinery of state bribery. He said that his departure had been “caused by
the impossibility of reforming the government from within.” He said “it is impossible to
remain in this government and witness how the leadership is sinking in the morass of
corruption and how the state apparatus is merging with international criminal bodies and how
the country is turning into a criminal enclave.”1359 Here, a striking analogy has to be made to
Shevardnadze himself, who, when Minister of the Interior in the Soviet Socialist Republic of
Georgia, used the pretext of exposing corruption pyramids headed by Mzhavanadze, the first
secretary of Communist party to campaign against the Mzhavanadze regime and family.1360
Shevardnadze tried to uphold his anti-corruption apparatchik image. He replaced over
three hundred high party and state officials, arrested hundreds of underground businessmen
and restricted the free flow of farm produce out of Georgia.1361 One of the first victims of
Shevardnadze’s anti-corruption reforms was Petre Gelbakhiani, corrupt rector of Tbilisi
Medical Institute, who was ripping off bribes from the students to pass entrance
examinations.1362 However, proof has emerged of rampant corruption during Shevardnadze’s
tenure. For instance, corruption in fruit and juice production led to the extreme deterioration
of the quality of its products. In the 1970s, an entire city above the Arctic Circle got food
poisoning from one of these fruit products. The crackdown ordered from Moscow only had
minor implications for the group, which simply moved to wool production.1363 So, contrary to
what was publicly stated, Shevardnadze’s rule led to a steady growth of a clan-based
corruption culture.1364
After Shevardnadze’s promotion to working in the central Communist apparat in
Moscow in 1985, Dzhumber Patiashvili, known for his animosity to Shevardnadze, became
the first secretary of the Georgian Communist party. Patiashvili moved shortly against the
key allies of Shevardnadze on allegations of bribery. The court ruled that Soliko
Khabeishvili, the Communist Party central committee secretary and Shevardnadze ally,
accepted bribes to ignore his subordinates’ professional misconduct, and moreover that
Khabeishvili became their krysha and promoted them in exchange for additional bribes. The
investigation concluded that Khabeishvili collected 412,000 roubles in 24 cases from 10
1359 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union (September 19, 2001).
1360 Voslensky (1984, pp. 194-5).
1361 Suny (1983, p. 381).
1362 Prosecutor’s office of Georgia, briefing on Gelbakhiani’s 1973 court sentence.
1363 Nizharadze (2005, pp. 106-7).
1364 Baev (2003, p. 129).
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individuals.1365 In a press interview, Khabeishvili indicated his arrest was related to a “bigger
game” between Shevardnadze and Patiashvili.1366 As in this case, the punishment of high-
ranking officials for corruption-related issues was more likely to be related to political
infighting, or to serve as a signal that some unspoken rule of rent-seeking had been breached,
such as showing ostentation or excess.1367 These practices continue today.
Clark writes that Shevardnadze’s career advancement flowed from his successes as
an anti-corruption policeman.1368 The Times reported in 1985, “the promotion of Eduard
Shevardnadze gives Mr Mikhail Gorbachov a Politburo ally with a reputation for combating
corruption.”1369
Saakashvili effectively used similar campaign tools to weaken Shevardnadze’s grasp
on power. During Soviet times, Shevardnadze, as the first secretary of the provincial
republic’s Communist party, was hoping for the support of his patrons in Moscow; in post-
Soviet independent Georgia, the opposition leader Saakashvili was hoping for the support of
the masses.1370 On February 14, 2003, in an expanded government meeting chaired by
Shevardnadze himself, Saakashvili declared that “corruption in Georgia could be eradicated
only after President Shevardnadze left his post.”1371
Corruption was largely tolerated during Shevardnadze’s tenure. The political elite
gave the green light to state employees for rent-seeking in exchange for their continued
loyalty to the regime.1372 In 2001, the amount paid in bribes to state officials was estimated
between USD 75 and 105 million,1373 while the state budget revenues the same year were
USD 499 million.1374 The state could not provide a living wage to the vast majority of its
employees and the salaries were delayed for months. Hence, corruption and bribery engulfed
every level of the state apparatus.1375 For instance, Ministry for Fuel and Energy officials
might have embezzled USD 380 million, half of the foreign aid for reconstruction of
Georgia’s energy sector.1376 The Ministers were often engaged in business activities in the
1365 Prosecutor’s office of Georgia, briefing on Khabeishvili’s 1985 court sentence.
1366 Khabeishvili (1992, pp. 217-223).
1367 Feldbrugge (1984, p. 542).
1368 Clark (1993, p. 152).
1369 Times (1985).
1370 This is not to imply that Shevardnadze did not care at all about public opinion, even though he governed in a
totalitarian system. Suny (1983, p. 381) reports that as Minister of Internal Affairs in 1966, he organized an
Institute for the Study of Public Opinion.
1371 Black Sea Press (February 14, 2003).
1372 Nodia (2006, p. 94).
1373 Godson, Kenney, Litvin and Tevzadze (2004, p. 9).
1374 CIA World Fact Book (2002).
1375 Nodia (2002, p. 420).
1376 Stefes (2006, p. 95).
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sphere which they were supposed to regulate1377 resulting in conflicts of interest or at worst,
outright corruption. For instance Fridon Injia, the Minister of Communications in the 1990s,
emerged as a major entrepreneur in the communication sector.
Since natural resources are limited in Georgia, international aid became a major
source of illicit income for corrupt state bureaucrats. Experts estimate that as much as 50-60
percent of international aid money was pocketed by corrupt officials in the 1990s.1378 In
2003, Thomas Adams, deputy coordinator for US assistance, stated that corruption resulted in
the loss of over one-hundred million GEL from the Georgian state budget.1379
All pre-Rose Revolution anti-corruption initiatives were permanently derailed by
corrupt interest groups. For instance, Shevardnadze’s program for fighting the shadow
economy, created in the 1990s, was never executed. As soon as the Ministry of the Economy
began implementation, it was sabotaged by the corrupt business-political nexus.1380
1997 was declared “the year of the crusade against corruption” by Shevardnadze.1381
Again in 2000 he said “we are preparing for a serious fight against corruption...my hand will
not shake.”1382 No real progress was seen over the years, each one declared a “decisive year”
for the anti-corruption fight. In fact, government efforts were targeting only petty bribery,
leaving corruption pyramids untouched. Nodia thinks that corruption was an important
stabilizing factor, allowing Shevardnadze to balance various interest groups against each
other.1383The capacity of Shevardnadze to balance among different factions and to
accommodate their illicit rent-seeking interests led some academics to argue that the
Georgian state in fact was not weak, but represented a rational construct that served specific
interests.1384 A real fight against corruption would change the status quo power balance.1385 In
2000 a leaked memo from a closed government meeting suggested that Shevardnadze
ordered the Tax Ministry and Interior Ministry to study the oil business interests of his
nephew. But, despite claims from Shevardnadze’s office that participants in illicit business
would be punished, 1386 no real steps were taken.
1377 Christophe (2003, p. 203).
1378 Esadze (2004).
1379 Katz (2006, p. 116).
1380 Kikabidze and Losaberidze (2000, p. 45).
1381 CIPDD (1997).
1382 Shevardnadze (2000).
1383 Christophe (2004).
1384 Ibid.
1385 Nodia (2002, p. 430).
1386 BBC Monitoring Service (July 15, 2000).
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As it became increasingly difficult for Shevardnadze to balance various rent-seeking
interests, in his last years in office he dropped the reformist image,1387 and his primary
objective became retaining power.1388 His inner circle powerbase eroded after the
appointment of a State Minister who was tied with the Soviet nomenklatura, Avtandil
Jorbenadze, in 2001.1389 By April 2003, a meeting of the large businessmen’s interest group,
the Taxpayers' Union, accused authorities of “ignoring the interests of business” and
threatened radical action.1390 Emergence of multiple power centres further weakened
Shevardnadze’s grasp on power, as in the Kyrgyz case.
Saakashvili knew the political and public support-building benefits of anti-corruption
drives. He knew that exposure of the corruption in Shevardnadze’s government would serve
as a pretext to clean up the system and install his own supporters in newly vacant posts. Some
critics allege that anti-corruption measures by the new government were aimed at the political
enemies of Saakashvili,1391 such as Sulkhan Molashvili, a long-standing opponent arrested for
embezzlement. Another case was the focus on Magticom, the cell phone company owned by
Shevardnadze’s son-in-law, Gia Jokhtaberidze. He paid USD 15,5 million in damages after
being arrested on charges of evading payment of 700,000 lari (about 390,000 USD) in
income taxes. After payment was made, Jokhtaberidze was released from pre-trial detention
and the charges against him were dropped.1392 Investigations were carried out unevenly.
Another big cellular phone operator, Geocell, avoided a similar investigation, adding to
suspicions that the anti-corruption drive was political. Okruashvili alleged in 2008 that
Saakashvili owns 40 percent of the shares in Biline, a Geocell subsidiary.1393
Later on, the financial amnesty offered by Saakashvili’s administration with regards to
unpaid taxes excluded Jokhtaberidze and the Omega group. Katz called this politics, not
justice. 1394
Another case of using corruption as a pretext for political prosecution was the arrest of
the editor of the local newspaper in Gori, the People’s Newspaper, for alleged drug
trafficking in early 2005. The arrest was made immediately after his paper stated that the
Shida Kartli administration and local police chiefs continued to participate in illegal trade and
1387 Nodia (2005, p. 101).
1388 Chiaberashvili, Tevzadze, Fluri, Cole (2005, p. 198).
1389Ibid., p. 189.
1390 Eurasia Net (2003).
1391 See for instance Esadze (2004).
1392 Rimple (2006).
1393 Okruashvili (2008).
1394 Katz (2006, p. 318).
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smuggling via South Ossetia. He was released only after major protests from human rights
groups.1395 The family of the detainee argues that the Governor of Shida Kartli, Mikheil
Kareli, as well as the region’s police chiefs were alarmed by publications in the newspaper,
and acted in retaliation.1396
Hence, the use of anti-corruption and anti-crime policies for political purposes in Georgia
continues. And yet, a shift since the Rose Revolution is apparent: before, anti-corruption
policy was mainly used to snatch control over illicit markets and cultivate new bribe
opportunities. In the post-revolutionary period anti-corruption policy targets the remnants of
the ancien regime, while eliminating political threats to regime stability by cracking down on
democratic freedom and the opposition. Unlike Shevardnadze, whose public approval came
from supplying basic law and order, 1397 Saakashvili’s government draws legitimacy from
curtailing the thieves-in-law and decreasing corruption. Susan Rose-Ackerman warns that
holding the prior rulers responsible for past actions should not become the goal in itself, but
rather the creation of a functioning criminal justice system, a task Saakashvili might not be
accomplishing.1398 Aware of the appearance of a one-sided anti-corruption policy, the
authorities tried to send clear signals that corruption would not be tolerated even in their inner
circle. In August 2005, an independent TV journalist was arrested for attempted blackmail of
MP Koba Bekauri, demanding USD 100,000 not to air compromising footage, allegedly
showing Bekauri illegally acquiring shares in the customs terminal Opiza.1399 The journalistic
investigation showed that the Opiza terminal, formerly owned by a Shevardnadze official,
passed into the hands of incoming Rose Revolution elites. The terminal’s incomes increased
speedily at the expense of shrinking revenues for another terminal, Lilo, that was artificially
bankrupted through state financial manipulations by Opiza’s owners.1400 The journalist was
imprisoned on extortion charges and Bekauri voluntarily left parliament under the pressure of
opposition and ruling party representatives. Hence elite corruption remained a problem, as
seen in another example. In May 2004, a Member of Parliament from the National Movement
party, Gia Kenchadze1401 was arrested for extorting money from a Batumi-based
businessman.1402 In October 2006, MP Gia Nutsubidze was arrested for attempting to bribe
1395 Civil Georgia (March 13, 2005).
1396 Civil Georgia (August 5, 2004).
1397 Nodia (2002, p. 428).
1398 Rose-Ackerman (2004, p. 184).
1399 Civil Georgia (August 30, 2005).
1400 Batumelebi (newspaper).
1401 Gia Kenchadze is an engineer-technologist by profession; he kept seat N 57 in the pre-election list as a
member of the National Movement: Democrats.
1402 Prime-News (May 19, 2004).
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Deputy Education Minister Teimuraz Samadashvili. The MP was lobbying for the renewal of
a construction contract the Education Ministry had cancelled when the company failed to
fulfil its obligations.1403
The first major crisis the authorities faced since the Rose Revolution was a direct
consequence of the arrest of Irakli Okruashvili, a close ally of Saakashvili and former
Defence Minister. Okruashvili broke away in November 2006 and made a political comeback
in September 2007, alleging Saakashvili’s involvement in corruption and other illicit
activities, such as ordering the murder of tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili. Earlier, during the
2007 war of compromats between the Saakashvili administration and Patarkatsivhili, Imedi
TV, owned by the latter, released video of a conversation between Uvais Akhmadov,
Chechen criminal, and senior officials of the Ministry of the Interior. The latter was trying to
negotiate the details of Patarkatsishvili’s assassination with the former. Confidential police
sources have confirmed that this kind of negotiation was really underway, demonstrating
ongoing use of transnational political-criminal links for political purposes.
Okruashvili made two other main allegations of the involvement of Saakashvili’s family
in illicit activities. He claimed that as Minister of Interior he (Okruashvili) detained
Saakashvili’s uncle, Temur Alasania, for extortion and taking a 200,000-dollar bribe, but
released him on the president's demand.1404 Additionally, he alleged that another relative,
Nika Alasania, controlled the import of munitions for the armed forces from Israel.1405 Other
similar allegations were made by the Deputy Governor of Mtskheta-Mtianeti region, who
resigned having accused the relatives of the President including Temur Alasania of
constructing two huge residencies in a closed zone, the village of Choporti, and that these
residencies were illegally financed from the state budget.1406 Several credible sources
corroborate that Temur Alasania is involved with other major businesses, such as mining.1407
Okruashvili’s comeback sparked a heavy-handed response from the authorities, who
raided the most critical TV station Imedi and put it off the air;1408 seized the office of
Okruashvili’s newly formed political party and arrested Okruashvili himself. The law
enforcement structures quickly brought criminal charges against some allies of Okruashvili,
such as Dimitry Kitoshvili, former chairman of the National Regulatory Commission for
1403 On this case see Civil Georgia (October 28, 2006); The Georgian Times (June 14, 2007).
1404 Okruashvili (2007).
1405Civil Georgia (September 26, 2007).
1406 Black Sea Press (October 25, 2007).
1407 Author’s interviews with G13, G15, G16, G18, G21, G257 Tbilisi, Georgia.
1408 For a comprehensive account of these developments see Human Rights Watch (2007).
222
Communications.1409 Political opposition leaders alleged that the arrest was politically
motivated and directed against Irakli Okruashvili although later on Kitoshvili confirmed the
accusations were true.1410 The prosecution of Okruashvili displays a striking resemblance to
the case of Ismail Isakov, former Minister of Defence in Kyrgyzstan. After Isakov changed
his stance and joined Bakiev’s political opposition, he was charged with corruption and abuse
of public office.1411
In the same period Mikheil Kareli, a close associate of Okruashvili and former governor
of Shida Kartli region, was arrested and charged with bribery and illegal business practices.
In October 2007, he was released on GEL 200,000 bail (over 122,000 USD) after pleading
guilty.1412 These associates of Okruashvili were indeed involved in illicit activities and
bribery, but releasing the evidence only after Okruashvili’s change of political stance implies
using an anti-corruption pretext for political purposes. These moves were aimed at “silencing
dissent” and warning high-ranking officials that their corrupt behaviours would be exposed if
they dared to join the opposition.1413
The arrest of Okruashvili sparked a wave of anti-government protests that culminated in
the November 7 dispersal of public demonstrations by the authorities. Okruashvili recanted
his charges, confessed, and was released after posting 6 million USD bail. However, after
escaping to France he reiterated that everything he said about Saakashvili was true and he
was obliged to deny these facts and make a confession under pressure. In short, Okruashvili
was the first major insider source that defected from the authorities and his accounts of
hidden government practices contributed to the partial verification of numerous other
sources’ allegations.
Another question mark was the presence of private funds set up by several state agencies,
including the main funding-destination ministries of Defence and the Interior1414 These funds
were obtained through confiscation of the property of corrupt officials or plea bargaining
deals. The allegations were that the official accounts of money received that were released to
the press differed from the real, unofficial accounts. For instance, one respondent claimed
that Akaki Chkhaidze paid 70 million USD instead of the 3 million reported to the press.
Reportedly the money went to Saakashvili’s Nationalist Party coffers and private funds.1415
1409 RFE/RL (September 25, 2007).
1410 Kavkas-Press (2007).
1411 See for instance Delo No (2009a).
1412 Prime News (July 31, 2008).
1413 Papava (2007).
1414 Rimple (2006).
1415 Author’s personal communication with G1, G2, G12, G13, G16, G26, Tbilisi, Georgia.
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This practice was encouraged since in the administration’s view, it was mobilizing additional
sources of income and returning stolen money and property back to the state. Yet the funds
were not subject to public scrutiny.1416 The financial monitoring program conducted by the
Georgian Young Lawyers Association of the foundations of regional governors demonstrates
that both the incomes and spending of these foundations are arbitrary and obscured from
public view, and often controlled by government pressure. The report also demonstrates that
public purchase contracts are made in a force majeure manner through directly contracting
companies, in gross violation of the law on public tenders. The regional administrations state
that this practice has been used under direct orders of the president for the sake of rapid
development.1417 Transparency International in 2006 found that 30 percent of all
procurements conducted by the ministries were the sole source variety.1418 A confidential
source informed me that a close university friend of one of the ministers has, under this force
majeure absence of public scrutiny, won a food supply contract and profited from it
enormously.1419
The high prevalence of corruption in the procurement sector was confirmed by the
Okruashvili case. As Minister of Defence, he arranged with businessman Kibar Khalvashi,
the former owner of Rustavi-2 Television and his close friend, to form a construction
company, International Building Company, that later received three defence ministry
contracts worth some 140 million lari (roughly 84,400,000 USD).1420 The charges date back
to 2005 when then-Defence Minister Okruashvili founded a construction company that had
146 million lari (about 90 million USD) worth of contracts with the Defence Ministry.
Later Okruashvili said in his interview with Kavkasia TV that roughly USD 80
million was accumulated in the fund for development of law enforcement structures. This
money was mainly spent on repairing buildings and purchasing cars for officials of the
Ministry of the Interior and Prosecutor’s office.1421 Therefore, efforts to retrieve looted funds
were not combined with sustained reform efforts, the practice against which Rose Ackerman
warns.1422 Hence the new rulers have risked laying a basis for new corrupt structures. The
1416 Papava (2007).
1417 See for instance GYLA (2006); Dolidze (2007).
1418 Transparency International, (2007b).
1419 Author’s personal communication with G2, Tbilisi, Georgia.
1420 Owen and Corso (2008).
1421 Okruashvili (2008).
1422 Rose-Ackerman (2004, p. 185).
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practice continued until spring 2005 when the extra budgetary accounts were closed under
pressure from the IMF.1423
A SDC (Swiss Development Agency) survey found that the most corruption-affected
sectors were customs, healthcare, procurement and privatisation.1424 Corruption is more likely
to be a problem on the central level since the local decision-making bodies have limited
rights and resources.1425 In August 2008, several officials of the Ministry of Economic
Development, including Deputy Minister of Economic Development Beka Okrostsvaridze,
and high privatization officials, were detained on charges of bribe-taking in exchange for
rights to a land plot on the Rustavi-Tbilisi highway.1426 The individuals offering the bribe
were also arrested.1427
The 2008 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State acknowledges that in
Georgia, petty corruption decreased while “high-level corruption remained a persistent
concern” with an anti-corruption policy based on “prosecution as opposed to
prevention…and ad hoc rather than systemic.”1428 The Global Integrity Report puts Georgia
on the watch list of countries with large corruption problems.
Appendix 3. Interview questionnaire
Background
How clear are the boundaries between the public and private sectors? Do leaders see state
institutions mainly as a means of rent-seeking and personal corruption?
Post and pre-revolutionary political and economic elites
Who were the members of old elites who were arrested? How far did the arrests go (low, mid
or senior level)? Were the arrests selective: i.e. corrupt members of previous regimes who
declared loyalty to the new governments stayed away from the prosecution?
1423 Papava (2007).
1424 SDC (2005, p. 4).
1425 Transparency International (2009).
1426 Black Sea Press (August 2, 2008).
1427 Interfax Information Services (2008).
1428 US State Dept. Bureau of Democracy (2009).
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How deep was the reshuffle of the elites? Did the previous elites manage to maintain power?
What are the cases of continued influence of past figures? What are the reasons for their
continued influence?
Who are the new elites? Are there any individuals with a criminal background? What level of
bureaucracy are they in (low, mid or senior)? What are their links with the individuals with a
questionable past, or with organized crime groups?
What are the reasons for cooperation, if any, between “revolutionary forces” and organized
criminal groups? Is there any evidence of the new political elites’ being financed by criminal
money?
Kryshas: what was the effect of the removal of old kryshas from certain criminal activities?
For instance, what was the effect on human trafficking in Kyrgyzstan when its krysha,
Akaev’s wife, was removed? Who are the new kryshas? Why do the kryshas act as
protectors: because of family connections, friendship, tribal relations, or purely due to
material interest, such as bribes?
Re-privatization/re-distribution of spoils
What are the methods of illegal property re-distribution, for instance informal pressure,
threats, use of violence?
Are there any cases of re-privatization according to legal processes (nationalization and then
re-announcements of tenders) when the questionable practices have been applied again? For
instance, via pressure from political elites on tender commissions, lobbying by businessmen
with links to new elites?
Reforms
What are the reforms implemented in the criminal justice system after the “revolutions,” in
particular in the:
a) Prosecutor’s Office
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b) Ministry of the Interior
c) Secret Services
d) Courts
Were the reforms comprehensive and sustainable? Were cost-benefit analyses done? Were
concrete action plans drafted? How much money was allocated to the reform budgets?
What were the side effects of reforms? For instance, over-concentration of power in
particular structures? What was the result of the reforms – centralization or decentralization
of power?
Regarding legal reforms, have there been any new anti-corruption or anti-crime laws passed
in the post-revolutionary period? What are the side effects of new laws? For instance, are
there any increased correlations between higher taxes and smuggling/the shadow economy?
Are the new staff policies comprehensive? Are there any indications of nepotism and
favoring of one’s allies in the “revolutions,” including criminals? How many people were
fired as a result of re-structurization and reorganization of law enforcement bodies? Where
are they now? Did they join criminal networks?
Informal politics
How are informal rules practiced? Do they provide mechanisms for enforcement and dispute
settlement?
Are the relevant political decisions made by parliament and government? Does one need
personal protection, if one wants to influence a political decision or reach an administrative
position?
Where is the centre of power?
Does one need to consider other rules and “laws” that are not indicated by the official law?
Are these rules in contradiction to the official law?
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How prevalent are favors and special considerations for constituents? How widely are
patronage jobs and contacts distributed? Who is appointed?
Are there particular sectors that exhibit high degrees of clientelistic practices? Which ones?
Who are the patrons? Intermediaries? How personalized are patronage relationships? Are
there direct links to national leaders, or are relationships mediated by political parties, by
ethnic or religious groups, or by lower-level administrative officials?
The structure/composition of organized crime groups
What are the layers of society that criminal activity draws on?
a) political elites
b) economic elites, private entrepreneurs
c) law enforcement structures
d) sportsmen
e) impoverished parts of the population
How do the criminal networks function? Do they have any constant centre of power? Do they
have strict hierarchical structures or they are fluid? Are the connections changing?
How do criminal networks recruit their members from the political and business realms? Is it
a case of criminals co-opting politicians through bribery and/or the threat or use of violence,
or is it a matter of politicians and businessmen forming alliances with criminal groups?
How, if at all, do the borders of organized crime networks coincide with those of:
a) Kyrgyzstan: firstly, tribes, clans, mahallas; and secondly, the North and South
regional division
b) Georgia: Families and sub-ethnic identities (Imeretian, Mingrelian, Svanetian)
c) Ukraine: old school ties, ethnic (Russian, Ukrainian) or sub-ethnic (Crimean)
identities, families; West and East regional division
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How important are friendships, “old school” ties (from previous workplaces) and other
connections (anything other than blood-based kinship) for the membership of criminal
networks?
Do the criminal networks play a quasi-governmental role? For instance, do criminal networks
help financially impoverished populations, create jobs in illegal industries or perform similar
functions?
Which are the nodes and connections most critical to the functioning of the criminal
network? Do the criminal networks continue functioning if certain rings are removed, for
instance, if a politician’s protection stops or a major criminal leader is arrested? Have you
seen a criminal network that stopped functioning? As a result of what
event/activity/circumstance?
How do criminal networks legitimize themselves? What are the mechanisms of laundering
dirty money, is it real estate, construction, casinos? What are the legal businesses in which
illegal networks are involved? Do they completely retire from their criminal business or use
the legal front companies for illegal activities?
Are the criminal networks “pragmatic coalitions of convenience, which may break apart
under pressure or simply as conditions change?”
What are the illegal businesses in which legal companies are involved? For instance, do
tourist companies cover human trafficking?
Do criminal groups seek monopoly over the markets, or just a share?
Tell me about private security companies, including staff, methods of operation, connections,
involvement in crime, the origins of their capital.
Post-revolution, how did criminal networks change their structure? How did they adapt to
new circumstances?
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The infrastructure for criminal activity
What are the main groups involved in smuggling? Did they change structure, operating
modes, or connections after the revolutions?
What are the main routes of smuggling? Have any routes been closed after the revolutions?
Did any new routes appear? For instance, is the drug route along the Khorog-Osh highway
linking Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan still operational?
Is there any system of interaction between criminal groups and law enforcement structures?
What are the most frequently practiced bribery schemes? Who participates?
How are the incomes from smuggling distributed between governments, businessmen and
criminal groups? Is there a pyramid of income and control?
Can the networks engaged in smuggling of legal goods (such as fuel) get involved in the
smuggling of illegal goods (such as drugs)?
Why is controlling smuggling difficult?
Appendix 4. Maps
1. Georgia
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2. Ukraine
3. Transdniester
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4. Kyrgyzstan
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